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Nuclear power both oers great promise and poses tremendous threat to the
American economy. On the one hand, it provides the greatest source of energy
without carbon dioxide emissions, and it provides a domestic energy supply that
does not add signicantly to trade decits. On the other hand, at every moment a
disaster on the scale of the Chernobyl accident is unlikely but remains possible at
over 100 U.S. reactors. No other private industry imposes such extreme risks on
so many, and few industries oer such benets relative to existing alternatives.
Few industries have been the focus of more research than the nuclear power
industry. Among the narrow eld of nuclear industry economics, a vast array
of publications span topics from the speed of technology adoption to costs of
regulation to the nature and magnitude of lingering eects of the Three Mile
Island accident. Given the size of the literature, what is left to study?
Despite the wide array of ne papers published by leading economists, im-
portant questions remain unanswered, and on many topics consensus remains
elusive. For several decades, no new construction was begun, and it seemed that
rising costs would force closure of existing plants. Protability seems now to be
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improving, and the ever increasing American demand for energy forces us again
to consider whether increasing our capacity of nuclear power generation might
be the optimal course. Even some environmentalists recently have called for in-
creasing reliance on nuclear power in order to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
For these reasons, we must take another look at the questions and problems
unique to this industry.
Of particular importance are the means by which we handle the risks of nu-
clear accidents. For nearly fty years, the federal government has oered liability
protections to the industry, so that they bear only partial liability for osite dam-
ages in the event of a serious accident. Many are concerned about the eects
of such protections, fearing that operators have too little incentive to operate
safely and that the public has no guarantee of compensation. Unfortunately, few
academic papers have been published on the topic to dene or measure the ben-
ets to operators of these protections or to determine their eects on operator
behavior.
Problems for nuclear power began while the industry was young. First, plants
proved more costly to construct than was expected. Next, they proved more
expensive to operate than was expected. Finally, the regulatory burden and
public opposition proved greater than anticipated. These matters have been
studied at great length, and many factors are known to contribute to each. Far
less work has been done to determine the eects on the industry of weakening
demand, and it seems that while many agree that high costs and burdensome
regulations largely caused the industry's troubles, there is little consensus on the
relative importance of each factor and how they might be related.
We nd it essential to begin by constructing a model of the nuclear power
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industry in order to determine the relationships among costs, demand, and reg-
ulation, and to determine the nature and magnitude of eects of liability pro-
tections.
We begin by building a unifying model of the nuclear power industry. Given
the breadth and depth of the literature, the work summarized within reveals
but a glimpse at the potential of such eorts. Still, constructing an adequate
conceptual framework requires thinking about nuclear industry economics in un-
conventional fashions, so that establishment of stylized facts leading to unifying
economic model in itself illuminates truths before unseen. Even small models,
we will see, help to answer challenging questions. And so as we begin, we keep
our goal in mind. We will not exhaust the possibilities in this present study.
Rather, our present goal is to begin by oering a small but powerful model of
the industry that reveals crucial economic and regulatory relationships and sheds
light on the little understood topic of liability limits. If we succeed, then much
work will remain to be done, supported and prompted by these beginnings.
Three frameworks are established and employed. Each has much potential
in present form and much is revealed as we begin to exploit that potential.
The greater promise, however, may be realized by extending further the work
begun. Present work may be summarized as 1) compilation and unication of
operating and accounting data sets for individual plants and sites, 2) construction
of an industry model with nuclear power plant operators, industry regulators,
and consumers, and 3) construction of a detailed model of nuclear power plant
operators.
The rst framework is the assemblage of data. Our key contribution is the
construction of a matched data set that combines dissimilar but mutually de-
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pendant bodies of information. On the one hand, we have detailed information
on the activities and conditions of individual reactor units. On the other hand,
we have slightly more aggregated nancial data on each site, which may include
several reactor units, and we have regional data on electricity prices. Others
have exploited the data separately, but we extend the sets and we go further.
By pooling available data and matching reactor, site, and regional information,
we produce a very rich data set with great potential.
The second framework is an extensible model that provides foundations to
support broad coverage of nuclear power economics. The present model exhibits
primary agents important to the industry, including regulators, power plant oper-
ators, insurance companies, and consumers. The model possesses key attributes
of the industry seldom found in combination elsewhere. Also, the scope of the
model encompasses more than is typical in models of nuclear power economics.
Model solutions and applications yield two important contributions. First, the
model reveals relationships between costs, demand, and regulation that existing
literature fails to make clear, and it shows the impacts of these factors on the
well-being of rms and consumers. Second, the model yields denitions of the
implicit subsidies provided to rms through liability protections. These deni-
tions are derived from models of regulated rms, and they extend understanding
of the scope of the matter. Our work demonstrates the importance of considering
the entire scope of regulatory impacts on rms when attempting to determine
eects of liability limits on safety and when attempting to quantify the benets
to the industry of liability limits. These contributions are important, though
even greater promise of the model may be seen by considering a few of the pos-
sible extensions fully supported by this work. For example, political activists
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clamoring both for expanding and banishing nuclear power surely aect regu-
lators, so that levels of regulation and the severity of its enforcement depend
on the public's opinions and level of concern. As a second example, the model
easily could be extended to feature explicitly a broad set of electricity generating
technologies, each with its own advantages and shortcomings, in order to gain
perspective on nuclear power's inherent risks relative to fossil fuel technology's
degradation of the environment. In this way, we can consider the benets of
continued operations of nuclear plants versus reduction of nuclear output. Our
construction of a basic economic model with the key economic players together
with key industry features make such extensions and applications feasible and
relatively simple.
The third framework develops models at the microeconomic level. We oer
a model of the rm, where in this case the rms are nuclear power plants. To
support the modeling eorts, we also construct a software package to aid in the
construction of similar models. Our model includes several features often over-
looked in other empirical and theoretical work. These include incorporation into
the model electricity prices and their eects on revenue and prots. The eects
on prots aect the behavior of operators that our model is designed to repre-
sent. Our model also incorporates measures of risk and the liability associated
with the possibility of catastrophic accidents. We attempt to determine whether
liability protections induce detectable changes on operator behavior.
Even cursory analysis of the data we compile reveals dramatic changes in the
industry over the past thirty years. We see that the 1980s proved very costly and
unprotable for the nuclear industry. Using our matched set, this is revealed both
in the cost data and in the activities of individual plants. In following decades,
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however, our extensions show that productivity improved dramatically. At the
same time, cost growth stabilized and prots per unit of output improved to
the point that operations currently seem to generate healthy prots. Our panel
data allow us to learn about the variation of costs and productivity across plants
that the aggregate gures typically reported by the industry fail to reveal. The
improved economic picture may be seen too by glancing at recent media reports
on the energy industry. For the rst time in decades, new nuclear power plant
construction is being proposed and permits are being acquired. It is striking both
that plant operators believe themselves capable of building and operating plants
protably and that regulators believe it politically feasible to grant building
permits and even to negotiate potential tax incentives.
The regional price data indicate that after nearly two decades of falling rel-
ative prices, electricity prices may be rising again. National energy eciency
continues to improve, and so electricity demand growth remains far lower than
rates seen forty years ago. Still, the growing American population and economy
demands ever more power to facilitate expansion. These demand side trends, to-
gether with supply side improvements observed in the cost and operating data,
indicate that the industry is healthy and may continue to thrive for years to
come.
On the other hand, disaster is possible. Costs of disastrous nuclear accidents
clearly are borne not solely by plant owners but also by the public. For this
reason, government authorities ostensibly representing public interests regulate
the industry and balance the conicting desires for economic gain and safety.
Yet regulation of an industry so technically complex, while dealing both with
powerful industry lobbies and consumer and environmental political activism,
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yields a terribly thorny problem. We begin to deal with the problem by building
a big-picture model. That is, we assemble a structure with the major players and
a vague representation of critical industry details. On this foundation, we add,
piece by piece, additional details to make the model ever truer to reality. Even
in these early stages and with the relatively simple forms presented here, we
extend existing literature on the nature, magnitude, and eects of the liability
limits often assumed essential to corporate survival yet still poorly understood.
While it is essential to make sense of the overall economic world of nuclear
power, we have particular interest in the operation of nuclear power plants. We
thus take a close look at their operation. Nuclear power plants were designed
and are permitted to operate for a limited number of years. Operators have a
clear interest in considering potential prots in all remaining years rather than
to focus solely on the current period. We thus employ a forward-looking model
in an attempt to capture the information set available to decision makers and
then to model the decision-makers as they employ this information. Given the
nature of forward-looking models and the limitations of current analytical and
econometric tools and technology, it is dicult to employ all available data in the
operators' information sets; of course, available data is but a small part of the
complete information set possessed by operators. It thus is a struggle to select
a sucient set of data for the model that will produce satisfactory results. We
believe that earlier eorts to model power plant operators left out key data and
that their results suered accordingly. An important contribution of this work is
the inclusion of electricity price information. Electricity price trends have varied
over the past several decades. Failure to account for these changes may have led
earlier scholars to attribute to other causes the eects on prots of changing price
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structures. In particular, economic eects of weakening demand may have been
mistaken for impacts of heightened regulation. Our model also includes potential
losses resulting from catastrophic nuclear accidents. The models can be employed
in several important applications, including 1) optimal lifespan predictions given
various assumptions about electricity price growth, 2) structural stability tests to
analyze the eects of changing regulations while accounting for structural price
shifts occurring at the same time, and 3) analysis of the eects of modications
to policies that limit liability.
And so, we have assembled data and models and employed them to learn
much about the nuclear power industry, yet they oer far more potential than
developed here. Some possible extensions are suggested throughout the following
chapters. Hopefully, the reader will nd the work suciently promising that
additional possibilities continually will become obvious.
We thus begin. We start with the history of the American nuclear power
industry, and based on this picture we build a static model of the industry
and its regulation. The static model proves sucient to reproduce a number
of major historical events. We then extend the static model to a multiperiod
framework in order to determine the optimal evolution of operators' decisions
and regulatory policies. Finally, we extend the dynamic model to a numerical
framework in order to incorporate additional important features of the industry.
A key application of our model is a close look at liability protections oered to
the industry and their eects on rm and regulatory policies. These protections
are considered throughout the rst section.
The second section begins with the development of regional price data, monthly
operations data for each commercial nuclear reactor, and annual cost data for
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each nuclear site. We employ the price and available output data to construct
estimates of revenue earned through the generation of electricity. Perhaps be-
cause estimation and even denition of such revenue is dicult, such estimates
are not available in other scholarly work, and because they are not forced to
do so, plant owners do not release revenue information. While it is dicult to
establish the accuracy of our estimates, the patterns revealed over the past three
decades correspond nicely to well-known historical facts and thus inspire con-
dence in our results. Other data work summarizes changes in operating policies,
which yielded much improved productivity and reliability, and development and
descriptions of cost data that also show dramatic improvements in performance.
Very likely, regulatory reforms contributed to these improvements. By devel-
oping dynamic programming models of nuclear power plant operators, we gain
improved understanding of truths hidden in the data. We summarize estimation
results of the model, and conclude with applications of the model.
The text concludes with a summary our work and a description of intended




Economics and Regulation of U.S.
Nuclear Power
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Should operators of nuclear power plants continue to run their plants given
the current economic circumstances and regulatory policies? Should regulators
adopt a conciliatory stance to feed the economic desires of producers and con-
sumers, or should they enforce hard-line standards to lessen the risks of nuclear
accidents? What are the eects of liability limits on the decisions of plant oper-
ators, and what is the economic benet to plant owners?
The four chapters comprising this section summarize the history of nuclear
power economics in the United States, and they describe and apply a series of
economic models in search of answers to these questions.
Chapter 2 begins with a review of the history of nuclear power industry
operations, regulation of the industry, and the evolving economics of nuclear
power. We go on to develop models of the economics and regulation of the
nuclear power industry, similar to the models developed by Steven Shavell of
the Harvard Law School. While the models are intended to capture matters
of political economy and ultimately should prove capable of portraying such
details, we begin by studying models that focus on regulation and economics,
and we then extend the model to illustrate eects of changing political climates.
Nevertheless, we continue to label them as political economy models to remind us
of intended directions of development. Politics certainly play important roles in
the industry, and so it remains desirable to portray such features along with other
key aspects. An important contribution is oered when we apply the model in the
analysis of liability protections to the industry. We employ our model to derive
a broad view of potential benets that nest earlier eorts. Deriving benets to
the industry from a model of rms and regulators reveals that earlier concepts
of implicit subsidies was too narrow. We show the importance of considering
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additional factors that heavily may aect the level of safety and economic benets
to operators.
We nd the relative simplicity of a static model adequately powerful to de-
velop a model core that is sucient to support many extensions, including dy-
namics. First, though, we take a closer look in Chapter 3 at protections oered
to the nuclear power industry in the form of liability limits. These protections
originally were passed as the Price-Anderson Act of 1957. Many assume that
survival of the nuclear industry depends on these provisions. It remains unclear,
however, whether this is true or even what is the magnitude of economic benets
aorded to the companies. We examine earlier attempts to quantify the amounts.
However, in addition to taking too narrow a view of potential benets, we show
that published calculations are awed and their models improbable. We oer
corrected calculations and improved models. These imply that the magnitude
of implicit subsidies may be far lower than reported earlier.
We next return to our model in Chapter 4 and extend it to a multiperiod
framework. The dynamics are simple, but they are sucient to capture the im-
portance of forward-looking behavior both by plant operators and by regulators.
The pattern of private investment in maintenance and safety is of particular in-
terest, and we are able to derive investment rules that vary over the life of the
plant. We also derive optimal regulatory policies that take these tendencies into
account. We apply the model to extend our understanding of the eects of the
Price-Anderson liability limits in a multiperiod framework. The result yields a
means of calculating the value to the industry of maintaining liability protection
policies.
In Chapter 5, we construct a numerical version of our dynamic model. The
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numerical framework allows us freedom to add features that under the previous
analytical model proved infeasible or at least cumbersome. Many of the features
that will be present in our model of the rm, including stochastic price evolution,
are introduced here to provide a bridge between our theoretical model of the in-
dustry and our empirical model of the rm. Unique contributions of our work
include the specication of insurance premiums paid by operators, taking into
account the behavioral policies of the rms, and the modeling of the shared lia-
bility features specied by American regulatory policies. We employ the model
in two exercises. First, we check the reaction of our model, measured as changes
to prots and optimal behavior, to changes in the evolution in electricity prices
as occurred in the American economy in the 1980s. Second, we check the model's
response to extensions of allowed maximum lifespans, as recently was made pos-
sible by nuclear regulatory authorities. In a chapter appendix, we derive a means
by which we can speed calculation for a class of numerical problems, and we show
how to apply the method to numerical dynamic programming problems like ours.
Chapter 6 concludes the rst section and summarizes our ndings. We now





This study develops models of the political economy of the nuclear power indus-
try, which extend greatly theoretic work developed by Shavell [57] and applies
it to the nuclear power industry. The primary motivations of nuclear power
operators and of nuclear industry regulators are considered. Optimal rules are
computed to govern behavior of each agent. These rules take into account the
eects of the agents' own actions on the behavior of others. It is assumed that
operators' primary motivations are to maximize prots. Operators' choices in-
clude whether to operate and how much to invest in maintenance and safety
enhancements. Regulators seek to ensure adequate electricity supplies while
minimizing costs and expected damage from nuclear accidents. We consider
four cases. First, we consider the case in which regulators are benevolent so-
cial planners who can guide the economy to the rst-best solution. Next, we
consider the cases in which regulators employ either regulatory standards for
safety enhancements or liability levels for damages, but not both. Finally, we
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consider the case in which regulators govern with both instruments. It is this
last case that best describes oversight of the nuclear power industry, while other
cases provide important reference points and limiting cases for consideration of
liability protections.
We review the history of nuclear power industry operations, regulation of the
industry, and the evolving economics of nuclear power. The results of the model
developed here then are compared to the economic history of the industry to
see whether the model qualitatively reproduces observed phenomena. Finally,
the model is employed to construct measures of subsidies created by adoption of
potentially sub-optimal liability levels. These measures are compared to others
in the literature.
The models are based closely on Shavell [57]. In that paper, he derives
optimal regulatory policies when rms face liability. However, there are several
signicant discrepancies between his model and the nuclear power industry. This
work seeks to eliminate some, but not all, such discrepancies. In the process,
we extend his theoretical work signicantly and make it far more useful and
realistic.
First, Shavell assumes that in the event of an accident causing damages to
third parties, the rm escapes liability with a positive probability. Instead, we
assume that operators cannot avoid liability for damages. This assumption,
which admittedly is too strong, is based on terms of the Price-Anderson Act.
This policy species minimal levels of insurance that each nuclear power plant
operator must carry. It also sets terms for industry self-insurance in addition
to the commercial insurance coverage. Operators are exempt from liability for
damages in excess of the amount specied in the policy. We assume that oper-
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ators cannot escape liability for the reason given in the MIT study [6, p. 81]:
"The compensation provision of both the rst and second layers of insurance are
`no fault' and not subject to civil liability litigation."
The second and primary dierence between this model and Shavell's is that
output matters here. In Shavell's model, prots implicitly were assumed always
positive, so that rms never exited the market. Similarly, it implicitly was
assumed that social welfare always was greater with production than without,
so that regulators never forced individual plants or the industry to close. In
this model, rms' output decisions are binary: they produce at full capacity if
expected prots are non-negative, and otherwise the rms close. Hence, output
does not decline continuously with regulation. In the aggregate, however, output
is a decreasing function of regulation. If expected damages are too great, so that
social welfare is believed greater without production, then regulators can force
plants with the greatest risk to close, so long as their policy instruments allow
them suciently precise control. Similarly, if liability or regulation becomes too
great, then rms will decide to exit the market.
Among a variety of applications that we provide, perhaps the most important
is employment of the model to determine the benets to rms, eects on rm
behavior, and the impact on safety of oering the industry limits on liability. In
the past, the benets to rms, or implicit subsidies, typically were dened as
the dierence in insurance premiums between insuring against all possible dam-
ages and insuring against the maximum amount of liability set by regulators. In
addition, it has been assumed that liability limits leave operators with too little
incentive to enhance and maintain safety standards, so that risk to the public is
unnecessarily high. In contrast to earlier approaches, our model shows the im-
16
portance of considering simultaneously the overall eects of regulation, including
both liability protections and other policies. If regulators optimally determine
these policies, then regulations on safety should account for limited liability. Our
results show that the net eect of regulation and liability protections on safety
and prots cannot be determined without additional empirical work, and our
results provide guidance for conducting such research while taking into account
the existing work of others.
2.1.1 Economics of the American Nuclear Power Industry
The economics of operating nuclear power plants proved far less favorable for
operators than was expected. Construction costs proved higher, operating costs
proved greater, and electricity demand growth and price growth fell sharply.
Many papers have been published that analyze the economics of constructing
nuclear power plants (See, for example, Ellis and Zimmerman [18] for the history
of construction, and see the University of Chicago study [8] for a comparison of
many results on the topic.) While there is little consensus in ranking possible
causes, it is clear that it proved more expensive to build plants than was pre-
dicted. Two primary reasons are that 1) expected increasing returns to scale
failed to materialize, so unit costs for constructing large commercial reactors
were not much lower than for small research reactors, and 2) plants took longer
to build than was expected. One reason for long construction times is greater
regulation of the construction process, but there is not a clear consensus on the
importance of this factor. The NRC [30, footnote 57] reports that lengthened
construction times were due, in part, to reluctance of operators to open plants
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for fear that demand was too weak to absorb the additional production.1
Once plants were completed and began operations, they proved more costly
to operate than was expected (EIA [2]). Operating costs grew rapidly through
the 1980s and early 1990s, although expenditure growth has slowed and eciency
has increased (Rust and Rothwell [56]).
Finally, demand side conditions deteriorated as the nuclear power industry
gained momentum (Nelson and Peck [39] and NRC [30]). Average annual elec-
tricity demand growth exceeded seven percent in the decade or more prior to
1973. Growth rates then fell abruptly to less than three percent. (See, for ex-
ample, Price [43, p. 107]. See Haltiwanger, et al [14] for a historical review of
electricity prices.) The NRC reports that the ratio of electricity demand growth
to overall economic growth fell from 1.5 in the 1970s to 1.0 in the 1980s, while
energy spending per dollar of GDP fell at 2% per year. Price [43] reports world-
wide increases in energy eciency following the oil price shocks of the 1970s.
Relative electricity prices continued to grow steadily until the early to mid1980s.
At that point, however, relative prices began a long, slow decline. Rothwell and
Eastman [51] report that from 1979 to 1981, the realized or allowed rate of re-
turn was less than the cost of capital for U.S. electric utilities. The need for ever
more base load capacity became much less pressing in the 1970s, and the shift in
electricity price growth forced increases in eciency for plants to remain viable.
Nelson and Peck show that the reality of weakening demand set in slowly, and
that the industry consistently over-estimated future demand growth from the
mid1970s to the mid1980s. Price also notes that the industry was slow to react
to signs of deteriorating economic conditions.
1See Price [43, p. 9] for a similar argument.
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Many partially constructed plants, and even some completed plants, were
abandoned as it became clear that demand growth was weakening. Similar
phenomena were observed among coal-red plants (Ellis and Zimmerman [18]
and Price [43]). A number of operating plants were decommissioned, and no
new starts were made in the following two decades. In recent years, though,
growing interest in new construction has developed, although signicant excess
baseload capacity remains (Nivola [41]).
When the U.S. government was considering the creation of a private nuclear
power industry, they realized that the enormous risks associated with operating a
nuclear facility meant that liability would need to be limited in order to ensure vi-
ability of the industry. In 1957, the government enacted the Price-Anderson Act
(PAA) which provides liability caps for o site damages. The stated objectives
of this policy were 1) to protect the public by ensuring prompt compensation
after an accident and 2) to foster the development of the nuclear power industry
(Dubin and Rothwell [16]). Such liability caps eliminated the need for plant
operators to protect themselves from possible losses for damages in excess of
the liability limit, thus limiting the need to purchase liability insurance. Many
argue that by enabling operators to avoid these additional insurance premiums
regulators provide an implicit subsidy to the industry. While estimates for the
value of these subsidies are fairly small (Dubin and Rothwell [16], Heyes and
Heyes [28, 29], and Denenberg [15] (note that problems exist in the estimates of
Dubin and Rothwell and Heyes and Heyes)), many still argue that the industry
would not survive without them. Unfortunately, these estimates are dicult to
compute, and little faith should be put in most published estimates (Heyes [26]).
Many consider the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) plant to be
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the primary cause of the deterioration of the nuclear power industry. However,
there are numerous causes, including those listed above. In fact, the backlog of
new orders fell and plants under construction were abandoned even before the
TMI accident (Ellis and Zimmerman [18]). Hence, all of these factors should be
incorporated in any model claiming to portray the economics of the nuclear power
industry. Unfortunately, most models focus only on one, or perhaps a few, such
factors. Given the growing interest in resuming construction of nuclear power
plants (University of Chicago [8] and MIT [6]), it is important that we improve
our understanding of the political economy of nuclear power.
2.1.2 Layout of this paper
Our work develops a model of nuclear power plant operations and industry reg-
ulation. First, the model is described, with timings, objective functions for
operators and regulators, and derivation of optimal decision rules. Next, a series
of propositions are stated and proved, following closely the lead of Shavell [57]
while extending greatly his work. Next, predictions of the model are compared
to observed phenomena in the 1970s and 1980s. The model is used to derive
measures of implicit subsidies created by enforcement of limited liability levels,
and the measures are compared to others in the literature. Finally, limitations
are noted and possible extensions are suggested.
Before beginning, we note that our initial eorts, summarized here, are con-
cerned more with regulation of the nuclear power industry than with political
economics. However, politics are of great importance in the nuclear power in-
dustry and such features readily may be added to extend our work. We will




This model has two primary groups of players, nuclear industry regulators and
power plant operators, who move sequentially in a static game-theoretic frame-
work. Regulators seek to maximize social welfare, and the rms' problem is to
maximize prots while satisfying the demands of regulators. It is assumed that
a continuum of markets exists, with one nuclear facility per market. No attempt
is made to explain the existence of power plants, and for simplicity prices and
demand for electricity are exogenous. Firms are identical, except for the amount
of damage that they cause if an accident occurs. We consider only one period. At
the end of the period, assuming that the rm survives, the rm incurs shutdown
costs and closes permanently.
The level of demand rst is announced. Next, regulators determine the op-
timal level of liability to impose on the nuclear power industry, and the level is
announced. Given this announcement, power plant operators decide an optimal
level of investment in safety-enhancing maintenance and similar expenditures.
If production yields more expected prots than the cost of decommissioning,
then rms invest, produce electricity, collect the revenue, and pay operating and
investment expenses. Accidents then occur with an endogenously determined
probability dependent on the level of investment. These accidents cause dam-
age to third parties, for which regulators may hold plant operators liable. If
expected prots are less than the cost of decommissioning, then operators make
no investments and close their plants immediately.
Exposure to liability with corresponding spending on safety, or spending to
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meet regulatory requirements, reduces prots. We assume that aggregate out-
put may fall with prots, as unprotable rms exit the market, so that greater
safety comes at the expense of output. The model has rms that either produce
or shut down, depending on whether prots are non-negative; non-negativity is
the condition for production, given our assumption for sake of simplicity that
shut-down costs are zero. We assume that regulators care about both output and
safety, and are cognizant of the eects on output of their own actions. Essen-
tially, we assume a continuum of identical markets, where prices and preferences
are exogenous. Hence, regulators consider separately consumers' utility in each
market. In each, either rms produce at full capacity and consumers receive
utility from the product, or rms close and consumers receive a level of utility
from zero consumption.
The denition of regulation is narrow, such that policies specify minimal
standards for investment in safety-enhancing goods and services. We consider
regimes with various combinations of regulation and liability, and we compare
social welfare for each.
We note an important paper by Baron and Myerson [10] in which they con-
sider the optimal regulation of a monopolist with costs that are unknown to the
regulator. Regulators have three instruments: to close the rm or to allow oper-
ations, to set the quantity produced or the market price, and to oer a subsidy
or to impose a tax on the rm. While we do not include some of the details of
the Baron-Myerson model, their paper does contain material of some relevance
for the nuclear power industry. Given our focus on nuclear power plant opera-
tors, however, and given the existence of mixed generating technologies in nearly
every market, it is not clear that their model would be ideal in this case. Regu-
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lated electricity prices must accommodate not only the most ecient generating
technology but a sucient number of plants in each market to satisfy demand,
including plants with higher marginal costs. That is, regulators cannot tailor
market prices to individual plants or technologies. Hence, we consider prices
exogenous and instead focus on other matters. Still, the idea of Baron and My-
erson of tailoring regulatory policies so that rms will reveal private information
is of great importance. In their study, the private information was the structure
of rms' operating costs. In our case, rms have private information about po-
tential damages. Unfortunately, the present model does not yet incorporate the
policy instruments required to entice rms to reveal private information.
2.2.2 Denitions
The continuum of (nearly) identical rms are indexed by the level of potential
damages, h, that they pose to their communities. In fact, h is the only distin-
guishing characteristic of the rms. We assume that h is an exact amount. This
magnitude of potential damage, known only to the rm, is such that h ∈ [a, b]
where 0 < a < b < ∞. Regulators do not know potential damages for indi-
vidual rms, but they do know the distribution of damages across rms f(h),
which is nonzero on and only on [a, b]. We use a proper probability distribution
f(h) only for convenience, in that it integrates to one and we can use familiar
techniques from statistics. More general specications of f(h) could integrate
to any positive value, as it simply species the number (or measure) of rms.
Industry capacity and potential output is Q. We assume that all plants have the
same capacity. We assume that electricity prices, less unit production costs, are
identically equal to one, so that net potential revenue at full capacity also equal
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Q. Firms may invest in goods and services, indexed by x such that 0 ≤ x, to
lessen the probability of an accident. The probability of an accident p(x), given
the level of investment x, is identical for each rm and depends only on invest-
ment. The rst derivative of the probability function is negative and the second
derivative is positive. (See Dubin and Rothwell [17] for a similar specication.)
Regulators seek to maximize social welfare. A component of the social wel-
fare function is U . For industry output q, where q ∈ {0, Q}, U(q) ≡ q + u(q).
Hence utility U is a quasilinear utility function, and is determined by the sum
of industry net revenue and the benet to consumers u(q) of consuming q. The
numeraire in this utility function is industry net revenue. The balance of the
social welfare function is in the same units (dollars) and is composed of invest-
ment and potential damages, as described below. Hence, regulators care about
the utility consumers obtain from consumption, industry prots, and potential
damages.
2.2.3 Industry Regulators
Industry regulators seek to balance the need for adequate electricity supplies and
the need for safety from nuclear accidents. If there is excess demand without
operation of nuclear plants, then neither desire can be satised fully without
sacricing the other. We model these conicting desires with a welfare function
for which regulators seek 1) to maximize output to satisfy consumers' demand
and operators' prot motives and 2) to minimize expected losses from accidents.
We consider various regulatory regimes with various combinations of regu-
lation and liability. We assume that the level of liability is outside the control
of regulators. Regulators thus have at most one instrument for governing the
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industry: they choose a minimum level of investment for operators.
We consider only cases in which operators bear either zero liability or liability
not exceeding the value of the rm. Whether rms face liability is not under
the control of regulators. We do not consider the possibility that regulators will
compensate rms for losses, nor do we consider punitive damages.
Similarly, we do not consider the possibility that regulators or consumers will
compensate rms for higher levels of investment, in the sort of exchange proposed
by Coase. The model could be extended to include such possibilities, but such
exchanges have not been observed and thus such possibilities are ignored.
2.2.4 The Social Planning Problem
The social planners' optimization problem, in which they seek to maximize social





U(Qi)− xi − p (xi)hi
}
(2.1)
for control of plant i with potential losses hi. We assume that social planners
know hi. Social planners thus know more than the simple regulators considered
later, for the regulators know only the distribution f(h). The planner must
decide whether to keep the plant idle or to allow operation. If the plant is closed,
then social welfare in the corresponding market is U(0). If the plant operates
after investing xi, then expected damages are p(xi)hi, and social welfare in the
corresponding market is U(Q)− xi − p(xi)hi.
The optimal level of investment is found by dierentiating the second term




= −1− p′(x)hi = 0 (2.2)
After simplifying, we have a rule for investment as a function of potential dam-
ages2:







where (p′)−1 is the inverse of the derivative of the probability function p. We see
that optimal investment increases with potential damages.
Clearly, social welfare declines with potential damages. Hence, social plan-
ners may nd it optimal to allow plants with little risk to operate (that is, plants
with h close to a), but plants with high risk shut down (that is, plants with h
close to b). We can dene the level of damages h̃SP such that social planners are
indierent between operating and closing the plant:
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We limit the range for h̃SP such that h̃SP ∈ [a, b]. Hence, plants with h < h̃SP
close, and remaining plants operate:
Output=
 0 : h̃
SP < hi
Q : hi ≤ h̃SP
We conrm that social welfare strictly decreases with potential damages,




 0 : q
SP
i = 0
−p(xSP ) < 0 : qSPi > 0





Hence, social welfare strictly decreases in potential damages, regardless of the
probability function p.
Total social welfare, or the sum of welfare across all markets, is found by




























where F (g) =
∫ g
a
f(h)dh for g ∈ [a, b] is the measure of plants that operate.
Aggregate output is ∫ h̃SP
a
Qf(h)dh
=Q× F (h̃SP )
2.2.5 The Case of Liability Only
We next consider a market in which private rms are permitted to operate freely
of regulation, but they do face liability. We assume that the level of liability
y is given, and may be assumed to be the level of assets or the value of the
rm. Alternatively, it may be set to any arbitrary level. In this analysis, we
assume that y ∈ (0, b]. That is, we assume that maximum liability is a positive
number that is no greater than potential damages in the worst case. For reasons
given in the introduction, we assume that rms are held liable for damages with




Power plant operators seek to maximize expected prots. They do so rst by
determining an optimal level of investment in safety improvements and mainte-
nance, given their level of liability and revenue. If expected prots are greater
than decommissioning costs given the optimal investment level, then operators
choose to produce. The level of potential plant-level output, Q, is given by the
level of installed capital. Electricity prices less unit production costs are assumed
positive and are normalized to one, and so for positive production levels, Q both
is the level of output and revenue less operating costs. If the value of the rm
(revenue less operating and investment costs less expected liability claims) are
less than decommissioning costs, the plants close immediately and incur shut-
down costs. In this version of the model, shutdown costs are assumed zero for
simplicity.






Qi − xi − p (xi) min {hi, y}
}
(2.3)
If the rm does not produce, then the rm exits the market with zero prots.
If the plant does produce, then the rm earns net revenue Q, less investment x
and expected liability p(x) min{h, y}. Note that the rm's liability either is the
total amount of damage h or the value of the rm y, which ever is less.
There is no capital investment in this model. Because we assume that demand
equals or exceeds Q, there is no load following. Hence, the rms' output decision
is whether to invest and to produce Q units of electricity or whether to close
permanently. We assume that no output is lost when operators invest. Of course,
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output likely is lost as the result of investment, adding costs in addition to the
direct expenditures. The assumption is made solely to simplify the model.





min {hi, y} = 0 (2.4)
For simplicity, we ignore the constraints that are required to ensure that x ≥ 0,
so that maintenance expenditures are irreversible for all probability functions
p; this assumption is not restrictive so long as p is suciently steep for low










We see that the investment rule is identical to that of the social planner, so long









Hence, we may determine a point h̃L such that rms are indierent between
closing and operating: {






where h̃L ∈ [a, b]. Firms with h ≤ h̃L nd operations protable, and remaining
rms close:
qi =
 Q : hi ≤ h̃
L
0 : h̃L < hi
3Note also that the SOC holds: δΠ
L2
δ2x = −p
′′(x)h < 0 for h < y.
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Social welfare may be found as under social planning, but now taking the rms'











f(h)dh+ [1− F (h̃L)]× U(0)
Aggregate output is ∫ h̃L
a
Qf(h)dh = Q× F (h̃L)
2.2.6 The Case of Regulation Only
We next consider the case in which rms operate without liability, but regulators
impose a minimal standard for investment. Ignoring the possibility of subsidies,
this scenario presents a lower bound for liability limits, measured as the benets
presented to rms by limiting their liability levels. We later will compare these
results to those for the case of both regulation and liability, which provides the
other relevant extreme when considering the eects of liability limits.
Operators
The prot function is specied as:







Given zero liability and zero damages to to value of the rm, and because this
model has only one period, rms clearly nd it optimal to invest as little as
possible. Hence, each sets investment to the regulated level s:
xR(hi) = s
For s ≤ Q, rms nd it protable to operate, but not otherwise. Hence, the
output rule is:
qi =
 0 : Q < sQ : s ≤ Q
Either all rms operate, or all rms close.
Regulators
Regulators take into account the eects of their policies on the decisions made
by plant operators. Hence, in eect they choose whether output will be zero or














{U(Q)− s− p (s)E(h)}
}
We see that the regulator must set a single minimal standard for investment
expenditures for all rms. The regulator cannot impose regulations tailored to
individual rms because we assume that h is known only by the rms themselves.
In the second line of the optimization problem, we see that the regulators' prob-
lem is identical to the social planners' problem for the average rm, with one
exception. The exception is that the regulation s must be no greater than Q so
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that operations for the average rm are protable. If both regulators and social
planners nd it optimal for the average rm to operate, but regulators nd the
constraint binding, then it may be optimal for them to set higher standards but
also to subsidize production, so that rms remain protable. However, we do
not consider this form of subsidies in this chapter.
The optimal level of regulation may be found by dierentiating the social





E (h) ≤ 0 (2.7)








We see that either regulation is set to the optimal level of investment for the
average rm under social planning, or investment exhausts prots. Again, in-
vestment is equal to the socially optimal level for the average rm or is equal to
Q, whichever is less.
We can calculate the level of social welfare under optimal regulation:
ζR = max
{






Note again that either the industry is closed or all rms operate under regulation.
Hence, output either is 0 or Q.
2.2.7 Liability and Regulation
The nal regulatory regime that we consider includes both regulation and liabil-
ity.






Operators again seek to maximize prots, given their levels of liability. Their
choice concerning investment now is constrained by the lower bound set by reg-
ulators. Firms either nd regulation binding, and thus invest at level s, or they
do not nd the policy binding and so invest as if there were no regulation. In
the latter case, the rm invests according to the rule derived in Section 4.2.5.
Hence, the rm rst determines their optimal investment according to the rule
in Section 4.2.5. If this level is greater than the mandated level, then the rm
sets its investment level accordingly. Otherwise, the rm sets its investment level
to the regulatory standard. Next, the rm determines whether, given its invest-
ment level, operations are expected protable. If so, the rm invests, produces,
collects revenue, and pays any damage claims up to their level of liability. If
rms determine that operations are not expected to be protable, then the rm
exits with zero prots.
We specify the prot function:















and corresponding investment rule.




As we found earlier, we may nd a point h̃LR(s) for which rms with this
level of potential damages are indierent between operating and closing. Now,
















although we constrain values of h̃LR(s) to the interval [a, b]. To solve the regu-
lators' optimization problem, we must determine how h̃LR(s) changes with the
level of regulation s. To determine this, we use the implicit function theorem.
First, dene










min {h, y} = Q
as the function which determines the combination of regulatory policies s and











+ p(xL) : h < y, s < xL






: y ≤ h, s < xL
0 : y ≤ h, xL ≤ s








) : h < y
0 : y ≤ h
Because regulation either binds or has no eect on the rm, the derivative is




 1 + p
′(s) min {h, y} : xL ≤ s
0 : s < xL
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< 0 : h < y, xL < s
δh̃LR(s)
δs
= 0 : o.w.
Hence, we see that h̃LR(s) is non-increasing in regulation. We claim that this
is so by noting that ∂C/∂s is zero for s = xL(h̃LR(s)), according to the rst
order condition from Section 4.2.5. For regulation to bind, it must be true that
x(h̃LR(s)) < s, and so ∂C/∂s must be less than zero.
Output is determined according to protability of operations. Production for
rm i may be determined by comparing hi to h̃
LR(s):
qi =
 0 : h̃
LR(s) < hi
Q : hi ≤ h̃LR(s)
Aggregate output is ∫ h̃LR(s)
a
Qf(h)dh = Q× F (h̃LR(s))
We employ the graph in Figure 2.1 to outline the implications of various
parameter values for the prots. In the gure, the x-axis covers the relevant
range of potential damages (a to b), and the y-axis depicts prots. We assume
that maximum liability is y ∈ (a, b). The upper graph ({S1, S2, S3, G}) is the
level of prots, assuming that regulation is not binding, so that rm hi invests
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xL(hi). Points on the graph marked {Si} are points of indierence between the
level of regulation si, for s1 < s2 < s3, and private investment.
Consider rst the possibility that point A on the vertical axis is less than or
equal to zero. Then clearly prots are less than or equal to zero for rms with
h = a, and so prots are negative for all h > a. Aggregate output will be zero,
regardless of the level s1.
Consider next the possibility that point B on the vertical axis is zero, and
suppose regulation is s2. Then rms with h2 < h close, as prots are negative.
Remaining rms operate, but they nd regulation binding and so they invest s2.
Their prots are given by {E, S2}. The slope of the prot function is −p(s2).
Consider next the possibility that point C on the vertical axis is zero, and
suppose rst that regulation is s2. Then the prot function is {E, S2, S3, G}.
Firms with h ∈ [a, h2] nd regulation binding. Firms with h ∈ (h2, y] invest
xL(h), and rms with h ∈ (y, b] invest xL(y). Suppose instead that regulation is
s3. Then all rms nd regulation binding, and the prot function is {F, S3, G}.
Note that rms with h ∈ (y, b] earn zero prots and are indierent between
regulation and private investment levels.
Finally, suppose that point D on the vertical axis is greater than or equal to
zero, and suppose regulation is s4. Then again, all rms nd regulation binding,
and all rms earn less than if they invested at privately-optimal levels.
Regulators
Regulators choose a minimal standard for investment in order to maximize social
welfare as before. This time, we consider three sets of parameters.




{Si} : si = xL(min{y, h})
}
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First, we assume that technology and the market is such that it is privately
optimal for all rms to close, even if regulators set the minimal standard
to its lowest level (s = 0). In this case, the only possibility for regulators
to foster output is through subsidies; however, we do not consider such
subsidies. In this case, we obtain the same solution as in the liability-only
case, and social welfare with zero output is
ζLR1 = ζ
L = U(0) (2.9)
2. a < h̃LR(s) ≤ h(s)
In this scenario, at least some rms nd it protable to operate despite
liability, but regulation is suciently high so that all rms that operate








{U(Q)− s− p (s)h} f (h) dh
+[1− F (h̃(s))]× U(0)

(2.10)
Regulators choose between forcing the market to close and allowing prof-
itable operations. Regulations are constrained. First, let us dene h(s) ≡(
xL
)−1
(s) as the point of indierence between s and xL. Then any solution
to the problem above must satisfy the following constraints:
h̃LR(s) ≤ h(s) ⇒ xL(h̃LR(s)) ≤ xL(h(s)) = xL((xL)−1(s)) = s
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Regulation must be suciently high that all rms that nd operations
protable also nd regulation binding. At the same time, we assume that
regulation is suciently low that some rms nd operations protable:
a < h̃LR(s) ⇒ xL(a) < xL(h̃LR(s))
3. a ≤ h(s) < h̃L(s)
Finally, we consider the case in which at least some rms operate, and at




















+[1− F (h̃L)]× U(0)

(2.11)
As before, regulators choose between forcing the market to close and al-
lowing operations. If any rms nd regulation binding, it will be those
with lowest h. To nd social welfare, regulators add together the benets
of production for rms investing at the regulated level, plus the benets of
rms investing higher levels, plus the benets of zero production for rms
that close. Policy choices are constrained on the lower end by zero; we
do not consider subsidies. We set an upper bound on regulation for this
scenario:
h(s) < h̃LR(s) ⇒ xL(h(s)) = xL((xL)−1(s)) = s < xL(h̃LR(s))
At least some rms nd it protable to operate while investing above man-







We can nd solutions to the objective functions above. First, we solve for
the case in which regulation binds for all operating rms. By dierentiating the




































U(Q)− U(0)− s− p(s)h̃LR(s)
]
= 0
Consider the last term in the simplied form of the equation. Note that the
derivative is non-zero only if h < y and s > xL. In specifying the problem, we
assumed that s > xL. To determine the sign of the term in brackets, we assume
that h < y, for otherwise the preceding derivative is zero and so the bracketed
term is not relevant. By denition, prots for rms with h = h̃LR(s) are zero.
Recall that we dened social welfare as prots plus utility from consumption less
consumers' liability. Consumers have no liability when h < y, and prots are

















Hence, we see that at the optimum (assuming an interior solution), the cost of
additional investment, plus the benets of lower expected damages, less the net
benets to consumers of production from rms that exit the market sum to zero.
If we suppose that
∫ h̃(s)
a
f(h)dh > 0, as it will be if this case is relevant, then















= −p′(sLR)E(h|h < h̃(sLR) + δh̃(s)
δs
f(h̃(s)|h ≤ h̃(s)) [u(Q)− u(0)]




E(h|h < h̃(sLR2 ))
)
If all rms nd operations protable, then this rule is identical to that in the
case of regulation only. For h̃LR(sLR2 ) < y, regulation will be lower than in
the regulation-only case due to the loss of consumption benets. Given the
protability constraint on regulation, and denoting the solution to Equation 2.12
as s∗2, we have
sLR2 = min
{
Q− p(sLR2 )h̃LR(sLR2 ), s∗2
}











In this third case, assuming that
∫ h(sLR)
a
f(h)dh > 0, we can nd a similar rule
to that in the second case:
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= −p′(s)E (h|h < h(s))
By solving for regulation, assuming an interior solution, we have
s = xSP (E (h|h < h(s)))
Again, we nd that the rule for regulation is similar to the solution for the
regulation-only case. The optimal policy is to set regulation to the social op-
timum for aected rms. Given the protability constraint, and denoting the
solution to Equation 2.13 as s∗3, we have
sLR3 = min
{
Q− p(sLR3 )h̃LR(sLR3 ), s∗3
}
In summary, we reviewed three cases. The rst requires that rms close,
regardless of the level of regulation, because of unfavorable technological and
economic conditions. If the rst case does not hold, then regulators choose
between the second and third cases. Given the optimal levels of regulation sLR2














+[1− F (h̃LR(sLR2 ))]× U(0),∫ h(sLR3 )
a
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Regulators choose between closing the industry, forcing all rms that operate to
invest the mandated amount, and allowing some to invest at the private optimum
while forcing others to invest the standard amount. In the following section, we




In this section, we establish a series of claims about optimal regulation and
operations in the markets described above. These correspond to the proposi-
tions given in Shavell [57], while incorporating our extensions to the model and
applying the results to the case of nuclear power.
2.3.1 Proposition 1:
The level of care taken by risk-bearing rms as a function of their liability is
xL(h) = xSP (min {h, y}) (2.15)
≤ xSP (h)
Hence, the level of care of taken by operating rms is less than or equal to the
rst-best; in fact, it is equal to the rst-best level so long as the magnitude of
the potential harm is less than the level of assets.
If ζSP (a) ≤ U(0) and ΠL(a) ≤ 0, then QSP = QL = 0. Likewise, if ζSP (b) ≥
U(0) and ΠL(b) ≥ 0, then QSP = QL = Q. In both cases, output under liability
matches output under social planning. In all other cases, either too many rms
or not enough rms operate relative to the social optimum.
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• Proof
1. The equality for Equation 2.15 is clear, since Equation 2.5 is of the same
form as Equation 2.2. Note that xSP is increasing in h, while min{y, h} is
increasing for h < y and is constant for h ≥ y. These imply the inequality.
The conditions listed for QSP = QL, such that h̃SP = h̃L, are obvious.
We list remaining feasible cases, and categorize them either as QSP < QL
or QSP > QL.
Too many rms operate under liability, so that h̃SP < h̃L, if 1) y < a,
U(0) < ζSP (a), ζSP (b) < U(0), and 0 ≤ ΠL(a); 2) ζSP (a) ≤ U(0) and
0 ≤ ΠL(a); or 3) U(0) ≤ ζSP (y), ζSP (b) < U(0), and 0 ≤ ΠL(y) = ΠL(b).
Regarding the third, suppose ΠL(y) ≥ 0. Then ΠL(b) ≥ 0 since liability
does not increase past y, and optimal investment is constant for all h ≥ y.
In this case, all rms will operate. If ζSP (b) < 0, then not all rms will
operate under social planning, and QSP < QL. If U(0) ≤ ζSP (b) and
0 ≤ ΠL(b), then Q = QL = QSP .
Too few rms operate under liability, so that h̃SP > h̃L, if 1) y < a, U(0) <
ζSP (a), and ΠL(a) < 0; or if 2) U(0) < ζSP (a) and ΠL(y) < 0. Regarding
the second, suppose ζSP (y) ≤ U(0). Then ζSP (y)−Π(y) = U(Q)−Q > 0,
for U(Q) = Q + u(Q), since xSP (h) = xL(h) for all a ≤ h ≤ y. Hence,
for all h ≤ y, prots and output are zero when social welfare is less than
u(Q) > 0, and thus QL < QSP .
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2.3.2 Proposition 2
The optimal regulatory standard equals the level of investment in the social
planning case for the rm posing the average level of potential damage, so long
as regulated rms remain protable:
sR = min{Q, xSP (E(h))} (2.16)
≤ xSP (E (h))
The optimal regulatory level equals the rst-best level of care for the average rm
so long as it does not exceed its revenue (i.e. so long as Q ≤ xSP (E(h))). The
regulator chooses between shutting down the industry and allowing all rms to
operate with this level of care. If the industry remains in operation, then parties
posing less risk of damage than E(h) invest more than the social planning level,
and those posing greater risk than E(h) invest less than the rst-best level.
If all rms close in the rst-best solution, then all rms close under regulation.
If all rms operate in the rst-best solution, and if the rms are protable under
regulation, then the optimal level of output is achieved, but social welfare is less
than rst-best. If only some rms operate under the rst-best solution, then
output under regulation either will be to little (if the industry closes) or too
great (if all rms operate). Clearly, social welfare is less than rst-best.
• Proof
1. Since the simplied RHS of Equation 2.6 is of the same form as Equa-
tion 2.1, then Equation 2.16 follows, so long as xSP (E(h)) ≤ Q. Since
xSP (h) increases with h, parties posing less risk than E(h) invest too much
and parties posing more risk invest too little, assuming that production re-
mains protable under regulation.
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If the social planner nds it best for all rms to close, then because it
is feasible and no superior solution is possible, so too does the regulator.
If sR = xSP (E(h)) ≤ Q, and if U(0) ≤ ζSP (b), then all rms operate
both under social planning and regulation; hence output is the same for
both. Because only the average rm invests optimally under regulation,
social welfare is lower.
Under regulation, either no rms operate or all rms operate. If only
some rms close under social planning, then either too few or too many
will operate under regulation, depending on the level of social welfare for
zero output versus full output.
If U(Q) − sR − p(sR)E(h) < U(0), then regulators force the industry
to close. If instead social welfare is greater with production but Q <
xSP (E(h)), then it may be socially optimal to set regulation so that all
rms operate with zero prots, while investing less than the rst-best level
for the average rm.
2.3.3 Proposition 3
Social welfare is greater under regulation than under liability if the liability
is suciently low (y suciently low) or if the range of potential damages is
suciently small (h tightly distributed about E(h)); otherwise social welfare
under liability is greater than under regulation. The exception is when, despite
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bankruptcy protection, high levels of liability cause rms to exit and output to
fall. If consumers value the lost products more than the risk reduction, then
it may be better to regulate a protable level of investment with zero liability
rather than simply to oer zero regulation and bankruptcy protection.
• Proof
1. We rst want to show that there is a ỹ where 0 < ỹ < b such that regula-
tion is superior to liability for y ≤ ỹ, but not otherwise.




























where the rst term holds for QR = 0 and the second holds for QR = Q. If
y equals 0, then Equation 2.15 implies that investment is equal to 0 for all
h ∈ [a, b], and thus the situation for rms under liability is identical to the
situation for rms under regulation facing the policy s = 0. The equation
above becomes
ζR − ζL = max
 U(0)− [U(Q)− p(0)E(h)] ,−sR − [p(sR)− p(0)]E(h)

since xL(h) = 0 and h̃L = b. Note that this equation is equivalent to
ζR(s = sR, q = QR)− ζR(s = 0, q = Q)
= max
 U(0)− [U(Q)− p(0)E(h)] ,−sR − [p(sR)− p(0)]E(h)

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From this equation, it is clear that the left-hand side is non-negative, for
social welfare under regulation can be no greater than at q = QR and
s = sR. If the rst term in brackets is greater, then regulators nd it bet-
ter to close the industry than to choose any feasible level of regulation such
that production is positive, including the feasible level s = 0. However,
this means that the rst term must be positive, since optimal closure of
the industry means that utility of zero consumption is greater than full
production and zero investment. If the second term in brackets is greater,
then regulators nd it better to choose a feasible level of regulation that
allows non-negative prots and thus a positive level of production. For
the optimal level of regulation sR > 0, the second term must be positive,
as it is equivalent to the dierence between social welfare with optimal
regulation sR > 0 and suboptimal regulation s = 0. Hence, since sR is
the (unique) optimal s and is positive, social welfare must be higher under
regulation than under liability when y equals 0. This and the continuity
of social welfare in y prove that regulation yields better outcomes than
liability for suciently low liability levels.














h}f(h)dh : y < h̃L = b





When potential damages for all operating rms fall short of the value of
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the rm, then small changes in the maximum level of liability do not aect
the rms' behavior, and so social welfare is not aected. If all rms nd it
protable to operate, and some mass of rms operate under the protection
of limited liability, then social welfare strictly increases with small changes
in liability, since these same rms invest greater amounts. Because the in-
creases move their investment levels closer to the socially optimal amounts,
welfare increases.
If rms that operate under the protection of limited liability just break
even, so that Π(y) = 0, then a small increase in liability could have a large
eect on output and social welfare. A small increase in y would cause
prots for [1 − F (y)] rms to become negative, so these rms would exit
the market and output would fall by a proportional amount. Consumers
would lose the benet of consuming the foregone products, which would
have an adverse aect on social welfare. On the other hand, the amount of
liability that [1−F (y)] rms had been escaping, and thus had been falling
on consumers or some other entity, would disappear. This would enhance
social welfare. The net eect depends on the preferences of consumers and
the magnitude of liability that rms escape.
Hence, if liability is superior to regulation for some y1, then generally
the same must be true for any y2 > y1, for in almost all cases we see that
social welfare is non-decreasing in y under liability, but is unaected by y
under regulation. The possible exception occurs for y1 and y2 such that
ΠL(y1) ≥ 0 and ΠL(y2) < 0, so that the increase in liability causes rms to
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exit. In this case, if consumers prefer the reduction of risk over the ben-
ets of consumption, then ζL would rise. Otherwise, if consumers value
the products more than escaping their share of potential damages, then ζL
falls. In this last case, social welfare is not non-decreasing in y, and welfare
could be higher under regulation both for low y and for relatively large y.
For y → b and ΠL(y) ≥ 0, ζL → ζSP , since investment under liability
is at the rst best level for all h ≤ y. Under these conditions, regulation
cannot do better and surely will do worse if the variance of h is suciently
large. For ΠL(y) < 0 as y → b, regulation either could prove superior
in all cases or could prove superior for small and large y, depending on
consumers preferences for consumption versus the escape of liability.
Hence, we prove that there is a ỹ, where 0 < ỹ < b, such that regula-
tion is superior to liability for y ≤ ỹ, and that liability will yield greater
welfare otherwise, with the notable exception of when consumption losses
outweigh safety gains in terms of social welfare.
To see the result of h tightly distributed about its mean, consider rst
the average rm as it operates either under regulation or liability. Note
from Equation 2.15 that for 0 ≤ ΠL(E(h)),




sR = min{Q, xSP (E(h))}
≤ xSP (E(h))
For E(h) ≤ y and xSP (E(h)) ≤ Q, then xL(E(h)) = sR and regulation
is as good as liability in maximizing social welfare for the average rm.
If xSP (y) < Q and y < E(h), then xL(E(h)) < sR and regulation is su-
perior to liability for maximizing social welfare for the average rm. If
Q < xSP (E(h)) and Q < xSP (y), then investment and output are zero
under liability but may be positive under regulation; they will be positive
only if it is socially optimal. Hence, regulation generally is superior to
liability for the average rm.
In cases where xL(E(h)) < sR so that ζL(E(h)) < ζR(E(h)), then con-









h. If the probabil-
ity mass within the interval is sucient, the dierence in expected social
















will be negative, and regulation will be superior to liability.
If h = E(h) for all rms, so that all rms are identical, then clearly the rst-
best solution can be reached under regulation so long as xSP (E(h)) ≤ Q,
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for then either sR = xSP (E(h)) or all rms are closed, with the decision
following the rst-best. This solution would not be reached under liability
when y < E(h) and ΠL(E(h)) ≥ 0, for then xL(E(h)) < xSP (E(h)). If
instead y ≥ E(h) and ΠL(E(h)) ≥ 0, then sR = xL(E(h)) = xSP (E(h)),
and so regulation is as good as liability. If Π(E(h)) < 0 under liability, but
optimal regulation allows operation, then regulation is superior; however,
sR = min{Q, xSP (E(h))} in this case, and so the social-planning level of
welfare might not be reached. Hence, regulation is at least as good as
liability when all rms are identical. As argued above, continuity allows
us to extend the argument to the case where the distribution of potential
damages is suciently small.
2.3.4 Proposition 4
For the optimal use of both regulation and liability, we classify three potential
outcomes:
1. For a < y, the optimal minimum level of investment is less than the level
required in the regulation-only case, and it equals the investment level in
the liability-only case for those parties posing the least potential damage:
sLR = xSP (a) < sR (2.17)
No rms' decisions are constrained by the regulations. All are induced by
liability to take at least as much care as the required standard sLR. A







or, equivalently, that the motivation to lower risk is suciently great (y
suciently high), while prots remain suciently high for rms with h = a.
• Proof
(a) sLR ∈ [xSP (a), sR]: For every h, expected social welfare is greater at
s = xSP (a) than at lower levels of investment, so that sLR ≥ xSP (a).
Of course, this assumes that rms with potential damages a nd it
protable to operate at sLR = xSP (a). If this is not the case, then
Equation 2.18 does not hold, and either the industry optimally is
forced to close or Proposition 4b or Proposition 4c holds.
To prove that sLR ≤ sR, let W (s; r) be expected social welfare un-
der regulation only, and let W (s; rl) be expected social welfare under
combined regulation and liability. Then for any s1 < s2
W (s1; r)−W (s2; r) ≤ W (s1; rl)−W (s2; rl) (2.19)
WE show this by establishing the corresponding weak inequality for
each h ≤ h̃L and s2 ≤ Q: max {U(0), U(Q)− s1 − p (s1)h}
−max {U(0), U(Q)− s2 − p (s2)h}
 ≤
 max{U(0), U(Q)−max{s1, xL(h)} − p(max{s1, xL(h)})h}
−max
{




To verify Equation 2.20, note that equality holds for h such that
xL(h) ≤ s1. For h such that s1 < xL(h), both for s1 < xL(h) ≤ s2
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and for s2 < x
L(h), the inequality is strict. The argument easily
can be modied to show the same condition when s1 < s2 ≤ Q and
h̃L < h, when s1 < Q ≤ s2, and when Q < s1 < s2.
As sLR maximizes W (s; rl) over s, W (sR; rl) −W (sLR; rl) ≤ 0. But
then if sR < sLR, Equation 2.19 would imply W (sR; r)−W (sLR; r) ≤
0, which would contradict our nding that sR is the unique optimum
under regulation. Thus sLR ≤ sR.





plies that some rms invest amounts exceeding sLR, that is, sLR <
xLR(h̃L), so long as 0 < ΠLR(a): If not, then it must be that xLR(h̃L) ≤
sLR, and so for s ≥ sLR, Equation 2.10 is relevant. Since Equa-
tion 2.10 has a unique maximum either at sR or at the point sLR >
xL(h̃L) such that ΠLR(h̃L) = 0, and we assumed that sLR < sR while
prots at h̃L were positive given investment level sLR, then Equa-
tion 2.10 must have a unique maximum over s ≥ sLR at sR. But
then the social welfare function could not have had a maximum at
sLR < sR. This contradiction is our proof.
(c) sLR < sR while ΠLR(h̃L) > 0 at investment level sLR implies that
sLR is determined by sLR = xSP (a), so long as ΠLR(a) ≥ 0: From
(b), we know that if sLR < sR while ΠLR(h̃L) > 0 at investment level
sLR, then Equation 2.11 is relevant for all s in an interval properly
including xSP (a) and sLR. We can split the equation into three of the
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following four integrals:∫ h(s)
a





















Note that for s ∈ [xSP (a), xSP (y)], the terms in the third and fourth
lines of Equation 2.21 are constant and thus are irrelevant for the
optimization problem. Note also that the second integral, on the
second line, is maximized for all h ∈ [h(s),min{y, h̃LR}]. The rst
integral, nally, falls short of the social welfare maximum for h(s) > a,
or ∫ h(s)
a





U(Q)− xSP (h)− p(xSP (h))h
]
f(h)dh
since s > xSP (h) for all h ∈ [a, h(s)). The two terms are equal only
for s = xSP (a), so that all rms with h ∈ [a, y] invest the rst-best
amounts. Firms with h ∈ (min{y, h̃LR}, b] either close or invest in
the amount determined by their liability, xLR(h) = xL(h). Hence, if
a < y, a possible solution is that regulation is not relevant. In this
case, all rms invest the privately-optimal amount xL(h).
(d) If Equation 2.18 holds, then sLR < sR: Suppose not. Then by (i),
sLR = sR. But suppose Equation 2.18 implies that Equation 2.11 is
relevant at sR; we need only follow the argument in (1c) to show that
sLR = xSP (a) < sR.
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2. All rms operate and nd regulation binding. Either the optimal level
equals the optimal regulation-only level, or regulation drive prots to zero




given xL(y) < sLR < sR. Liability is insucient to inspire greater invest-
ment than sLR. This will result for xL(y) suciently low for a ≤ y and
0 < ΠL(y), so that xSP (y) < sR.
(a) If ΠLR(y) ≥ 0 at investment level sR, and if sLR = sR, then no rm
invests more than sR: Otherwise, xL(y) > sR, which by (1d) implies
sLR < sR, a contradiction.
(b) If ΠL(y) > 0 but ΠLR(y) < 0 at investment level sR, and if xL(y) <
sLR, then ΠLR(y) = 0 and sLR < sR: Since prots fall with investment
given a xed liability level y, prots are lower for investment sR than
for sLR < sR. Since prots are zero at sLR, no rm would choose to
invest more. If prots were positive, then regulators could improve
welfare by increasing regulation toward sR.
(c) If xL(y) is suciently low for a ≤ y, and 0 ≤ ΠL(y), then xL(y) <
sLR ≤ sR, and either sLR = sR or ΠLR(y) = 0: Assume the contrary.
Then in particular it must be possible that sLR < sR while 0 < ΠLR(y)
for an xL(y) ≤ xSP (a). But by (1b) we know that if sLR < sR and
prots are positive, then xL(y) > sLR. Hence, xSP (a) > sLR. This,
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however, contradicts (1a), so that certainly for all xL(y) as low as
xSP (a), xL(y) < sLR ≤ sR.
Note that as the liability limit decreases, so does investment, and
it approaches xSP (a) as y approaches a. Hence, if y is suciently
small, xL(y) < sLR ≤ sR.
3. The optimal regulatory standard allocates all prots when y < a, 0 ≤
ΠL(a), and prots are negative for s = xSP (a); that is, the optimal liability
level is
{sLR : Q = s+ p(s)y}
such that xL(a) ≤ sLR < Q. If U(0) < ζR(s) for s = sLR, then all rms
operate. Otherwise, regulators force all rms to close. If rms operate, no
party is induced by liability to take more care than xL(a), but all rms
nd regulation sLR binding.
This will obtain if y < a and production by all rms at sR < xSP (a) both
provides greater social welfare than zero consumption and allows those
rms to earn non-negative prots. In this case, xL(y) ≤ sLR < xSP (a). In
other words, rms invest x = max{s, xSP (min{h, y})}. Then, for y < a
and 0 < ΠL(a) and U (0) < ζR for s = sLR, it may be optimal to set
xL(a) ≤ sLR < xSP (a) to gain the benet of consumption despite sacric-
ing safety.
If production is positive under regulation, then sLR < sR.
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(a) If y < a, 0 < ΠL(a), and prots are negative for s = xSP (a), then
xL(a) ≤ sLR: This follows from (1a).
(b) If ΠLR(a) < 0 for s = xSP (a) but 0 ≤ ΠLR(a) for sLR < Q, and if
U(0) < ζR for s = sLR < Q, then all rms operate: First, if U(0) < ζR
for s = sLR < Q, then it is welfare-maximizing for all rms to operate
with x ≥ sLR. Because rms bear (limited) liability costs, liability
levels strictly must be less than net revenue (sLR < Q) for rms
to remain protable. Because xSP (h) and xL(h) are increasing in
h < y, and because 0 < ΠL(a), investments of xL(a) < xLR < xSP (a)
fall closer to the rst-best solution while leaving prots non-negative.
Hence, it is optimal to allow all rms to operate while forcing them
to invest sLR > xL(a), given the assumption that U(0) < ζR(s) for
s = sLR.
(c) If production is positive under regulation, then sLR < sR: If produc-
tion is positive under regulation, then sR ≤ Q. Positive production
under both liability and regulation requires that sLR ≤ Q− p(sLR)y,
given the other assumptions listed above. If sR < xSP (a), then it
must be the case that sR = Q, for otherwise it social welfare would
be increased by moving sR closer to the rst-best solution for a. How-
ever, prots clearly are negative for sLR = sR = Q, and so given the
assumptions above, it must be true that sLR < sR, with the dierence
being p(sLR)y. Essentially, this is the amount of the rms' insurance
premiums, assuming that insurance is available at an actuarially fair
rate. Hence, regulators nd it optimal to set regulation lower than the
optimum under zero liability, but the savings go to pay for insurance.
58
2.3.5 Summary
In this section, we examined optimal conditions under three regulatory regimes.
First, we considered the case with limited liability but no regulation. Next,
we considered the case in which there is regulation but no liability. We then
compared the relative merits of the rst two alternatives.
Finally, we considered the case in which there is both limited liability and
regulation. In this case, assuming that technology and economics allow at least
some rms to operate with the given level of liability as long as regulation is
suciently low, regulators' choices depend on the level of liability limits. If
all rms realize the benets of liability limits, then regulators set regulation
such that all rms nd it binding. If prots were non-positive for all rms at
investment level xSP (a), then regulators set their policies suciently high to
drive prots to zero for all rms. If some rms face full liability, but the liability
level is relatively low while prots remain positive for rms facing the greatest
liability, then regulators set policies such that all rms operate and all invest at
the regulated level. If the liability limit is relatively high, such that most rms
invest at the rst-best level, then regulators set policies suciently low that they
fail to bind for any rm.
2.4 Applications
In this section, we consider a series of applications of the model. The rst several
consider whether this model responds to parameter changes in a way consistent
with historical market changes. The nal applications derive estimates of implicit
subsidies to rms for liability limits, and we address the question of what is the
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optimal level of liability limits.
2.4.1 A Fall in Excess Demand
Demand growth was very high in the decade or more preceding 1973, with aver-
age annual growth rates exceeding seven percent. Following 1973, average annual
growth rates fell to less than three percent. Suppliers had been preparing for
continued high growth rates by investing heavily in new base load plants, espe-
cially nuclear and coal-red power plants. This signicant reduction in demand
growth forced many planned and partially constructed plants to be abandoned,
and less protable plants were closed.
To allow for changes in demand, suppose that U(Q) is scaled by parameter φ.
When multiplied by utility u(Q), φ becomes a preference parameter. Suppose it
also aected prots directly, so that net revenue becomes φQ. Thus, changes in
consumers' tastes aect rms directly as changes to market prices. In the model
above, φ = 1. The level of utility for zero consumption remains unchanged at
u(0). Hence, for a shift from φ = 1 to φ < 1, positive consumption becomes
relatively less desirable compared to zero consumption.
A reduction of excess demand, in terms of our model parameters, would
appear as an fall in φ. There is no construction in our model, and we assume
that all produced electricity is sold. Hence, these changes have no direct eect
on privately optimal investment xL in our model. However, rms are more likely
to exit as net revenue φQ falls. Hence, aggregate output may fall with φ.
If we ignore changes to production capacity, and if instead we assume that
all changes to excess demand come through the preference parameter φ, then
the level of maintenance spending remains unchanged for all rms that operate
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but are not bound by regulation. However, the condition for whether regula-
tors should allow production is aected, as is the optimal level of regulation in
relevant cases. We see in Equation 2.14 that for suciently large reductions in
demand, regulators will shut down the industry.
Of course, the nuclear energy industry was not shut down completely in the
1970s or 1980s, when this shift in excess demand occurred. Hence, if we believe
that y < a as described in Proposition 2.3.4-3, then the predictions of our model
require that regulators decrease sLR in order to maintain protability. This is
so because under our assumptions, regulation either allows all rms to operate
or all rms close. In reality, most agree that regulations were heightened. Con-
tinued production with a mere thinning of producers indicates that our model's
predictions are too extreme. We will revisit the matter in the section below
on exit costs. Still, our model does predict a qualitative response that at least
vaguely is accurate under some parameter vectors.
2.4.2 Increased Aversion to Losses
The 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant made
the possibility of a serious accident real to most Americans. While this accident
turned out to be relatively minor, and little or no o site damage was caused by
escaping radiation, the 1986 accident at Chernobyl truly was catastrophic. Such
events led some to adjust upward their assessment of the probability of accidents
that would cause harm to third parties, which is represented in this model as an
increase in p. (See, for example, Zimmerman [63] and Price [43, p. 58].) Suppose
that the perception of probability function p is scaled upward by parameter α
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As operators perception of their own risk increases, so too does their invest-
ment. This reduces expected prots directly, so rms are more likely to exit and
aggregate output may fall. In general, prots change by
∂Π
∂α
= − [1− α] ∂x
L
∂α
− p(xL) min {y, h}
For high levels of expected damage, the derivative is negative even for α > 1.








In this case too, assuming an interior solution, regulation forces investment to
increase and prots to fall, so aggregate output also may fall. The condition for
whether regulators should allow production also is aected by aversion to losses,
and it becomes more likely that regulators will force plants to close. Under both
liability and regulation, investment will increase for all rms, since all invest
either xL(h) or sLR, and these terms both increase.
At lease some of the increase in aversion to loss, however, is represented bet-
ter as a change in preferences. Specically, the public developed greater concern
for safety and relatively less concern for economic well-being. Consequent pres-
sure on politicians may have caused regulators' preferences to shift similarly.
5Of course, α must be restricted such that α ∈ [0, 1/p (0)] so that αp ∈ [0, 1]. These awkward
restrictions make clear that the constant parameter should be generalized to a function α (h)
such that α (h) p (x (h)) ∈ [0, 1] and satises our assumptions regarding derivatives. We then
might consider shifts in the function α.
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Such changes may be modeled simply as in the preceding section on decreasing
demand.
Alternatively, we can redene the parameter α in our analysis above to rep-
resent political preferences or public tolerance of nuclear power risks. In this
case, there are no parameter restrictions. α < 0 indicates a public comprised of
thrill-seekers, and α = 0 indicates an indierent population. Increasing positive
values of α indicate growing aversion to potential harm. For α→∞, consumers
reject nuclear power regardless of potential benets. If we assume α > 0, which
seems reasonable, then we might ask what determines the magnitude of the pref-
erence parameter. In our static model in which each market and each group of
consumers are identical, we might assume the parameter exogenous and perform
comparative-statics analysis. A slightly more interesting approach would be to
assume a range of randomly-distributed preferences. The distribution would be
analogous to the real-world distribution of ideological and political persuasions
concerning the corporate world, consumer safety, and the natural environment.
Perhaps still more interesting and important cases could be analyzed with a
dynamic version of this model. With such a model, tolerance for risk and per-
ception of risk could be based on past performance of plants; of course, this
particular application also would require other extensions to our model. If the
public had imperfect information concerning the risk posed by the plant in their
own market, and if past performance oered a signal of the true risk, then prefer-
ences might lean against nuclear operations (high α) following poor performance
or misbehavior, and the public might be tolerant of operations (low α) following
periods of good performance. Regulators would have political interests lead-
ing them to care about the public's perception of risk in addition to economic
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well-being and their own risk assessments. This methodology could incorporate
problems of waste disposal that currently plague the industry. Waste disposal,
especially temporary storage, perhaps poses greater political problems than tech-
nical problems. It thus would be better to consider waste storage as a political
constraint that may force plants to close when allowed space is exhausted. These
factors too best would be captured in a dynamic political economy model.
Increasing aversion makes it less likely that plants will be allowed to operate,
which generally is consistent with the events of the late 1970s and 1980s. The
perception of risk appears to have increased following the TMI accident, although
there is evidence that it was trending upward throughout the 1970s. In the
following years, many plants were closed, investment expenditures increased,
and prots fell. However, Zimmerman [63] argues that existing power plants
lost little value as a result of TMI once the uncertainty immediately following
the accident was resolved. The primary impact of that accident was felt by those
building new plants.
2.4.3 Increasing Maintenance Expenditures
It is dicult to nd data on maintenance expenditures alone. Usually, this
data is combined with operating costs. Such data are reported by the Energy
Information Administration ([2, p. 9]) for 1974 to 1992 in constant dollars per
kilowatt of plant capacity. Prices are assumed equal, or at least proportional to,
the implicit price deator for GDP. Most notable are rapid cost increases between
1975 and 1984, followed by falling costs through 1992. Costs reported by the EIA
increased roughly six-fold in 1993 dollars, from about $10 per kilowatt in 1975
to about $60 per kilowatt in 1984. The aggregation over operating expenses and
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maintenance costs does not allow us to make claims about maintenance alone.
We might reason maintenance costs generally grew at least as fast as operating
costs, however, based on the stricter regulatory policies enacted in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, and based on stricter enforcement of such policies.
Rothwell [48] reports that older plants, which generally are more expensive
to operate, are most likely to close. Plants in regions with lower electricity
prices also are more likely to close, although these pressures may be lessened by
pollution controls and possible future taxes on carbon emissions. In this era of
deregulation of electricity markets, we might expect acceleration of plant closings
as prots are squeezed both by lower prices and the higher costs of maintaining
aging plants. (Also see Rust and Rothwell [56] for a forecast of plant closings.)
Higher expected decommissioning costs and higher estimated accident prob-
abilities also would lead to higher spending.
2.4.4 Exit Costs
In the work above, we assumed that decommissioning costs were zero. We can
adjust the point of indierence h̃L between operating and closing for the liability-
only case, given positive closure costs c:
{






It is easy to see that h̃L increases with c so that rms are more likely to remain in
the market when exit costs increase. Exit costs do not enter the investment func-
tion xL(h), nor do they enter the interior regulation rule sR = (p′)−1 (−1/E(h)).
However, if the corner solution holds for regulation, then the optimal policy be-
comes sR = Q + c which is increasing in exit costs. Similar extension may be
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made for the case of both liability and regulation.
We see then that higher expected decommissioning costs would lead to higher
spending. I do not have evidence that closure costs increased. We might suppose
that they did, as regulatory standards generally increased through the 1970s.
Suppose that there is a distribution of exit costs, such that the cost for closing
plant i is 0 < ci, and suppose that c is not correlated with h. Then the corner
solution under regulation only becomes less clear. Before, aggregate output was
Q for sR ≤ Q and zero otherwise. With a distribution of exit costs, aggregate
output will begin to fall as sR increases past Q, and aggregate output reaches
zero when sR = Q + max(c). Hence, rms with low exit costs will close rst
when economic conditions deteriorate. In the section above on excess demand,
we noted that the number of power plants fell at the same time that demand
weakened, but aggregate output did not reach zero. A distribution of exit costs
provides a simple, though simplistic, explanation.
Note that we have not accounted for on-site cleanup costs following an acci-
dent. We might expect that such considerations would lead rms to invest more.
If cleanup costs are greater than normal decommissioning costs, then we also
expect rms to be more inclined to exit. The expected cost of decommissioning
Unit 1 at the Peach Bottom power plant was reported to be about $130 million,
and the cost of cleaning up the damaged Unit 2 at Three Mile Island was es-
timated to be $433 million.6 See Price [43] for an international comparison of
decommissioning costs.
Surely the mandated changes and other regulatory policies, together with
re-optimization and reassessment by plant operators, explain much of the be-
6Reported in the Lancaster New Era on December 3, 2003.
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havior recorded in the data. Of course, this model assumes that maintenance is
preventative rather than reactionary. We have no data on preventative mainte-
nance. Also, there likely is some distinction between maintenance that makes
production more reliable and that which reduces the likelihood of an accident.
While there is some overlap, we model only the latter.
2.4.5 Liability Levels
While Shavell dened liability y as the value of the rm, making the model
conform to standard bankruptcy rules, it equally well could be dened otherwise.
In the U.S., liability is established under the Price-Anderson Act. This generally
means that liability is less than the value of the rms operating nuclear power
plants.
Prior to 1988, these levels were set in nominal terms and were adjusted in-
frequently. Since then, the levels are set in real terms and adjust automatically
for general ination. Still, the liability levels are not linked directly to poten-
tial accident costs. One obvious reason for this is the diculty of establishing
the distribution of accident costs, or even to establish an upper bound for these
costs. Making cost estimation still more dicult are the great regional dier-
ences among plants. Some plants are located in rural settings with relatively
low values for surrounding properties, while others are in urban settings with
tremendous real estate values. However, commercial insurance companies do
assess potential damages for each plant. Factors they consider are the size of the
plant, population and property values in the surrounding area, and the prob-
ability of an accident at the plant (Dubin and Rothwell [17, 16]). Dubin and
Rothwell [17] fail to nd that power plants in highly-populated areas respond
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more quickly to opportunities to improve safety. This may indicate that Price-
Anderson protections give too little incentive for operators to minimize risk and
that regulators' ability to construct and implement optimal policies tailored to
specic locations is limited.
The assumptions in our model regarding potential damages are not satisfac-
tory. A troubling assumption is that operators have complete knowledge of h but
that regulators know only the distribution. In reality, it seems that regulators
should have an estimate of h that at least approaches the accuracy of the rm's
assessment. A better assumption would be that rms have private knowledge of
the probability of an accident p, which may be dierent for each rm. Another
troubling assumption is that the potential damage for each rm is a single value.
In reality, there is a distribution of potential damages for each plant (Dubin and
Rothwell [16], Heyes and Heyes [29]). We might dene hi to be the expected
value of potential damages for rm i, and f(h) becomes the distribution of mean
values across rms. In this case, all rms might benet from liability limits,
even if their mean damage assessment falls below the limit. We will continue to
ignore such problems in the following analysis.
The denition of the value of the rm becomes troublesome when we consider
the possibility of catastrophic accidents. Consider the possibility that all assets
of a rm are devoted to a single plant. Suppose that the plant is destroyed in an
accident. Whether the value of the rm had been dened as the present value
of prots or as the value of the rm's capital (see Rothwell [50] for a comparison
of the net present value of prots to resale plant prices), the value of the rm
is destroyed. For liability laws to be credible and thus to aect investment, the
rm must hold other assets or insurance. This problem is less apparent in a
68
dynamic model, because the appeal of future prots make rms more inclined
to avoid accidents today. However, it remains a problem in any nite-horizon
model, for expected future prots diminish over time.
We could extend our model by allowing regulators to choose a level of liability
ŷ ∈ [0, y] to maximize social welfare, where y is the value of the rm. In such
a model, it is possible that changes in other parameters, as described in the
sections above, have been modest, and that the optimal liability level ŷ would
not have changed much. If so, then it is possible that such a model would be
consistent with reality. However, it seems unlikely that regulators choose the
liability level to maximize a simple welfare function as presented in this model.
Recent diculties with renewing the Price-Anderson Act, for example, show that
political pressures aect signicantly the establishment of policies.
In our model, we assume that maximum liability is specied exogenously,
and is not under the control of the regulator. If we dene y as the value of
the rm, which is the maximum liability level under standard bankruptcy law,
then we already have analyzed the relevant extremes: the regulation-only case
sets liability to zero, and the regulation and liability case sets liability to the
full value of the rm. If we dene ŷ ∈ [0, y] as the actual level of liability, then
we might use the results above to analyze the current regulatory framework. A
comparison of results for y and ŷ would begin to address the arguments that
Price Anderson should be abandoned. We begin such comparisons in the next
section, where we construct measures of the benets to rms for setting ŷ below
the full value of the rm.
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2.4.6 Implicit Subsidies
The benet to plant owners of liability caps ŷ < y can be computed using
the operators' objective function from Equation 2.8. We must remember that
private benets do not mean necessarily that social welfare suers, given our
specication of the welfare function. We consider later the eect of ŷ < y on
social welfare. Nevertheless, we adopt the common phrase "implicit subsidies"
to describe the dierence in prots for the two regimes.
We can compute the value of subsidies for a given rm i by comparing prots
under two regulatory regimes; we omit the subscript i to simplify the notation.
In the following equation, we rst assume that production takes place under
both regimes, and we rst consider the case described in Proposition 4-1 (a < y
and sLR = xSP (a)). We consider two alternative liability rates ŷ and y, where








. The value of
operations is Π̂ and Π under policies ŷ and y, respectively. The value of subsidies
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We see then that operators save by spending less on investment goods. Less
investment means that the probability of an accident will be higher, but the lower
liability level makes the net eect on prots ambiguous. From an earlier section,












so 0 < S at least for ŷ → y. Expected liability can be decomposed into the
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expected dierence in payments given the new accident probability, plus the
dierence in accident probabilities times the original liability level.
Most other attempts to estimate the benets of liability caps consider only
the second term in the last line of equation above. They assume that y = h,
ignoring standard bankruptcy rules, and that xL(ŷ) = xL(y). Hence, authors like





Most debate compares current liability levels, where ŷ clearly is less than h,
at least in the worst case, to an alternative regime where operators bear full
liability (i.e. y = h). Such arguments in reality concern whether it is optimal
to allow operations, as it commonly is assumed that no plant would operate if
forced to shoulder full liability. However, if there is a ỹ such that ŷ < ỹ < h, and
if ỹ is the liability level that leaves rms indierent between decommissioning
and operations, then private benets are not greater under a ỹ regime than under
a regime with full liability h. If we maintain the assumption that exit costs are
zero, then Π̃ = 0. To calculate subsidies, we replace Π in the equation above
with Π̃
S = Π̂− Π̃ (2.23)
= Π̂− 0
= Π̂
Note that we obtain the same result for any y > ỹ, so that subsidies do not
increase without bound as potential damages h > ỹ increases, regardless of
the limited liability level ŷ. Implicit subsidies are equal to reported prots less
expected liability.
If we were to follow other authors in assuming that y = h, that rms operate
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despite expected losses, and that investment is xL(ŷ) under both regimes, then



























































Note that −Π > 0 since prots for a rm with liability y would be negative.
Hence, given our unlikely simplifying assumption about investment, which them-
selves may lead to exaggerated measures of implicitly subsidies, alternative es-
timates in the literature further exaggerate implicit subsidies by the losses that
rms would incur if forced to remain in the market while bearing liability y > ỹ.
In Proposition 4-1, we saw that under given conditions regulation played no
role, as it was set suciently low so that it failed to bind for any rm. Hence,
so long as a ≤ ŷ, the optimal regulation level is not aected.
Under the conditions for Proposition 4-2, all rms nd regulation binding.
Since optimal investment increases with h, then regulation will continue to bind
for ŷ < y, provided that the regulatory policy continues to exceed the private
investment level. Assuming that policies do not change, the subsidy will be
S = Π̂− Π
=
{




















For unchanged regulatory policies, then, the benets to rms is the expected
value of escaping liability y − ŷ. We ignore here the expenses of sLR > xLR,
however, so the picture for operators might be less rosy than the result suggested.
If y = h ≤ ỹ, then the approach to measuring subsidies taken by other authors
is correct. If ỹ > y or if h > ỹ, then those estimates are exaggerated by
χ =
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[y − ỹ], so that other estimates exaggerate subsidies by expected damages
in excess of ỹ.
In the preceding paragraph, we assumed that sLR is unaected by changes
in ŷ. However, we can show that ∂h̃
LR
∂y
≤ 0 for h̃LR ≥ y and is zero otherwise.
By considering the case of Proposition 4-2, we assume that all rms operate,
or h̃LR = b. If this is true both for y and ŷ, then optimal regulation sLR
indeed remains unchanged. Recall, however, that sLR = xL(a) for relatively





relatively low liability limits (see Proposition 4-3). Thus, for ŷ < y, then sLR =




could be optimal for ŷ.
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In this case, assuming that y < ỹ and that sLR = sR for ŷ, subsidies are
S = Π̂− Π
=
{









































On the last line, the rst term is negative and the second and third are positive.
Firms' gains from liability limits partially are oset by spending requirements
that exceed privately-optimal levels. This case is quite interesting, for investment
is higher for ŷ than for y. If expected prots are negative under y, then a possible
justication for setting ŷ < y is that lower accident probabilities and higher
aggregate output can be gained. Essentially, rms are able to save on insurance
premiums but are forced to spend the money on investment.
For y < a, as described in Proposition 4-3, prots are zero for all rms.
Hence, so long as ŷ < y < a, there are no subsidies under optimal regulation
and limited liability. If ŷ < a < y, then the results in Proposition 4-3 are not
relevant, for we assumed that prots are negative for y < a and sLR = xSP (a). If
this is true for ŷ < a, then prots surely will be negative for a < y. Hence, given
the conditions specied for Proposition 4-3, there are no subsidies if regulation
is set optimally. The level of regulated investment, however, does depend on the
liability limit. The optimal policy rule is
sLR = Q− p(sLR)ŷ
We saw earlier that the break-even point falls as regulation rises. Thus, regula-
tion increases to maintain zero prots when decreasing the liability limit from
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y > a to ŷ < a. This greater spending on safety measures again means that
limiting liability can both decrease the probability of an accident and increase
aggregate output.
2.4.7 Social Welfare Under Liability Caps
Again consider the regulatory regime in Proposition 4a. Consider liability levels
ŷ < ỹ < h, and again suppose that Π̃ = 0. We now consider dierences in social
welfare among the alternative liability levels.
First, note that ζ(h) = ζ(0) since rms close under liability h. If liabil-
ity is lowered to ỹ, output becomes positive and social welfare becomes ζ̃ =
U(Q) − xL(ỹ) − p(xL(ỹ))h = u(Q) − p(xL(ỹ)) (h− ỹ). This is the sum of the
benet of consumption less the liability borne by consumers. If ζ̃ > ζ(0), then
welfare improves with the reduction in liability to the point where rms earn
zero prots. If liability is lowered further to ŷ, then social welfare becomes
U(Q) − xL(ŷ) − p(xL(ŷ))h = Q + u(Q) − xL(ŷ) − p(xL(ŷ))h. If ζ̂ > ζ(0), then
welfare improves with the reduction in liability and rms earning positive prots.
Without additional information, we cannot determine whether society is better
o with liability ŷ, ỹ, or h.
In the section above, we showed that investment spending can be higher
under lower liability limits. In such cases, liability is transferred from rms to
consumers. In exchange, rms are forced to spend their gains on additional
safety measures. Clearly, this lowers expected damages. We might argue it best
to take this to the extreme by adopting the regulation-only policy. In that case,
net revenue may be exhausted by forced spending on investment goods. Bar-
ring explicit subsidies for investment products, this achieves the lowest possible
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accident probabilities. Given our specication of quasi-linear preferences in the
social welfare function, regulators care only about the level of expected harm;
they do not care about who bears liability in the event of an accident. If we
believe that the distribution of liability matters, then we face a limitation of the
present model.
2.5 Conclusions
We specied a model of rms and regulators that incorporates key features of
the nuclear power industry. In particular, rms seek to maximize prots while
facing required maintenance and safety standards, and they operate under the
possibility of major accidents with corresponding liability for losses. Regulators
seek to balance conicting desires to satisfy the economic wishes of consumers
and rms while ensuring that the public is aorded a reasonable degree of safety.
Our model thus combines industry output and prots, electricity demand
and social welfare, and safety and liability regulation. Few other models of
the nuclear power industry assemble these details. The resulting model thus
proves useful in sorting and assembling alternative factors that contributed to
the evolution of the industry. Other work in the literature typically focus on
particular cost or regulatory factors, but we consider both along with additional
critical matters concerning demand and liability. In current form and with simple
extensions, we show the model capable of reproducing many crucial historical
facts and events.
The key application of our model is the analysis of implicit subsidies. We
show that only under special cases will the current accepted denition of implicit
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subsidies remain valid. We derive measures of implicit subsidies from a model of
rms and regulators, in contrast to other attempts that simply propose equations
with little support. We show that it is important to consider the full regulatory
picture when attempting to understand and to quantify implicit subsidies, for
otherwise the results tend to be exaggerated in terms of benets to operators and
increased risk to the public. In addition, we show the importance of considering
standard bankruptcy rules as the alternative to Price-Anderson, a simple fact
usually overlooked by other scholars and critics. Our resulting denitions of
implicit subsidies should guide future attempts to calculate their levels.
This model would benet from many improvements and extensions. Some
already were described. Others include nding a solution for the optimal liability
level. As was noted, we may be forced to move away from the convenient quasi-
linear specication of social welfare in order to get an interesting solution.
Other possibilities include the allowance of dierences across plants for p(x),
and to make f(h) a distribution of potential damages for each plant. (See Dubin
and Rothwell [17] for a similar specication.) This could improve the plausibil-
ity of assumptions regarding private versus public information. Liability limits
would aect all plants in all cases.
Rothwell [47] notes the relationship between safety and plant performance.
That is, plants with high accident probabilities generally are more troublesome
and expensive to operate. Hence, operators have incentives to maintain their
plants in order to maximize output and minimize repair costs, even if they face
no liability. Dubin and Rothwell [17] nd that operators of less-reliable plants
moved more quickly to invest in safety equipment. They also report that relia-
bility generally falls with the age of the plant, suggesting that older plants have
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higher accident probabilities. This correlation between reliability and accident
probabilities likely will prove important in any future quantitative analysis and
in more detailed theoretical work. Still, we might expect our qualitative results
to survive.
A particularly useful extension will be to make the model dynamic. In a
dynamic model, we can examine how optimal rm behavior and optimal policies
change over time. If we relax the assumption that regulators observe invest-
ment perfectly, and if rms have incentives to misbehave, then we can introduce
monitoring and penalties for misbehavior, including civil and criminal penalties.
Penalties are best explored in a dynamic model, for rms often seem to suer
most from the costs of being forced to close temporarily. These costs include the
purchase of replacement power and higher levels of investment spending. While
regulators do impose nes, they have been relatively small and thus seem rela-
tively unimportant. The EIA [2] reports that industries highest annual level of
nes between 1975 and 1991 was less than $8 million in 1993 dollars. Following
a near-accident at the Davis-Besse power plant in 2000, the NRC imposed a
ne of about $6 million, but the owner reportedly spent hundreds of millions on
replacement power and repairs. Price [43, p. 111] reports that the operator of
TMI was ned "over a million dollars" and that 33 plant operators also were
ned following the 1979 accident. Again, these amounts pale in comparison to
the reported $250 million in retraining and improvements for the surviving plant,
in addition to the costs associated with a two-year closure. This detail best can
be captured in a dynamic model.7
7Shavell and Polinsky [42] provide similar analysis in a static model. They derive optimal
enforcement eorts, when observation and detection of misbehavior is costly, and the optimal
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When we consider the possibility of plant closures, whether because of low
social welfare or low protability, the problem of optimal regulation becomes
far more complex. While our results are similar to those of Shavell, they reect
the increased complexity of the model. For essential goods like electricity, and
for great potential damages as with nuclear power production, it is important
to consider whether it might be better to close individual plants or even the
industry. At the same time, we must consider the eects of burdensome regula-
tion both on the decisions of rm operators and on the corresponding eects on
consumers. Hence, the increased burden of complexity is necessary as we seek




Price Anderson Liability Limits
We turn briey from our model to take a closer look at the Price-Anderson Act.
We review other attempts to quantify the benets to rms of these liability pro-
tections. We noted in the last chapter possible problems with the denition of
implicit subsidies specied by others. Nevertheless, in this chapter we set aside
those concerns and take seriously the work of others. We correct several mis-
takes made in earlier attempts and oer extended models, based on given facts
regarding the industry and its history, in an attempt to lessen certain unlikely
implications of existing models. This work provides quantitative estimates of
implicit subsidies to rms that will be useful in later chapters.
The models of this chapter may be viewed as extensions of the applications
of the previous chapter. We follow the lead of earlier authors, however, and so
we do not consider all forms of potential benets that rms may realize as the
result of these protections. The estimates calculated here will be employed in the
dynamic programming model developed in the second section of this dissertation.
Immediately following this chapter, though, we will return to the modelling
eorts begun in the previous chapter.
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3.1 Introduction
The possibility of accidents leading to catastrophic destruction poses a signicant
concern for operators of nuclear power plants, industry regulators, and others.
Because private insurers seem unwilling or unable to cover all potential losses,
Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) in 1957 to cap liability for power
plant operators and to ensure prompt reimbursement to the public for losses.
Dubin and Rothwell ([16], DR) proposed a simple technique to estimate the
benet of PAA to power plant operators using 1) private insurance premiums
that operators purchase to cover a legislated amount of osite damage and 2)
expert assessment of the probability and magnitude of damage in the worst case.
In 1998, Heyes and Heyes ([28], HH) corrected a mistake in DR's specication of
private insurance terms. Benets to the nuclear industry, as calculated by DR
and HH, have been used to support PAA (e.g. Rothwell [49]) and to criticize
liability caps (in Congressional testimony by PIRG Legislative Director Anna
Aurilio ([9]) and in Canadian federal court testimony by Ralph Winter (Heyes
[26])). PAA expired in 2002 but then was extended to December 2004. In 2005,
the act was extended for another 20 years. Whether such policies continue to be
oered may determine whether new plants are built in this country, and so it is
imperative that we understand clearly the eects of such policies.
3.2 The Dubin-Rothwell-Heyes-Heyes Model
DR and HH (DRHH) calculated implicit subsidies to the nuclear industry by
rst solving a two-equation system for the parameters of an embedded density
function f(L), where L represents osite losses. The rst equation describes
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private insurance coverage purchased by each operator. In 1984, operators paid
an average of $0.4m per year1 (Brownstein [11]) for coverage of osite dam-
ages between $1m and $160m.2 DR assume a 30% markup3, leaving $0.28m in
expected losses. The insurance companies cover all osite damages for totals
between $1m and $160m, and they cover the rst $160m of damage for worse ac-
cidents. The second equation summarizes a 1985 NRC assessment: a worst-case
accident will result in $10,000m in osite property damage and will occur with




L× f (L) dL+ 160
∞∫
160




f (L) dL = 1− F (10, 000).
Given an appropriate two-parameter density function, the system can be
solved numerically. Calculation of expected losses above the liability cap, less
the amount of industry liability and conditional on the parameter estimates,
yields the implicit subsidy per reactor year to power plant operators. Implicit
subsidies are the insurance premiums operators are spared for coverage above









1Unless stated otherwise, all monetary gures are in millions m of 1985 dollars.
2Required coverage rose to $300m by 2003, in current dollars (NEST-DOE [7]).
3If there are no accidents within 10 years, 70% of the premium is returned to the operators
(Denenberg [15]). Hence, DR assume that expected losses amount to 70% of the premium.
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where PAA is the industry's liability limit4 and Disaster is a worst-case damage












where a and b are parameters. Unfortunately, DR and HH omitted the term b/L
in the density function and thus their results are not consistent with the intended
model.6 This problem caused estimates in both papers to be exaggerated.
Results for the corrected DRHH model are presented in the rst column of
Table 3.1, and the density function is plotted in Figure 3.1. Before the PAA was
amended in 1988, the model suggests operators implicitly received an average
subsidy of $0.033m per reactor year, and they received about $0.003m following
the amendment. Before the Act expired in 2002, the implicit subsidy was valued
4Operators are equally and jointly liable for a portion of osite damages. Liability for the
industry is capped at $560m, $7,153m, $6,018m ($9,300 in 2002 dollars), and $6,418m ($10,100
in 2003 dollars) for pre1988, post1988, 2002, and 2003, respectively, in millions of 1985 dollars.
Prices are deated with the PCE deator.
5Note that DR and HH omit the term (Disaster − PAA)×
∞∫
Disaster
f (L) dL, which accounts
for the probability mass at L = Disaster.
6See Meeker and Escobar [37] for details of the log-logistic density function. The functions
shown here are equivalent to theirs with 1/b ≡ σ and = a/b ≡ µ. Note that if b ≤ 1.0, so that
the upper tail approaches zero too slowly, the mean does not exist. Hence, the interpretation
of the 1985 NRC assessment and the corresponding specication of Equation 3.1 are crucial:
if losses truly are distributed according to the log-logistic distribution but if damages are not
limited to a maximum Disaster, then the value Subsidy in Equation 3.2 will be innite for any
calibration leading to b ≤ 1.0.
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at about $0.005m per reactor year; the amount fell slightly in 1985 dollars with
extensions of the PAA in FY2003 legislation. These values are far smaller than
those reported by HH; their estimates were $13.3m before 1988, and $2.3m after
the amendments.7
Integration of the density function from $1m to innity yields the implied
likelihood of an accident causing signicant osite damage. The model predicts
that such accidents will occur with a 6.84% probability per reactor year. This
seems high given the industry's relatively safe operating history. Denenberg [15]
calculated the insurance industry's estimate as 1/1700, or 0.059% per reactor
year.8 An alternative proxy for the probability of accidents may be the likelihood
of core melt. In 1985, the NRC estimated this likelihood to be 0.03% per reactor
year (New York Times [62]), which also is far less than the accident probability
implied here. However, the insurance market characterization given by DRHH
rules out both of these estimates. Beginning with the rst equation in (1), we see
again that expected losses for private insurers are the total of expected losses for
minor accidents plus the probability of major accidents times the maximum
payout of $160m. Clearly, these expected losses are less than those under a
hypothetical alternative insurance structure in which insurers pay $160m for
7Denenberg [15] derived an accident probability of 1/1700, or 0.00059 per reactor year. He
assumed damages of $40,000m per accident. The product of probability and magnitude implies
subsidies of about $23.5m per reactor year. DR argue that this methodology is unreasonable
since the true probability density is not uniform, and so these simple calculations are not
reliable.
8Denenberg assumed a pure insurance component of 58%; hence, if a $1000 premium buys
$1m of coverage, then the pure insurance component is $580. This implies perceived risk of
$580 / $1m, or 1/1700 .
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accidents of any magnitude. However, we can divide the corresponding equation
by $160m and then simplify to obtain a lower bound for insurers' beliefs about











160× f (L) dL+ 160×
∞∫
160






f (L) dL = P (1 < L) .
According to the specied equation, insurers believe that accidents causing signif-
icant osite damage will occur with probability greater than 0.175% per reactor
year. Note that this result does not depend on the chosen density function, nor
does it depend on assumed worst-case magnitudes or probabilities. While this
lower bound is far below the estimate reported above, it still seems implausible
given the industry's operating history and related risk assessments, and so we
must consider alternative descriptions of the insurance market.
3.3 Alternative Models
If plants operate without osite losses for 10 years, then they are eligible for a
70% refund of paid premiums (Denenberg [15]). DR thus assumed that expected
losses totaled 70% of the premium, or $0.28m, and that the remaining 30% was
overhead and prot. Instead, we extend the DRHH equation to capture these
details. Insurance premiums ($0.4m per reactor year) are the sum of expected
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where π is the percentage of overhead and prots and r is the average yield
of investments. The rst bracketed terms are expected losses as described in
DRHH. The second term in brackets is overhead, prot, and other expenses.
Denenberg reported costs in 1972 that totaled 58% of premiums; this implies
that π is 42%. The last term is the expected discounted value of refunds. Recall
that 70% of the premium is eligible for return. This is discounted at the market
rate9 and is multiplied by the probability of safe operations for 10 years (F (1)10),
where F (1) is the yearly probability of no signicant accident.
Results for this model are displayed in the second column of Table 3.1. Cal-
ibration values are unchanged from the DRHH model. The rate of return r
is set to 0.07, and the markup rate π is set to 0.42. The probability density
is not plotted, but its shape is similar to the DRHH distribution. This model
projects subsidies of $0.028m per reactor year under the original terms of PAA
and $0.003m per reactor year after the 1988 amendments. For regulations in ef-
fect in 2002, the subsidy was somewhat higher ($0.005m), but again the value fell
slightly under the 2003 PAA extension. Note that these projections are slightly
lower than those of the corrected DRHH model and that all values are in 1985
dollars.
The implied likelihood of an accident is 2.5% per reactor year. While implied
risk is two-thirds lower than implied by the DRHH model, it still is well above
9Denenberg assumes a market rate of return of 7%; we do the same.
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other risk assessments. We can derive a lower bound for this risk, from the




L× f (L) dL+ 160
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160× f (L) dL+ 160×
∞∫
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⇒ 0.00057 < θ. (3.7)
Equation 3.7 is solved for θ ≡P(1 ≤ L); one real, positive root exists. This char-
acterization of insurance markets, when evaluated at the given rates of return
and markup, implies that insurers perceive at least a 0.0565% chance per re-
actor year of incurring losses.10 This lower bound is very close to Denenberg's
perceived risk estimate of 0.059%, even though our methodology is more elab-
orate. However, our model must be modied if we are to obtain a probability
distribution that approaches this lower bound. Of course, this lower bound for
perceived risk levels still may be far from true levels of perceived and actual risk,
but arguably it is more reasonable than levels implied by the models above.
Suppose we alter the model to allow explicit calibration of the probability of
10When evaluated with r = 0.07 and π = 0.42, the lower bound is 0.0565%. When π = 0.60,
it is 0.0111%, and when π = 0.20, it is 0.1120%. Hence, the lower bound is sensitive to the
choice of these values.
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f (L) dL (3.8)
where the density function f(L) is constructed from a Bernoulli density function
with parameter θ ≡P(1 ≤ L) and a three-parameter log-logistic density function








: 1 ≤ L
1− θ : 0 ≤ L ≤ 1
. (3.9)
In this model, accidents occur with probability θ; given such an accident,
losses are distributed according to the log-logistic function. Note that we are
constrained in calibrating θ by the lower bound established in Equation 3.7.
This lower bound is not theoretical only; numerical routines also begin to fail
as θ approaches the limit. Hence, we could employ the Denenberg estimate of
0.059%, but we are unable to employ the NRC estimate for core melt (0.03%).
Unfortunately, the results are rather sensitive to the choice of θ, but implied
subsidies seem to remain relatively small even as θ approaches the bound.
Results for this model are displayed in the fourth column of Table 3.1. Again,
calibration values are unchanged from the DRHH model, the rate of return is
7%, and markup is 42%. The probability of an accident is 0.057%, which is
slightly above the lower bound derived above. The probability density between
$1m and $10,000m is plotted in Figure 3.1. Note that earlier models distribute
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much probability mass in the neighborhood above $1m, indicating that the prob-
ability of minor accidents is relatively high, and that probability density then
falls monotonically as damages increase. Denenberg suggests that the actual
distribution instead is bimodal, with a mass concentration at low damage lev-
els and another at much higher levels. Our model calibrates a high probability
mass for losses under $1m. A second mode is evident in Figure 3.1 (the rst
is not shown) at approximately $250m. Estimated subsidies are signicantly
higher than those of previous calculations in this paper: $0.239m before the
1988 amendments, $0.003m following the changes, and about $0.012m in 2003.
Estimates for policies after 1988 changed relatively little with the specication
changes, but estimated subsidies under the original policies now are over 9 times
greater. Note, however, that the mode and subsidy estimates depend heavily on
the calibrated point mass at zero. Perhaps the value employed is appropriate,
but we are unable to calculate results for lower perceived accident probabilities
because of the limitations of the theory as shown in Equation 3.7. Hence, while
some qualitative properties of this model seem superior, certain doubts remain
even if we accept its many other assumptions.
A signicant criticism of the DR model was its calibration of worst-case dam-
ages ($10,000m). The employed statistic included only osite property damage
and, in particular, omitted damage to health and loss of life. Denenberg cites
an Atomic Energy Commission study, conducted in the early 1960's, that esti-
mates damage (in current dollars) at $40,500m.11 Suppose that we arbitrarily
11This gure includes $17.0 billion for property damage, $13.5 billion for deaths, and $10.0
billion for injuries. The estimate accounts for 45,000 deaths, with lifetime earnings per person
of $300,000. It also accounts for 100,000 severe injuries, with a cost of $100,000 per worker.
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set the magnitude of damage in the worst case to $500,000m in 1985 dollars but
keep the NRC probability estimate of 8.0E-7. While this calibration is ad hoc,
the corresponding results should indicate the sensitivity of the estimates to cal-
ibrated damages. Of course, the results also depend heavily on the many other
assumptions.
Estimates are shown in the third column of Table 3.1 for our rst alterna-
tive model with an accident probability of 0.08% per reactor year. Estimated
subsidies were about $1.158m per reactor year before 1988 and averaged about
$0.960m after the amendments. Note that these values are lower than those
reported by HH even though their (erroneous) calculations covered losses only
to $10,000m. Hence, this model (given its calibrated values) suggests that im-
plicit subsidies are signicant but not enormous, and they are smaller than those
predicted earlier for less severe scenarios.
Estimates are shown in the fth column of Table 3.1 for the second alternative
model with an accident probability of 0.057% per reactor year and assumed
worst-case damages of $500,000m. This model implies subsidies of about $5.110m
per reactor year before 1988 and about $3.357m in 2003. The density function
for this model is depicted in Figure 3.2. We see that the second mode for this
distribution is approximately $400m, where the rst mode of course is between
0 and 1.
Tests for the DRHH model and the rst alternative model were repeated
using the Pareto distribution.12 For all calibrations listed in this paper, the
It does not account for diseases that develop years later, and it does not include dislocation
costs for evacuation of the contaminated area. The study was performed by the Brookhaven
National Laboratory for the Atomic Energy Commission.
12The Pareto PDF and CDF are f (L) = a × ba/ (L + b)a+1 and F (L) = 1 − ba/ (L + b)a,
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results were similar to those using the log-logistic distribution. Tests also were
conducted with lower and higher markup rates (π in Equations 3.6 and 3.8).
Expected losses and implicit subsidies fall as the assumed markup rate increases.
However, even for markup rates of 20% (results shown here employ Denenberg's
report of 42%) and the high damage assumption (where worst-case damages are
$500,000m) implicit subsidies are similar to those reported by HH.
3.4 Conclusion
What, then, can we conclude about the magnitude of implicit subsidies provided
by PAA? First, we acknowledge the signicant limitations of the model noted
by previous authors. Rothwell [49] notes that results depend heavily on 1) the
assumed distribution function and 2) on the assumed worst-case magnitude and
probability. Heyes [26] doubts the ability of private insurers to assess accurately
their expected losses. Further, he doubts the ability of any such method to reveal
the truth accurately: For use in informing policy, results from studies such as
these should be heavily salted. Estimation of current subsidy levels based on
the implied 1985 distribution requires the additional dubious assumption that
the cost distribution has not shifted. That is, we assume that safety has not
improved with operator experience nor has safety diminished with reactor age.
Hence, we must exercise caution in the use of these results lest they mislead us.
While keeping such limitations in mind, we can conclude that the method-
ology proposed by DRHH and the alternatives suggested here imply implicit
subsidies far lower than reported earlier. The results, together with the assump-
respectively.
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tion of perfect insurance markets, imply that PAA should make little dierence
since projected expected losses above PAA are small. Of course, insurance mar-
kets may not be perfect and may not oer complete coverage regardless of the
probability distribution. Hence, construction of new plants in coming years may
depend heavily on recent extensions to PAA.
Useful extensions of this work should incorporate the data reported in the
1998 NRC report [30]. This document summarizes the types of insurance of-
fered the nuclear industry and oers details of PAA. Published in the document
are aggregate annual premiums refunded to operators. Also published is a his-
tory of claims under PAA and corresponding payments. Some of the reported
payments result from policies not considered here. Information on remaining
policies should be reconciled with our stylized picture of the industry as related





















$160m $160m $160m $160m $160m
Disaster Cost $10,000m $10,000m $500,000m $10,000m $500,000m
Disaster Probability 8.0E-7 8.0E-7 8.0E-7 8.0E-7 8.0E-7
Accident Probability 0.06839 0.02535 0.00768 0.00057 0.00057
Results: Parameter a 2.61167 3.64933 4.86102 -15.97674 -10.61556
Parameter b 1.24067 1.12801 0.69939 2.44772 1.30944
Expected Losses $0.337m $0.166m $1.313m $0.516m $5.417m
Subsidy Pre1988 $0.033m 0.028m $1.158m $0.239m 5.110m
Subsidy Post1988 $0.003m $0.003m $0.959m $0.003m $3.242m
Subsidy 2002 $0.005m $0.005m $0.963m $0.014m $3.416m
Subsidy 2003 $0.005m $0.004m $0.956m $0.012m $3.357m
The rate of return r is 0.07 and markup π is 0.42. Dollar gures are in millions
of 1985 dollars. Expected losses are total expected losses, including all insured
and uninsured losses. Industry liability caps are $560m, $6,018m ($9,300m in
2002 dollars), and $6,418m ($10,100m in 2003 dollars) for pre1988, post1988,
2002, and 2003, respectively. Prices are deated with the PCE deator.
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Figure 3.1: Density Functions
Figure 3.2: Density FunctionsHi Damages
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• In Figure 3.1, the corrected DRHH loss function is plotted to the left (solid
line), and the cost function for Equation 3.9 is plotted to the right (dashed
line). The x-axis is in millions of 1985 dollars.
• In Figure 3.2, the cost function was constructed with worst-case damages




A Dynamic Programming Approach
This chapter extends greatly our models of regulation and industry economics.
We earlier developed the primary features of our stylized world of nuclear power
economics by building a static model and using comparative statics to analyze
its properties. In reality, of course, dynamics matter in ways that cannot be
represented well in a static model. We thus extend our earlier work by adding
simple dynamics to our basic static model that will prove sucient to reveal op-
timal paths of output, investment, and regulation, and to support more detailed
dynamic models in the next chapter.
Many dynamic features do not appear in this chapter. We incorporate some
of the omitted features in the following chapter, where we build a numerical
version of the dynamic model. The purpose of this chapter instead is to push
our analytical model farther in the direction of dynamics. This proves dicult
even with our reasonably simple models, and we resort to numerical methods for
some of our results.
We employ our model in the calculation of the value to the nuclear power
industry of liability limits. We derive measures of the amount the industry would
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be willing to pay in order to preserve those protections. This extends our work
on the subject in Chapter 2 in order to account for the ow of implicit subsidies
over time and to account for evolving behavior of rms and regulators.
4.1 Introduction
This work develops dynamic models of the political economy of the nuclear power
industry, extending our earlier work with static models. The primary motivations
of nuclear power operators and of nuclear industry regulators are considered.
Optimal rules are computed to govern behavior of each agent over the life of the
industry. These rules take into account the eects of the agents' own actions on
the behavior of others. It is assumed that operators' primary motivations are to
maximize prots. Operators' choices include whether to operate and how much
to invest in maintenance and safety enhancements. Regulators seek to ensure
adequate electricity supplies while minimizing costs and expected damage from
nuclear accidents. We consider four cases. First, we consider the case in which
regulators are benevolent social planners who can guide the economy to the rst-
best solution. Next, we consider the cases in which regulators employ either
regulatory standards for safety enhancements or liability levels for damages.
Finally, we consider the case in which regulators govern with both instruments.
The model is employed to construct measures of subsidies created by adoption of
limited liability levels. These measures are compared to others in the literature.
The models in this chapter are based on our extensions of Shavell's work [57].
In that paper, he derives optimal regulatory policies when rms face liability.
However, there are several signicant discrepancies between his model and the
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nuclear power industry. This chapter extends our eorts to eliminate some, but
not all, such discrepancies.
In the event of an accident causing damages to third parties, we assume that
rms strictly are held liable for all damages. This assumption, while admittedly
is too strong, is based on terms of the Price-Anderson Act. This policy species
minimal levels of insurance that each nuclear power plant operator must carry. It
also sets terms for industry self-insurance in addition to the commercial insurance
coverage. Operators are exempt from liability for damages in excess of the
amount specied in the policy. We assume that operators cannot escape liability
for the reason described in the 2003 MIT study [6, p. 81]: "The compensation
provision of both the rst and second layers of insurance are `no fault' and not
subject to civil liability litigation."
Output matters here. Firms' output decisions are binary: they produce at full
capacity if the expected present value of prots is non-negative, and otherwise
the rms close. Hence, output does not decline continuously with regulation. In
the aggregate, however, output is a decreasing function of regulation. If expected
damages are too great, then regulators can force the industry to close. Similarly,
if liability or regulation becomes too great, then rms will decide to exit the
market. In either case, the benets of greater safety come at the expense of
economic well-being.
This model has multiple periods. The solution is found using nite-horizon
dynamic programming techniques, although innite-horizon techniques also could
be applied. We argue that nite-horizon modeling is appropriate for the Amer-
ican nuclear industry, since plants were engineered to operate about 60 years
and all existing plants operate under 40 or 60-year licenses, and it is not certain
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whether a second generation of plants will be politically or economically feasible
in the foreseeable future.
We apply the results of this model in two ways. First, we derive the present
value to the industry of liability protections. This is the amount of money that
the rm would be willing to pay in order to maintain liability protections. In
contrast to earlier attempts to quantify these implicit subsidies, we take into ac-
count the value of future benets in addition to current benets, and we consider
in our calculations the net eect of all regulation rather than to focus solely on
liability protections. This yields a more accurate picture of the eects of regu-
lation on prots, behavior, and safety. Finally, we discuss the application and
extension of this work to cover political matters aecting regulation and industry
economics.
4.1.1 Layout of this paper
This chapter develops a model of nuclear power plant operations and indus-
try regulation. First, the model is described, with timings, objective functions
for operators and regulators, and derivation of optimal dynamic decision rules.
Where it is not possible to derive a complete set of analytical solutions, the
results are supplemented with numerical solutions. The key application of the
model is the derivation of measures of implicit subsidies created by enforcement
of limited liability levels, and we nd the present value of these benets. We also
describe techniques of political economy that can extend our work to capture
important elements of the industry not captured in our basic model. Finally,




This model has two primary groups of players, nuclear industry regulators and
power plant operators, who move sequentially in a dynamic game-theoretic
framework. Regulators seek to maximize social welfare, and the rms' problem
is to maximize prots while satisfying the demands of regulators. It is assumed
that a continuum of markets exists, with one nuclear facility per market. No
attempt is made to explain the existence of power plants, and prices and de-
mand for electricity are exogenous. Firms are identical, except for the amount
of damage that they cause if an accident occurs. We consider a nite number of
time periods. When the maximum lifespan has been reached, assuming that the
rm survives, the rm incurs any shutdown costs and closes permanently.
At time zero, the level of demand is announced; we assume that this level
is xed throughout time. In the beginning of each period, starting in Period 1,
regulators determine the optimal level of liability to impose on the nuclear power
industry, and the level is announced. Given this announcement, power plant op-
erators decide an optimal level of investment in safety-enhancing maintenance
and similar expenditures. If production yields a higher expected present value
than the cost of decommissioning, then rms produce electricity, collect the rev-
enue, and pay operating and investment expenses. Accidents occur at the end of
each period with an endogenously determined probability. These accidents cause
damage to third parties, for which regulators may hold plant operators liable. If
the expected present value of the rm is less than the cost of decommissioning,
then operators make no investments and close their plants immediately. If the
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rm remains in operation at the end of its maximum allowed lifespan, the plant
incurs decommissioning costs and closes permanently.
Exposure to liability with corresponding spending on safety, or spending to
meet regulatory requirements, reduces prots. We assume that aggregate output
may fall with prots, as unprotable rms exit the market, so that greater
safety comes at the expense of output. The model has a continuum of rms that
either produce or shut down, depending on whether prots are non-negative. We
assume that regulators care about both output and safety, and are cognizant of
the eects on output of their own actions. Essentially, we assume a continuum
of identical markets, where prices are exogenous. Hence, regulators consider
separately consumers' utility in each market. In each, either rms produce at
full capacity and consumers receive utility from the product, or rms close and
consumers receive a level of utility from zero consumption.
The denition of regulation is narrow, such that policies specify minimal
standards for investment in safety-enhancing goods and services. We consider
regimes with various combinations of regulation and liability, and we compare
social welfare for each.
4.2.2 Denitions
The continuum of (nearly) identical rms are indexed by the level of potential
damage, h. In fact, h is the only distinguishing characteristic of the rms. We
assume that h is an exact amount. This magnitude of potential damage, known
only to the rm, is such that h ∈ [a, b] where 0 < a < b <∞. Regulators do not
know potential damages for individual rms, but they do know the distribution
of damages f(h), which is nonzero on and only on [a, b]. We use a probability
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distribution f(h) only for convenience, in that it integrates to one and we can
use familiar techniques from statistics. More general specications of f(h) could
integrate to any positive value, as it simply species the number or measure of
rms with potential damages h. Industry capacity and potential output is Q.
We assume that all plants have the same capacity. We assume that electricity
prices, less unit production costs, are identically equal to one, so that net revenue
also equals Q. Firms may invest in goods and services, indexed by x such
that 0 ≤ x, to lessen the probability of an accident. The probability of an
accident p(x), given the level of investment x, is identical for each rm and
depends only on investment. The rst derivative of the probability function is
negative and the second derivative is positive. (See Dubin and Rothwell [17]
for a similar specication.) We assume that p does not change with plant age,
thus abstracting from the physical deterioration that tends to leave plants less
reliable, and we assume no cumulative eects for investment levels.
Regulators seek to maximize social welfare. A component of the social wel-
fare function is U . For industry output q, where q ∈ {0, Q}, U(q) = q + u(q).
Hence utility U is a quasilinear utility function, and is determined by the sum
of industry net revenue and the benet to consumers u(q) of consuming q. The
numeraire in this utility function is industry revenue. The balance of the social
welfare function is in the same units (dollars). Investment and potential dam-
ages comprise the balance, as described below. Hence, regulators care about
the utility consumers obtain from consumption, industry prots, and potential
damages in excess of rms' liability.
Time is indexed by t, beginning with t = 1. The maximum possible lifespan
is T . If rms operate in Period T , then they must close in Period T + 1. We
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assume that the model parameters are time-invariant; that is, demand, prices,
maximum liability, the functions p(.) and f(.), the utility functions, and the
values of h and Q for each rm do not vary over time. The endogenous terms of
course may vary, including investment, regulation, output, and social welfare.
A matter not pursued fully are the eects of attrition, through accidents,
voluntary closure, or forced regulatory shut down, on the capacity of the industry.
Note that given a continuum of rms, any positive accident probability will make
disasters inevitable each period. In reality, accidents are rare. We thus deviate
slightly from rational expectations. We assume that the accident probability
p is an ex ante measure each period, but no accidents actually occur. In this
way, rms and regulators take into account the possibility of accidents when
making decisions, but our model does not imply an unreasonably high number
of accidents. This matter deserves further attention in future work.
4.2.3 Industry Regulators
Industry regulators seek to balance the need for adequate electricity supplies and
the need for safety from nuclear accidents. If there is excess demand without
operation of nuclear plants, then neither desire can be satised fully without
sacricing the other. We model these conicting desires with a welfare function
such that regulators seek 1) to maximize output to satisfy consumers' demand
and 2) to minimize expected losses from accidents.
We consider various regulatory regimes with various combinations of regula-
tion and liability. Hence, regulators have at most one instrument for governing
the industry. They choose a minimum level of investment for operators. Whether
liability is imposed, and if so the level of liability, is outside the control of the
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regulators.
We consider only cases in which operators bear either zero liability or liability
up to the value of the rm. We do not consider the possibility that regulators
will compensate rms for losses, nor do we consider punitive damages.
Similarly, we do not consider the possibility that regulators or consumers will
compensate rms for higher levels of investment, in the sort of exchange proposed
by Coase. The model could be extended to include such possibilities, but such
exchanges have not been observed and thus such possibilities are ignored.
4.2.4 Social Planners
The social planners' problem, in which they seek to maximize social welfare in
each market, is to choose each period between closing permanently the plant in
that market or to run the plant with a given level of investment. If the plant is
decommissioned in Period t, where t ∈ {1, T}, then social welfare is









All plants must close by Period T + 1, so we have
ζT+1(hi) = U(0)
In all preceding periods, assuming that plant i was not previously decommis-
sioned, social welfare can be represented as welfare given zero production and
consumption plus the dierence between welfare with potentially positive pro-
duction1 and welfare with zero production. We label the dierence in social
1We use the adjective potentially because social planners will not allow production if
expected social welfare is negative. Hence, even if the plant was not shut down in an earlier
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welfare between potentially positive and zero production in Period t as Difft,






U(Q)− U(0)− xt − p (xt)h+ 1−p(xt)1+r Difft+1(h)

where x is investment in safety enhancements and p (x) is the probability of an
accident. Hence, the dierence in welfare is the welfare dierence in Period t plus
the probability-weighted value of receiving discounted future dierences. Note
that DiffT+1(h) = 0 for all surviving plants. Immediately below, we show that
this is the correct specication of such dierences.
























U(Q)− U(0)− xt − p (xt)hi + 1−p(xt)1+r Difft+1(hi)

= ζCloset +Difft(hi)
for control of plant i with potential losses hi. We assume that social planners
know hi. Social planners thus know more than the simple regulators considered
later, for the regulators know only the distribution f(h). The planner must
decide whether to close permanently the plant or to run the plant in the current
period. If the plant is closed, then social welfare in the corresponding market is
period so that production may take place, production will be zero if social welfare is negative.
For this reason, Difft ≥ 0.
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U(0). If the plant operates after investing xi, then expected damages are p(xi)hi,
and social welfare in the corresponding market is U(Q) − xi,t − p(xi,t)hi, plus
discounted future welfare.
Again, we see that social welfare may be represented as the sum of utility
for zero production and the dierence in utility between positive and zero pro-
duction. Expected future utility is discounted at rate 1/ (1 + r), where r is the
interest rate. This rate is chosen for simplicity, so that utility and prots are
discounted at the same rate. With probability p(xi,t), an accident will occur
in market i in period t, and the corresponding plant operator will be liable for
damages hi. The market will receive the discounted value of the nite stream
of zero consumption. No accident will occur with probability 1− p(xi,t). In this
case, the rm moves to the next period and faces a similar optimization problem,
until the maximum age of T is reached.
The optimal policy rules for investment may be found by dierentiating the








For simplicity, we ignore the constraints that are required to ensure that x ≥ 0,
so that maintenance expenditures are irreversible for all probability functions
p; this assumption is not restrictive so long as p is suciently steep for low
investment. Obviously, investment in period T + 1 will be zero. In all other
periods, we see that




















where p′−1 is the inverse of the derivative of the probability function. Exami-
nation of this function shows that investment increases with potential damages
and with potential future relative benets of production.
To determine the evolution of the level of social welfare, we can focus atten-
tion on the evolution of our variable Difft. Dene ∆ as the time dierence in
Diff , and denote pt ≡ p (xt):
∆t−1 ≡ Difft−1 −Difft





[Difft −Difft+1]− [pt−1 − pt]Difft+1
]





∆t − [pt−1 − pt]Difft+1
]
Diff cannot ever be negative. Note that DiffT+1 = 0. Note also that if
DiffT = 0, then Difft = 0 for all t ∈ [1, T ]. Suppose instead that DiffT > 0.
Then




If DiffT > 0, then with investment at level xT , utility is suciently high that
production is optimal. Note that xT−1 = xT is a feasible solution for investment
in period T − 1. At this rate,
∆T−1 =




so that the present value of social welfare is greater in period T−1 than in period
T . Optimization of investment rules indicates that xT−1 will dier from xT only
if the change enhances utility. Hence, we conclude that DiffT−1 > DiffT >
DiffT+1 = 0 for all h, so long as DiffT (h) > 0. In period T − 2, a feasible level




[DiffT−1 −DiffT ] > 0
By similar reasoning, we can show that Diffτ (h) is decreasing in τ ∈ [1, T ] if
DiffT (h) > 0. By incorporating this result in the optimal investment rule, we
see that optimal investment also decreases in τ ∈ [1, T ] if DiffT (h) > 0.
We can employ results from the static version of this model by noting that the
static version is very similar to the dynamic model in Period T . Conditions that
make production preferable and possible in the static model make production
feasible and desirable in Period T of this model. The results above extend the
arguments to Periods t < T in the dynamic model.
Clearly, social welfare declines with potential damages. Hence, social plan-
ners may nd it optimal to allow plants with little risk to operate (that is, plants
with h close to a), but plants with high risk close (that is, plants with h close to
b). We can dene a level of potential damages h̃t such that social planners are
indierent between closing and operating the plant:
{
h̃SPt : argminhDifft(h) = 0, a ≤ h̃SPt ≤ b
}
We limit the range of h̃SPt such that h̃
SP
t ∈ [a, b]. Note that h̃SPτ = h̃SPT for all
τ ∈ [1, T ]. Expected utility from operations of plant i is non-increasing over
time. If ever it is optimal to close a plant before period T + 1, then it is optimal
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to close the plant in period 1. Hence, the rule for whether to operate a plant
may be determined by considering the decision in period T . Because of this
result, we can use the analysis from the preceding static model to learn about
h̃SP (at least the signs of the derivatives, but perhaps not the levels). Plants
with h < h̃SP close in the rst period, and remaining plants operate:
Outputt,i =
 0 : h̃
SP < hi
Q : hi ≤ h̃SP
=
 0 : h > argminh {Difft(h) = 0}Q : o.w.
We conrm that social welfare strictly decreases with potential damages,
assuming that it is optimal to produce, so long as the rst derivative of the
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Aggregate output in each period is∫ h̃SP
a





where F (g) =
∫ g
a
f (h) dh for g ∈ [a, b] is the measure of plants that operate.
In summary, we see that aggregate output is constant over time, barring
attrition through accidents. Optimal investment and social welfare are non-
increasing over time.
4.2.5 Liability Only
We next consider a market in which private rms are permitted to operate
without regulatory oversight, but they do face liability. We assume that the
maximum level of liability y is given, and may be assumed to be the level of
assets or the value of the rm. Alternatively, it may be set to any arbitrary
level. In this analysis, we assume that y ∈ (0, b]. By dening y to be the value
of the rm, we assume that standard bankruptcy rules apply.
For reasons given in the introduction, we assume that rms are held liable
for damages with probability 1. We do not allow the possibility that rms will
escape responsibility for damages.
Operators
Power plant operators seek to maximize expected prots in each period. They
do so rst by determining each period an optimal level of investment in safety
improvements and maintenance, given their level of liability and the present
expected value of continued operations. If expected prots are greater than de-
commissioning costs, given the optimal investment level, then operators choose
to produce. The per-period level of potential output is given by the level of
installed capital, Q. Electricity prices less unit production costs are assumed
positive and are normalized to one, and so for positive production levels, Q is
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the level of output and revenue less operating costs. If prots (revenue less op-
erating and investment costs less expected liability claims plus the present value
of expected future prots) are less than decommissioning costs, the plants close
immediately and incur shutdown costs. In this version of the model, shutdown
costs are assumed zero, so that
ΠCloset = 0
for all t ∈ [1, T + 1]. Plants must close by period T + 1.
The prot maximization problem in period t for rm i with potential damages
hi is specied as





Q− xt − pt min {hi, y}+ 1−pt1+r Πt+1(hi)
 (4.3)
To simplify notation, we denote pt ≡ p (xt (hi)). If the rm does not produce,
then the rm permanently exits the market with zero prots. If the plant does
produce, then the rm earns net revenue Q, less investment xt and expected
liability p(x) min{h, y}. The rm also receives expected discounted prots from
future periods.
There is no capital investment in this model, and there is no load following.
Hence, the rms' output decision is whether to invest and to produce Q units
of electricity in the present period or whether to close permanently. We assume
that no output is lost when operators invest. Of course, output likely is lost
as the result of investment, adding costs in addition to the direct expenditures.
The assumption is made solely to simplify the model.
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For simplicity, we ignore the constraints that are required to ensure that x ≥ 0,
so that maintenance expenditures are irreversible for all probability functions
p; this assumption is not restrictive so long as p is suciently steep for low
investment. After simplifying, we have the investment rule as a function of
potential damages:









We see that the optimal investment rule under liability is similar to that under
social planning, so long as rms bear full liability. The dierence is that the
term (u (Q)− u (0)) / (1 + r) appears in the denominator of the social planning
rule, so that xLt < x
SP
t even for rms that bear full liability. We see also that




 0 : y ≤ h−p(xLt ) + 1−p(xLt )1+r ∂ΠLt+1∂h : h < y
Using the same reasoning as in the social planning case, we can show that
expected discounted prots are non-increasing in the age of the plant. The
optimal investment rule thus indicates that investment is non-increasing with
age.







min {h, y}+ Πt+1(h)1+r
]
< 0 for h < y.
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We can determine points h̃Lt , for each period t ∈ [1, T ], such that rms are




t (h) = 0, a ≤ h̃L ≤ b
}
We nd a result similar to that for social planning: the indierence point does not
change over time, so that h̃Lt = h̃
L
T for all periods t ∈ {1, T}. This may be seen
easily by rst nding the value h̃LT . At this damage level, prots in T are zero, and
so the aected rms' optimization problems in period T − 1 are identical to the

















= 0. The value h̃LT thus satises our conditions




T . Similar reasoning extends the
argument to all t ∈ [1, T ].
Firms with h ≤ h̃L produce, and remaining rms close:
Outputi =
 Q : hi ≤ h̃
L
0 : h̃L < hi
=
 Q : 0 < Πt(hi)0 : Πt(hi) ≤ 0
Because h̃L is constant over time, unprotable rms close in the rst period.
If no accidents occur, aggregate output will not change over time. Given the
innite number of rms in our model, though, we expect
∫ h̃L
a
p (xt (h)) f (h) dh
accidents to occur in period t, and it would be extraordinarily unlikely for no
accidents to occur. We thus suppose that p is an ex ante measure, but that no
accidents occur.
















Social welfare may be found as under social planning, but now taking the rms'

















+[1− F (h̃L)]× ζCloset
Aggregate output is ∫ h̃L
a




In summary, we see that under liability only, aggregate output is constant
over time, while investment and prots are non-increasing. For all rms that
operate, xLt < x
SP
t , so expected damages are greater and social welfare is lower
under liability than under social planning unless all rms close in both cases.
4.2.6 Regulation Only
We next consider the case in which rms operate without liability, but regulators
impose minimal standards for investment in each period. Ignoring the possibility
of direct subsidies, this scenario presents an upper bound for liability limits,
measured as the benets presented to rms by limiting their liability levels.
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Operators
The rms' prot functions are specied as









Given zero liability, rms nd it optimal to invest only to improve the likelihood
of receiving prots in the future, but they must satisfy current investment re-
quirements. In the last period, when future prots surely are zero, rms prefer
to invest nothing. Generally, rms invest either the regulated amount st or the








so long as the expected present value of prots is non-negative. For s greater
than the sum of current and discounted future revenue, rms close. Otherwise,
they operate. Hence, the output rule is:
Outputt,i =









Either all rms operate, or all rms close.
Regulators
Regulators take into account the eects of their policies on the decisions made
by plant operators. Hence, in eect they choose whether output will be zero
or positive. The regulators' optimization problem can be written as the sum of
social welfare with zero aggregate output, plus the dierence in welfare between
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positive and zero production for markets in which plants produce. We will derive
the dierence for the market facing potential damages h, but for now we claim
it to be:
Difft(h) = max
 0,U(Q)− U(0)− st − p (st)h+ 1−p(st))1+r Difft+1(h)

Social welfare for markets in which plants are closed can be written as









Hence, we claim that social welfare for individual markets may be written as
ζRt (h) = ζ
Close
t +Difft(h)
assuming that plants invest no more than the required amount.
To leave the industry viable, it must be that given policy st, Π ≥ 0. By
solving this prot-function condition for s, we have the upper bound s̄t dened
as s = argmins {Π = 0}. We also know that rms will invest no less than xLt ,
given y = 0, so there is no reason to consider lesser policies. We thus have the















































= ζCloset + max
st≤st≤s̄t
Difft (E (h))
where pt ≡ p (st). The constraints ensure that regulation leaves the industry
viable. We need not consider regulatory levels below the investment levels the
industry nds optimal, and we need not consider regulatory levels above that
which drives output to zero. Note that the specied lower bound is not dened in
period T , and thus should be replaced with zero in that period. More generally,
in any case in which Πt+1 = 0, then the constraint becomes 0 ≤ st ≤ Π−1(0).
We omit such details in the equation for simplicity.
We see that the regulator must set a single minimal standard for investment
expenditures for all rms. The regulator cannot impose regulations tailored to
individual rms because we assume that h is known only by the rms themselves.
In the last line of the optimization problem, we see that the regulators' problem is
identical to the social planners' problem for the average rm, with one exception.
The exception is that the regulation s must be less than the present value of the
rm so that operations for the average rm are protable. If both regulators and
social planners nd it optimal for the average rm to operate, but regulators nd
the constraint binding, then it may be optimal for them to set higher standards
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but also to subsidize production, so that rms remain protable. However, we
do not consider production subsidies in this paper.
The optimal level of regulation may be found by dierentiating the social

























We see that either regulation is set to the optimal level of investment for the
average rm under social planning, or investment exhausts prots. Note that
E (h)+Difft+1(E(h))
1+r
> Πt+1 (E (h)), so the lower bound on regulation never binds.
We can determine the evolution of optimal regulatory levels by comparing
the values of Diff over time. Let ∆t be the dierence between Difft−1 and
Difft:
∆t−1 ≡ Difft−1 −Difft









Note that DiffT+1 = 0. Assume that DiffT > 0. Then




Note that for DiffT > 0, sT led to suciently high utility that it was optimal to
allow rms to operate. Note that sT−1 = sT is a feasible solution for regulation









in period T − 1. At this rate,
∆T−1 =
1− p (sT )
1 + r
DiffT > 0
Optimization of regulatory policies indicates that sT−1 will dier from sT only
if the change enhances utility. Hence, we conclude that DiffT−1 > DiffT >
DiffT+1 = 0 for all h. Note also that in period T−2, a feasible level of regulation




[DiffT−1 −DiffT ] > 0
By similar reasoning, we can show that Diffτ (h) is decreasing in τ ∈ [1, T ] if
DiffT (h) > 0. By incorporating this result in the optimal regulation rule, we
see also that regulation is decreasing in τ ∈ [1, T ] if DiffT (h) > 0.
It is easy to see that if the constraint ever binds, then it always will bind.
Consider period T . If the constraint binds, then sT = Q < (p
′−1) (−1/E (h)).
However, optimal regulation never will be lower, and so the constraint also must
bind in all preceding periods. Because prots are zero in period T , the rms'
optimization problem is identical in period T − 1. By continuing this reasoning,
we can extend the argument to period 1.





















= ζCloset +Difft (E(h))
In summary, aggregate output is constant under regulation apart from losses
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to accidents, and the values of the rms are non-increasing. Regulation also is
non-increasing, as is the social benet of continued operations.
4.2.7 Liability and Regulation
The nal regulatory regime that we consider includes both regulation and lia-
bility. As we will see, full analytical results are dicult or impossible to obtain.
We instead shall rely on a combination of analytical and numerical solutions to
our model.
Operators
Operators again seek to maximize prots, given their level of liability. Their
choices concerning investment are constrained by the lower limit set by regula-
tors. Firms either nd regulation binding, and thus invest at level st, or they
do not nd the policy binding and so invest as if there were no regulation. In
the latter case, rms invest according to the rule derived in Section 4.2.5. If
these levels are greater than the mandated level, then the rms set their invest-
ment levels accordingly. Otherwise, the rms set their investment levels to the
regulatory standard. Next, the rms determine whether, given their investment
levels, operations are expected protable; that is, if the expected present values
of operations are greater than exit costs. If so, those rms invest, produce, col-
lect revenue, pay any damage claims up to the level of liability, and continue to
the next period if no accidents occur. If rms determine that operations are not
expected to be protable, then those rm exit with zero prots.
We specify the prot function in period t ∈ [1, T ]:
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ΠLRt (hi) = max

0,

















Assuming that the irreversibility condition does not bind, we can compute the
corresponding investment rule.







= xLt (hi) for {sτ ≤ xLτ (hi)∀t < τ ≤ T} (4.10)
We claim that for non-binding regulatory levels both now and in all future
periods, the rms' investment problems are identical to the case in which there is
no regulation. However, this claim requires that regulation will not bind in future
periods. Otherwise, the present value of prots will be aected, and so while the
investment rule remains identical to the liability-only case, the investment level
will be lower. It remains to be shown that if regulation does not bind for a rm
in period t, then regulation will not bind in future periods.
As we saw earlier, we may nd a point h̃t
LR
(s) for which rms with this level
of potential damages are indierent between operating and closing. Now, the
indierence point depends on the level of regulation s. The point may be found
as:
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although we constrain values of h̃LRt (s) to the interval [a, b].
To solve the regulators' optimization problem, we must determine how h̃LRt (s)
changes with the level of regulation s. To determine this, we use the implicit
function theorem. First, dene





















as the combination {h, s} that yields zero prots in period t. By dierentiating

















) : h < y












: xL ≤ s
0 : s < xL
With these equations, we can compute the derivative of h̃t
LR
(s) with respect to


























: h < y, xL ≤ s
0 : o.w.
(4.12)
Hence, we see that h̃LRt (s) is non-increasing in regulation. We claim that this is
so by noting that ∂C/∂s is zero for s = xLRt (h̃
LR
t (s)), according to the rst order
condition for prot maximization. For regulation to bind, it must be true that
xLt (h̃
LR
t (s)) < s, and so ∂C/∂s must be less than zero.
Output is determined according to protability of operations. Production for
rm i may be determined by comparing hi to h̃
LR(s):
Outputi =
 0 : h̃
LR
t (st) < hi
Q : h̃LRt (st) ≥ hi
Aggregate output is ∫ h̃LRt (s)
a
Qf(h)dh = Q× F (h̃LRt (s))
Regulators
Regulators choose a minimal standard for investment in order to maximize social
welfare as before. This time, we consider three sets of parameters.
1. h̃L ≤ a
First, we assume that technology and the market is such that it is privately
optimal for all rms to close, even if regulators set the minimal standard
to its lowest level (s = 0). In this case, given the maximum liability level
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y, the only possibility for regulators to foster output is through subsidies;
however, we do not consider output subsidies. In this case, we obtain the
same solution as in the liability-only case, and social welfare with zero
output is







2. a < h̃LR(s) ≤ h(s)
In this scenario, at least some rms nd it protable to operate despite
liability, but regulation is suciently high so that all rms that operate
nd regulation binding. We dene the dierence at time t between the











We will derive below lower and upper bounds s and s̄, respectively. We






































h|h < h̃LRt (sLR)
))
Regulators choose between forcing the market to close and allowing prof-





(s) as the point of indierence for rms between s and xLRt . Then
any solution to the problem above must satisfy the following constraint:
h̃LRt (s) ≤ ht(s)






Regulation must be suciently high that all rms that nd operations
protable also nd regulation binding. At the same time, we assume that
regulation is suciently low that at least some rms nd operations prof-
itable:
a < h̃LRt (s) ⇒ xLRt (a) < xLR(h̃LRt (s))
Together, these conditions provide lower and upper bounds for regulation
in our optimization problem.
3. a ≤ ht(s) < h̃t
LR
(s)
Finally, we consider the case in which at least some rms operate, and at
least some do not nd regulation binding. We rst dene the dierence in
















We will derive below lower and upper bounds s and s̄, respectively. We










































































As before, regulators choose between forcing markets to close and allowing
operations. If any rms nd regulation binding, it will be the those with
lowest h. To nd social welfare, regulators add together the benets of
production for rms investing at the regulated level, plus the benets of
rms investing higher levels, plus the benets of zero production in markets
in which rms close. Policy choices are constrained on the lower end by
the lowest voluntary level of investment; we do not consider subsidies, and
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⇒ xLRt (ht(s)) = xLRt ((xLRt )−1(s))
= s
< xLRt (h̃t(s))
At least some rms nd it protable to operate while investing above man-






We can nd solutions to the objective functions above. First, we solve for the
case in which regulation binds for all operating rms (Case 2). By dierentiating










If we assume that the constraints do not bind, then we can employ this result in




































Hence, we see that at the optimum (assuming an interior solution), the cost of
additional investment, plus the benets of lower expected damages and poten-
tially lost future prots, less the net benets of production from rms that exit
127
the market sum to zero. If the optimum is a corner solution, then sLRt will result
in zero prots for rms with potential damages h ≥ y.
If we suppose that
∫ h̃LRt (st)
a
f(h)dh > 0, as it will be if this case is relevant,
then we can simplify the rst order conditions for the second case, and we have
∫ h̃LRt (s)
a
f(h)dh > 0 (4.16)







































Because ∂h̃LRt (s)/∂s ≤ 0, we know that
1 ≤ −p′t
[







E(h|h < h̃LRt (sLRt ))
)
If all rms nd operations protable despite facing liability, then this policy
rule is identical to that in the case of regulation only. Given the protability

















The solution sLRt for this case then is determined as the solution of three
equations: sLRt is determined by the rst-order condition (although additional
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attention must be paid to the constraints), h̃LRt is determined by Equation 4.11,
and the derivative of h̃LRt is given by Equation 4.12.
In similar fashion, we nd the optimal level of regulation for the third case










We employ this result in the rst-order condition for social welfare, assuming






















If any rms nd regulation binding, then the following condition holds:
∫ ht(s)
a
f(h)dh > 0 (4.17)





























h|h < h(sLRt )
))
Note, however, that a = ht(s) in the static case, so that regulation failed to




We conclude that when both regulatory and liability instruments are available
to industry regulators, they rst must solve the equations above to determine
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optimal regulatory policies in each case. They then must choose the case yielding
the greatest expected welfare given the optimal regulatory policies. We thus













+[1− F (h̃(sLR))]× U(0),∫ h(sLR)
a
{


















+[1− F (h̃L)]× U(0)

Numerical Results
Finding general analytical solutions in the case of both liability and regulation
is quite dicult. Instead, we report here some numerical results. Such results
are limited by nature, and depend on additional assumptions.
First, we assume arbitrarily that the distribution f (h) is uniform over h, with
a = 1000 and b = 5000. Second, we specify accident probabilities as p (x) ≡ χx,
and χ is set to about 0.759. Note that this function satises our requirements
noted earlier. Utility is specied as u (Q) = 100 × ln (Q+ 1) and u (0) = 0.
Remaining parameters are Q = 100 and r = 0.07. Maximum liability is set to
y = 4, 500 and y = 1, 010 for low and high liability cases, respectively. Finally,
the maximum lifespan is set to T = 40.
Results are shown in Figure 4.1, assuming that y = 1, 010. The gure in
the upper-left displays the level of regulation assuming that regulation binds for
all rms (the higher level) and that regulation binds for only some rms (the
lower graph). For the given assumptions, the optimum is that regulation binds
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for all. Note that under the alternative, in which regulation binds for only some
rms, the optimal level of regulation is identical to the private investment level
xLRt (a); we proved a similar rule in the static case.
The upper-right gure displays prots, at 5-period intervals, for rms with
damages h. Recall that the optimum is for all rms to invest the same amount
in each period. The slight downward slope in each graph is because potential
damages increase with h, even though the probability of facing such liability is
unchanged. Prots, as reported here, actually are the present values of the rms.
The present values decline over time, so the uppermost graph is the present value
at t = 1, and the lowest graph is the result at t = 40.
The lower-left gure displays aggregate utility assuming that regulation binds
for all rms (the higher graph) and that regulation binds for only some rms
(the lower graph). Under the specied parameters, there is little dierence, and
so the graphs nearly coincide. Note that social welfare appears to converge when
there are many remaining time periods.
Finally, the lower-right gure displays aggregate output and aggregate prof-
its over time. Note that aggregate output does not change, assuming that no
accidents occur. Note also that prots appear to converge when the potential
lifespan of the rm is long.
Two more sets of graphs are displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Both g-
ures compare results for the regulation-only case to results for both liability and
regulation. Figure 4.2 displays results for y = 4, 500. Note that for periods
t ∈ [1, 25], the optimal level of regulation is such that all rms nd it binding.
Perhaps surprisingly, it becomes optimal to lower the level of regulation in re-
maining periods, so that all rms decide for themselves how much to invest. This
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Figure 4.1: Model Solutions
seems surprising, since rms have little incentive to invest when time horizons
are short. Remember, however, that potential damages are low relative to net
revenue and social welfare. Recall from Figure 4.1 that the dierence in welfare
is small in this case, regardless of whether regulation binds for some or for all
rms. A corresponding jump in investment may be seen in the lower-right gure.
A corresponding set of graphs may be seen in Figure 4.3, given the assumption
that y = 1, 010.
4.3 Implicit Subsidies
While typically we dene liability y as the value of the rm, making the model
conform to standard bankruptcy rules, it could equally well be dened otherwise.
In the U.S., liability is established under the Price-Anderson Act. This generally
means that liability is less than the value of the rms operating nuclear power
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Figure 4.2: Solutions: High Liability
Figure 4.3: Solutions: Low Liability
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plants.
Prior to 1988, these levels were set in nominal terms and were adjusted in-
frequently. Since then, the levels are set in real terms and adjust automatically
for general ination. Still, the liability levels are not linked directly to poten-
tial accident costs. One obvious reason for this is the diculty of establishing
the distribution of accident costs, or even to establish an upper bound for these
costs. Making cost estimation still more dicult are the great regional dier-
ences among plants. Some plants are located in rural settings with relatively
low values for surrounding properties, while others are in urban settings with
tremendous real estate values. However, commercial insurance companies do
assess potential damages for each plant. Factors they consider are the size of the
plant, population and property values in the surrounding area, and the prob-
ability of an accident at the plant (Dubin and Rothwell [17, 16]). Dubin and
Rothwell [17] fail to nd that power plants in highly-populated areas respond
more quickly to opportunities to improve safety. This may indicate that Price-
Anderson protections give too little incentive for operators to minimize risk.
The assumptions in our model regarding potential damages are not satisfac-
tory. A troubling assumption is that operators have complete knowledge of h but
that regulators know only the distribution. In reality, it seems that regulators
should have an estimate of h that at least approaches the accuracy of the rm's
assessment. A better assumption would be that rms have private knowledge of
the probability of an accident p, which may be dierent for each rm. Another
troubling assumption is that the potential damage for each rm is a single value.
In reality, there is a distribution of potential damages for each plant (Dubin and
Rothwell [16], Heyes and Heyes [29]). We might dene hi to be the expected
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value of potential damages for rm i, and f(h) becomes the distribution of mean
values across rms. In this case, all rms might benet from liability limits,
even if their mean damage assessment falls below the limit. We will continue to
ignore such problems in the following analysis.
The denition of the value of the rm becomes troublesome when we consider
the possibility of catastrophic accidents. Consider the possibility that all assets
of a rm are devoted to a single plant. Suppose that the plant is destroyed in an
accident. Whether the value of the rm had been dened as the present value
of prots or as the value of the rm's capital (see Rothwell [50] for a comparison
of the net present value of prots to resale plant prices), the value of the rm
is destroyed. For liability laws to be credible and thus to aect investment, the
rm must hold other assets or insurance. This problem is less pressing with
young rms, because the appeal of future prots make rms more inclined to
avoid accidents today and so, at least if we ignore technological problems for
young plants, economic incentives make accidents less likely. However, accident
probabilities may rise with age in any nite-horizon model, for expected future
prots diminish over time. Regardless of the likelihood, accidents are possible
at any age, and whether the rm aected would have the means to bear liability
remains an important question. Liability-sharing clauses of the Price-Anderson
Act partially address the problem.
We could extend our model by allowing regulators to choose a level of liability
ŷ ∈ [0, y] to maximize social welfare. In such a model, it is possible that changes
in other parameters, as described in the sections above, have been modest, and
that the optimal liability level would not have changed much. If so, then it is
possible that such a model would be consistent with reality. However, it seems
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unlikely that regulators choose the liability level to maximize a simple welfare
function as presented in this model. Recent diculties with renewing the Price-
Anderson Act, for example, show that political pressures aect signicantly the
establishment of policies. We will return to the subject of politics in the section
below.
In our model, we assume that maximum liability is specied exogenously,
and is not under the control of the regulator. If we dene y as the value of the
rm, which is the maximum liability level under standard bankruptcy law, then
we already have analyzed the relevant extremes: the regulation-only case sets
liability to zero, and the regulation and liability case sets liability to the full
value of the rm. If we dene ŷ ∈ (0, y) as the actual level of liability, then
we might use the results above to analyze the current regulatory framework. A
comparison of results for y and ŷ would begin to address the arguments that
Price-Anderson should be abandoned. We begin such comparisons below, where
we construct measures of the benets to rms for setting ŷ below the full value
of the rm. The work follows our work with the static version of this model, and
our results extend our ndings to the dynamic case.
The benet to plant owners of liability caps ŷ < y can be computed using
the operators' prot functions. We must remember that existence of private
benets do not mean necessarily that social welfare suers, at least given our
specication of the welfare function. Despite its negative connotation among
industry critics, we nevertheless adopt the common phrase "implicit subsidies"
to describe the dierence in prots for the two regimes.
We can compute the value of subsidies for a given rm i by comparing prots
under two regulatory regimes; we omit the subscript i to simplify the notation.
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We compute implicit subsidies generally as
St = Π̂t − Πt
where prots are denoted Π̂ and Π given liability levels ŷ and y, respectively.
By making additional assumptions, we can decompose subsidies. In the follow-
ing equation, we assume that production takes place under both regimes, and
we consider the case in which regulation fails to bind for any rm; other as-
sumptions easily can be analyzed with the same framework. We consider two











. The value of operations is Π̂t and Πt under policies ŷ
and y, respectively. The value of subsidies is
St = Π̂t − Πt (4.18)
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We see then that operators save by spending less on investment goods. Less
investment means that the probability of an accident will be higher, but the
lower liability level makes the net eect on prots ambiguous. If we are to
compute the present value of implicit subsidies, then to this per-period level we
add the probability of receiving discounted future subsidies, less the dierence
in expected future prots caused by higher accident probabilities.
Most other attempts to estimate the benets of liability caps consider only
the second term in the equation above, and only the per-period implicit subsidies
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are reported. They assume that y = h, ignoring standard bankruptcy rules, and
that xL(ŷ) = xL(y). Hence, authors like Dubin and Rothwell [16] essentially





Most debate compares current liability levels, where ŷ clearly is less than h,
at least in the worst case, with an alternative regime where operators bear full
liability (i.e. y = h). Such arguments in reality concern whether it is optimal
to allow operations, as it commonly is assumed that no plant would operate if
forced to shoulder full liability. However, if there is a ỹ such that ŷ < ỹ < h, and
if ỹ is the liability level that leaves rms indierent between decommissioning
and operating, then private benets are not greater under a ỹ regime than under
a regime with full liability h. If we maintain the assumption that exit costs are
zero, then Π̃ = 0. To calculate subsidies, we replace Π in the equation above
with Π̃
St = Π̂t − Π̃t (4.19)
= Π̂t − 0
= Π̂t
Note that we obtain the same result for any y > ỹ, so that subsidies do not in-
crease without bound as potential damages h > ỹ increase. The present value of
implicit subsidies are equal to the present value of reported prots less expected
liability.
Suppose the full value of a rm is y = 4, 500, and the enforced maximum
liability for the rm is ŷ = 1, 010. We can compute implicit subsidies for this rm
by computing the dierence in the prot levels reported above. Note that because
of the peculiar shift in optimal policies reported in Figure 4.2, the reported
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Figure 4.4: Implicit Subsidies
implicit subsidies also will appear peculiar. A contour plot of subsidies is shown
in Figure 4.4. Note that implicit subsidies are negative for rms with very
low potential damages. These rms actually would prefer higher (though not
binding) liability limits with corresponding shifts in regulation. Hence, the value
of liability limits to rms is not always so straightforward to compute as many
expect.
We do not mean to suggest that calculation of implicit subsidies ever will be
easy. Even calculation of the present value of the rm requires some knowledge
of accident probabilities, which have proven very dicult to calculate.
Given the years of ghting leading up to the 2005 extension of the Price-
Anderson Act, it is clear that the industry strongly values the policy and that
critics strongly oppose it. Many critics assume that the industry would disappear
without protections. Given calculation of the present value of implicit subsidies,
we could gain an idea of the amount that the industry would pay that would
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leave them indierent between having or forsaking Price-Anderson. If the cost
would leave rms bankrupt, then their critics at least partly are right. If not,
then perhaps the benet is not so great as critics claim. In either case, we should
consider not only the eects of Price-Anderson on the value of the rms, but also
we should consider the eects of both liability and regulation on safety, and we
should consider the overall eect of nuclear power operations on social welfare.
4.4 Political Economy
The 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant made
the possibility of a serious accident real to most Americans. While this accident
turned out to be relatively minor, and little or no o site damage was caused by
escaping radiation, the 1986 accident at Chernobyl truly was catastrophic. Such
events led some to adjust upward their assessment of the probability of accidents
that would cause harm to third parties, which is represented in this model as
an increase in p. (See, for example, Zimmerman [63] and Price [43, p. 58].) In
addition, many reassessed their preferences and their willingness to tolerate the
risk of nuclear accidents. Suppose that the estimate of expected damages p (h)h,
or more generally the aversion to damages, is scaled upward by parameter α to
become αp (h)h. If operators' assessment of their own potential losses increase,
then they willingly increase investment or exit the market. If regulators become
more averse to losses, then they may mandate stricter regulations.
The public developed greater concern for safety and relatively less concern for
economic well-being following the accidents in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequent
pressure on politicians may have caused regulators' preferences to shift similarly.
140
Such changes may be modeled simply as in the preceding section on decreasing
demand.
Alternatively, we can dene the parameter α to represent political preferences
or public tolerance of nuclear power risks. α < 0 indicates a public comprised of
thrill-seekers, and α = 0 indicates an indierent population. Increasing positive
values of α indicate growing aversion to potential harm. For α→∞, consumers
reject nuclear power regardless of potential benets. If we assume α > 0, which
seems reasonable, then we might ask, what determines the magnitude of the
preference parameter. In our model in which each market and each group of
consumers are identical, we might assume the parameter exogenous and perform
comparative-statics analysis. A slightly more interesting approach would be to
assume a range of randomly-distributed preferences. The distribution would be
analogous to the real-world distribution of ideological and political persuasions
concerning the corporate world, consumer safety, and the natural environment.
Perhaps still more interesting and important cases could be analyzed by ex-
tending our model to incorporate dynamics for the level of α.With such a model,
tolerance for risk and perception of risk could be based on past performance of
plants; of course, this particular application also would require other extensions
to our model. If the public had imperfect information concerning the risk posed
by the plant in their own market, and if past performance oered a signal of
the true risk, then preferences might lean against nuclear operations (high α)
following poor performance or misbehavior, and the public might be tolerant
of operations (low α) following periods of good performance. Regulators would
have political interests leading them to care about the public's perception of risk
in addition to economic well-being and their own risk assessments.
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Increasing aversion makes it less likely that plants will be allowed to operate,
which generally is consistent with the events of the late 1970s and 1980s. The
perception of risk appears to have increased following the TMI accident, although
there is evidence that it was trending upward throughout the 1970s. In the
following years, many plants were closed, investment expenditures increased,
and prots fell. However, Zimmerman [63] argues that existing power plants
lost little value as a result of TMI once the uncertainty immediately following
the accident was resolved. The primary impact of that accident was felt by those
building new plants.
Whether the behavior of the public and of regulators is consistent and can be
modeled remains an open question. It widely is accepted that regulations were
tightened in the late 1970s, and that regulations became tighter still following the
TMI accident. In this same period, public opposition to nuclear power became
a formidable threat to the industry. Since then, public opposition has dwindled
and perhaps regulation has become burdensome. On the other hand, perhaps
operators simply improved their behavior and thus simply are avoiding wrath.
Clearly, we need to extend our work to consider political factors, but this model
provides a good start as we seek to disentangle these factors.
4.5 Conclusion
We constructed a model of liability-bearing rms and regulators and applied it
to the nuclear power industry. We considered prot maximization as the pri-
mary motivation for rms, and they seek to enhance prots by deciding whether
to operate and how much to invest willingly in safety enhancements. We mod-
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eled regulators as welfare maximizers that set minimal standards for safety en-
hancements and accident avoidance measures, which ultimately may determine
whether the industry remains viable.
Our solutions for the optimal investment policies indicate that rms have too
little incentive to invest, so that investment levels and safety fall short of the rst-
best solution. This in principle seems to provide some justication for imposition
of safety standards, for social welfare otherwise is shown to be lower than it could
be. On the other hand, the realities of limited policy instruments make optimal
regulatory policies less clear. In simulations of our model, we nd support for
results analogous to static model implications: in some cases, it in fact is better
to set low regulations and simply to let liability guide investment. We do not
claim that this case applies to the nuclear power industry. Rather, our model is
useful to guide future empirical studies, as well as to provide illumination on a
variety of theoretical matters.
We applied our model to derive the present value of implicit subsidies from a
model of rms and regulators. This work takes a broader view of the eects on
rms of liability limits. We criticize other eorts to identify and quantify implicit
subsidies as taking too narrow a view of regulatory eects. Instead, we take into
account the eects of liability limits on behavior, and we take into account the
eects of regulation. The result yields the full value of liability limits to rms,
which should guide future eorts to quantify implicit subsidies and should inform
both defendants and critics of Price-Anderson policies.
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Chapter 5
A Numerical Model of Nuclear Power
Plant Operations
In this chapter, we generalize the dynamic programming model of regulation and
the rm developed in the last chapter by adding details and by relaxing some of
the restrictive assumptions that were made for sake of simplicity. We combine
features of our earlier models of the nuclear power industry and its regulation.
We add considerable detail for individual plants. In doing so, we set the stage
for the second part of this dissertation. In that second part, we focus directly on
the power plants themselves and on the operation of the plants. This is a key
chapter, for it ties together nearly every part of the dissertation.
Our model adds many important factors of the nuclear power industry that
were left out of previous analytical exercises for sake of feasibility. We add
an insurance industry in response to the Price-Anderson clause requiring partial
coverage. We specify the level of insurance premiums based on potential damages
and the endogenous accident probabilities. We include the potential premium
refunds that are specied in the insurance policies. Also included is the liability
sharing among all rms required by Price-Anderson.
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The model of the rm now includes revenue, operating costs, and decommis-
sioning costs. The output decision now is continuous. Revenue is the product
of output and electricity prices, where prices are stochastic and exogenous. Pa-
rameters are calibrated or estimated using available data.
We employ the model in two applications. We consider the eects of elec-
tricity price growth on the value of rms and on their decisions. We nd that
the value of the rm predictably falls as price growth rates decline as they did in
the mid1980s. We also consider the eects of license extensions that allow older
rms to continue operations. We nd that the value of all rms increase with
such extensions, which rst were oered to the industry in the late 1990s.
We thus add signicantly to the set of key industry features incorporated
in our model, and calibration enhances its realism. The results shed light on
the industry in ways that few other models oer, and our work in this chapter
provides important guidance for remaining chapters.
In a chapter appendix, we develop a means by which we greatly increase the
computational speed and simplify the code of our numerical model. The method-
ology is useful generally, but we provide an application to show its particular
usefulness in nding solutions to calibrated dynamic programming models. We
oer evaluations that demonstrate reasonable numerical accuracy and describe
ways that the method may be generalized and extended.
5.1 Introduction
When the U.S. government was considering the creation of a private nuclear
power industry, they realized that the enormous risks associated with operating
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a nuclear facility meant that liability would need to be limited in order to ensure
viability of the industry. In 1957, the government enacted the Price-Anderson
Act which provides liability caps for o site damages. The stated objectives
of this policy were 1) to protect the public by ensuring prompt compensation
after an accident and 2) to foster the development of the nuclear power industry
(Dubin and Rothwell [16]).
Price-Anderson requires that operators purchase private insurance coverage.
In 1984, operators paid an average of $0.4m per year (Brownstein [11]) for cov-
erage of osite damages between $1m and $160m.1 The insurance companies
cover all osite damages for totals between $1m and $160m, and they cover
the rst $160m of damage for worse accidents. If plants operate without osite
losses for 10 years, then they are eligible for a 70% refund of paid premiums
(Denenberg [15]).2
Price-Anderson requires that plant owners equally share liability for damages
in excess of private insurance coverage and below an imposed liability cap. Cal-
culation of expected losses above the liability cap, less the amount of industry
liability, yields an implicit subsidy per reactor year to power plant operators.
Implicit subsidies are the insurance premiums operators are spared for coverage
above the liability cap.
Such liability caps eliminated the need for plant operators to protect them-
selves from possible losses for damages in excess of the liability limit, thus limiting
the need to purchase liability insurance. Many argue that by enabling operators
to avoid these additional insurance premiums, regulators provide an implicit sub-
1Required coverage rose to $300m by 2003, in current dollars (NEST-DOE [7]).
2See [30] for a listing of annual aggregate refunds.
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sidy to the industry. While estimates for the value of these subsidies are fairly
small (Dubin and Rothwell [16], Heyes and Heyes [28, 29], and Denenberg [15]
(note that problems exist in the calculations of Dubin and Rothwell and Heyes
and Heyes)), many still argue that the industry would not survive without them.
Unfortunately, these estimates are dicult to compute, and little faith should
be put in most published estimates (Heyes [26]).
Such protections oered by the government proved insucient to maintain
a healthy nuclear power industry. The 1970's and 1980's proved dicult for
the electricity sector. Average annual electricity demand growth exceeded seven
percent in the decade or more prior to 1973. Growth rates then fell abruptly
to less than three percent. (See, for example, Price [43, p. 107].) Rothwell
and Eastman [51] report that from 1979 to 1981, the realized or allowed rate of
return was less than the cost of capital for U.S. electric utilities. The need for
ever more base load capacity became much less pressing in the 1970s, and the
shift in electricity price growth forced increases in eciency for plants to remain
viable. Nelson and Peck [39] show that the reality of weakening demand set in
slowly, and that the industry consistently over-estimated future demand growth
from the mid1970s to the mid1980s. Price also notes that the industry was slow
to react to signs of deteriorating economic conditions.
Many consider the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) plant to
be the primary cause of the deterioration of the nuclear power industry. How-
ever, there are numerous causes, including falling demand due to increased price
growth, slowing income growth, and higher price elasticities (see Nelson and
Peck [39]); higher costs (see the EIA report [2]); and greater regulatory hur-
dles. In fact, the backlog of new orders fell and plants under construction were
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abandoned even before the TMI accident (Ellis and Zimmerman [18]). Hence,
all of these factors should be incorporated in any model claiming to portray the
economics of the nuclear power industry. Unfortunately, most models focus only
on one, or perhaps a few, such factors. Given the growing interest in resuming
construction of nuclear power plants (University of Chicago [8] and MIT [6]),
it is important that we improve our understanding of the political economy of
nuclear power.
This paper combines a simplied version of the Rust-Rothwell model of nu-
clear power plant operations [56, 55] with our dynamic model of operations and
investment under risk [57]. Power plant operators are assumed to be prot max-
imizers. They are assumed to be without market power, and thus they observe
prices but cannot inuence them. Each period, operators choose either to op-
erate or to decommission permanently their plant. If they choose to operate,
then they choose a level of investment and a level of capacity utilization. Invest-
ment is dened as maintenance and other irreversible expenditures that lower
the probability of an accident. If an accident occurs, then an amount of damage
known ex ante by plant operators will occur. Operators are liable either for the
full amount of damage or an announced nite amount, which ever is less. The
capacity of each plant is xed upon construction. Costs are convex in invest-
ment and output. The time horizon is nite. The model is solved with dynamic
programming techniques.
The solution for the model reports the optimal levels of investment and out-
put based on the age of each plant, the levels of liability faced by each plant, and
electricity prices. Optimal levels of investment and output balance the desire to
maximize prots by increasing output with the need to limit costs and expected
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damage payments.
We apply the model in two ways. First, we consider the eects of a structural
shift in prices. Such a shift occurred in U.S. electricity markets in the mid1980s.
Second, we consider the eects on plants of 20-year extensions to their operating
licenses. Such extensions were oered beginning in the late 1990s.
We conclude with development and application of a method to speed calcula-
tion of the integral of the approximation of a function f (x), where x is normally
distributed. We apply the method to numerical dynamic programming prob-
lems. The method is employed in this chapter to increase the speed of nding
model solutions, with the added benet of simplifying our model code.
5.1.1 Layout of this paper
This paper develops a model of nuclear power plant operations. First, the model
is described, with timings (i.e., the order of events each period), descriptions of
insurance companies and policies, objective functions for the operators, and in-
dustry details. We then derive optimal operating and investment policies for the
rms. We further describe insurance companies and specify insurance premium
calculations. We describe consumers and calculation of social welfare. Next,
calibrate the model with available data, and we generate and report numerical
solutions and simulations. We then apply the model in two ways. First, we eval-
uate the eect on prots and behavior of a shift in the structure of electricity
prices. Second, we evaluate the response to an increase in the allowed maximum
lifetimes of rms. Following the chapter conclusion, an appendix describes a




5.2.1 The Temporal Structure
This model has one primary group of players, nuclear power plant operators, who
operate in a dynamic framework. The rms' objectives are to maximize prots.
It is assumed that a continuum of markets exists, with one nuclear facility per
market. No attempt is made to explain the existence of power plants, and
prices and demand for electricity are exogenous. Firms are identical, except for
the amount of damage that they cause if an accident occurs. We consider a
nite number of time periods. When the maximum lifespan has been reached,
assuming that the rm survives, the rm incurs any shutdown costs and closes
permanently.
The model also has two secondary groups of agents. First, there is a pri-
vate insurance company that issues policies, collects premiums, and pays the
company's share of damages. Second, there is one or more consumer in each
market. These consumers obtain utility through the consumption of electricity.
These same consumers bear losses in the event of an accident in cases where the
damage exceeds the liability cap.
At time zero, the level of demand is announced; we assume that this level is
xed throughout time and that demand is perfectly inelastic.3 We assume that
demand at least is as high as potential output, so that each rm can produce at
3More generally, there may be other generating technologies, e.g. natural gas, that absorb
demand uctuations. Nuclear plants service some or all base load demand, which we assume
is perfectly stable. In the absence of nuclear power production, consumption is normalized to
zero, though in reality a portion of demand may be met through other generating technologies.
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full capacity and sell the amount at the given market price. Prices are modeled
as dynamic log-normal autoregressive processes. Before operations begin, a max-
imum level of liability is imposed on the nuclear power industry, and the level is
announced. Given this announcement, each period power plant operators decide
an optimal level of investment in safety-enhancing maintenance and similar ex-
penditures. If production yields a higher expected present value than the cost of
decommissioning, then rms invest, produce electricity at the optimal utilization
rate, collect the revenue, and pay operating and investment expenses. Accidents
occur at the end of each period with an endogenously determined probability.
These accidents cause damage to third parties, for which regulators may hold
plant operators liable. If the expected present value of the rm is less than the
cost of decommissioning, then operators make no investments and close their
plants immediately. If the rm remains in operation at the end of its maximum
lifespan, the plant incurs decommissioning costs and closes permanently.
We also incorporate features of the Price-Anderson Act. First, in each period
in which a plant operates, an insurance premium is paid before operations begin.
In the event of an accident, the insurance company pays its share of damages at
the end of the period. Second, liability in excess of insurance coverage is shared
among all operating rms. The shares are assessed and paid at the end of each
period.
Exposure to liability with corresponding spending on safety reduces prots.
Installation of investment goods makes the production process more dicult, so
that output costs are greater with higher investment spending. The model has
a continuum of rms that either produce at an optimal utilization rate or shut
down permanently, depending on whether the expected present value of prots
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are greater than decommissioning costs. Essentially, we assume a continuum of
identical markets, where prices are exogenous. Each market possesses one rm
that either produces goods and delivers them to consumers in the same market
who receive utility from consumption of the products, or the rm closes and
consumers receive a level of utility from zero consumption.
5.2.2 Denitions
The continuum of (nearly) identical rms is indexed by the level of potential
damage, h, that each rm may cause by operating. In fact, h is the only distin-
guishing characteristic of the rms. We assume that h is an exact amount. This
magnitude of potential damage, known only to the rm, is such that h ∈ [a, b]
where 0 < a < b < ∞. The publicly-known distribution of damages across
rms is f(h), which is nonzero on and only on [a, b]. We use a probability dis-
tribution f(h) only for convenience, in that it integrates to one and we can use
familiar techniques from statistics. More general specications of f(h) could
integrate to any positive value, as it simply species the number or measure of
rms with potential damages h. Firms face liability either for the full level of
damages or for a maximum level of damages y, whichever is less. We assume
that all plants have the same capacity. Capacity for each plant is Q. Because
the measure of plants in the industry is 1, industry capacity and potential out-
put also is Q. This may be seen by integrating over capacity for each plant:∫ b
a
Qf (h) dh = Q
∫ b
a
f (h) dh = Q. The level of output for a given plant oper-
ating at a given capacity utilization rate is denoted q, so that the utilization
rate is q/Q ∈ [0, 1]. We also denote aggregate output as q, where in this case
q (P ) =
∫ b
a
q (P, h) f (h) dh, and where q (P, h) denotes the optimal plant-level
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output quantity for given levels of prices and potential damages. The level of
expected discounted prots is denoted Π (h, P ) for individual rms and Π (P )
for the industry aggregate.
We assume that the logarithms of electricity prices P are normally dis-
tributed; we denote the logarithm as p̂. Production and investment costs are
denoted C (x, q). This function is convex in investment and output. Firms may
invest in goods and services, indexed by x such that 0 ≤ x, to lessen the prob-
ability of an accident. The probability of an accident p(x), given the level of
investment x, is identical for each rm and depends only on investment. The
rst derivative of the probability function is negative and the second derivative is
positive. (See Dubin and Rothwell [17] for a similar specication.) If an accident
occurs, then rms are liable for the amount h or the liability cap y, whichever
is less. Firms also must clean up on-site damages.
A component of the social welfare function is U . For industry output q,
where q ∈ [0, Q], U(q) = Pq − C (x, q) + u(q). Hence utility U is a quasilinear
utility function, and is determined by the sum of industry revenue less operating
and investment costs plus the benet to consumers u(q) of consuming q. The
numeraire in this utility function is industry revenue less operating and invest-
ment costs. The balance of the social welfare function is potential damages and
is in the same units (dollars) as is the numeraire. If a rm exits the market, then
the corresponding market receives the present value of the utility stream, given
zero output and consumption. Hence, social welfare depends on consumption,
industry prots, and potential damages in excess of rms' liability.
Time is indexed by t, beginning with t = 1. The maximum possible lifespan
is T . If rms operate in Period T , then they must close in Period T + 1 and
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pay decommissioning costs. We assume that all plants begin life at the same
time, so that all operating plants are of the same age. While we could generalize
this specication, it seems a reasonable simplication since the U.S. essentially
has a single generation of commercial nuclear power plants. We assume that
the model parameters are time-invariant; that is, demand, price parameters,
maximum liability, the functions p(.) and f (·), the utility functions, and the
values of h and Q for each rm do not vary over time. The endogenous terms
of course may vary, including investment and output, as does the exogenous
evolution of prices.
5.2.3 The Firms
We consider markets in which private rms are permitted to operate without
regulatory oversight, but they do face liability. We assume that the maximum
level of liability y is given, and is assumed to be set to less than the level of assets
or the value of the rm and that that y ∈ (0, b]. Alternatively, it could be set
to any arbitrary level such that standard bankruptcy rules apply. Instead, we
impose terms of the Price-Anderson Act liability protections. As we will see, the
values of the rms change over time, and so it seems that perhaps y also should
change over time. We do not consider this in the model, nor do we consider
optimal values for y.
Power plant operators seek to maximize expected prots in each period. They
do so rst by determining each period optimal levels of output and investment
in safety improvements and maintenance, given their levels of liability, product
prices, and the present expected value of continued operations. If expected
prots are greater than decommissioning costs, given the optimal investment
154
levels and utilization rates, then operators choose to produce. The per-period
level of output is denoted q and is given by the level of installed capital, Q,
times the capacity utilization rate. For simplicity, we assume that electricity
prices P = exp (p̂) follow a log-normal autoregressive process
p̂t = γ + ρp̂t−1 + εt
where ε ∼ N (0, σ2). Production and investment costs are given by a convex
function. We choose a simple quadratic form to illustrate the problem:
C (x, q) = α1q + α2q
2 + α3x+ α4x
2 + α5qx
Per-period gross prots thus are Pq−C (x, q). If the values of the rms are less
than decommissioning costs, the plants close immediately and incur shutdown
costs. In this version of the model, shutdown costs are time invariant, so that
ΠCloset = Decommissioning
for all t ∈ [1, T + 1]. Plants must close by period T + 1.
The Price-Anderson Act requires that operators purchase insurance for spec-
ied amounts of o-site damages. In the event of an accident, the insurance
covers the rst portion of damages. If no accident occurs for 10 years, then the
Price-Anderson Act species that plant owners are eligible for a refund of up to
70% of their insurance premiums. We specify Refundt (Pt, hi) as the amount of
refunds received in Period t by plants with hi. Refundτ = 0 for τ = 1, . . . , 10. In
subsequent periods, operators receive Refundt = Premiumt−10×0.70 in periods
in which they operate. If instead the plant closes, then we assume that refunds
are distributed over the following years. We denote the present value of these











Price-Anderson also requires that plants share risk through industry self-
insurance. This self-insurance covers damages above the level of insurance cov-
erage and below the liability cap. All plants equally are liable for shares of these




where ft (h) is the distribution of plants that have chosen to operate and have sur-
vived until Period t. We assume that plants with potential damages h ≤ h̃t (Pt)
will operate, and remaining plants close voluntarily. The amount of liability






The amount of expected damages for which the industry is liable, after private
insurance covers damages up to Coveraget (Pt, h), is seen in the numerator. This
amount is shared by all plants that operate; the measure of operating rms is
shown in the denominator. Note that the level of shared liability depends only on
time and the price level. In this model with its innite number of rms, the mea-
sure of plants experiencing accidents each periods is
∫ h̃t(Pt)
a
p (xt (Pt, h)) ft (h) dh.
Even with a constant value for h̃t, the measure of operating plants thus will fall
over time since some will experience accidents. However, we will ignore this de-
tail and assume that the distribution f is independent of time. Since our model
is a stylized version of an industry with a nite number of rms, and since acci-
dents are very rare, we hope that this simplication does not impose excessive
harm to our results.
The prot maximization problem in Period t for rm i with potential damages
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hi is specied as















If the expected discounted value of the rm is less than the exit costs plus refunds,
then the rm permanently exits the market with zero prots. If the plant does
produce, then the rm earns revenue P × q, less operating and investment costs
C (x, q), less expected onsite damages p (x)×Cleanup, plus expected discounted
prots from future periods. The rm pays an insurance premium Premium,
accepts refunds Refund, and bears a share of industry liability SharedLiability.
Expectations of future prots EΠ are computed by integrating over prices
EΠ (P ′, h) ≡
∞∫
−∞
Π (P ′, h)φ(P ′|P )dP ′
where φ (P ′ | P ) is the density function for future prices given the current price
level. We discuss computation of these expectations in the appendix.
Assuming an interior solution and taking as predetermined the functions
Premium, Refund, and SharedLiability, the solutions for investment and out-
put may be found by calculating the gradient of Equation 5.2
δΠLt (Pt, h)
δx







































The gradient indicates that under optimal policies the marginal cost of an ad-
ditional unit of investment will equal the marginal reduction in expected cleanup
costs and marginal increase in expected prots. Marginal costs include both pur-
chase costs of investment goods and services and lost or more costly production.
The second term of the gradient indicates that the marginal revenue will equal
marginal costs. For simplicity of notation, we ignore the constraints that are
required to ensure that x ≥ 0, so that maintenance expenditures are irreversible
for all probability functions p; imposition of this assumption is not restrictive so
long as p is suciently steep for low investment. Also, we ignore the constraint
that q ≥ 0.
Note that the level of prots does not depend on potential damages h unless
insurance premiums and refunds depend on potential damages. This is true
because of liability sharing, and because rms do not take into account their
own contribution to the level of shared liability. If premiums do not depend on
h, then investment decisions will be independent of h. All rms will invest the
same amounts, and these levels will depend only on the age of the rms and the
current electricity price.
If we assume that the Hessian is diagonal, so that δ2Π/δxδq = 0, then we
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have the investment rule as a function of potential damages:









where (p′)−1 is the inverse of the derivative of the probability function. Exam-
ination of this function shows that investment increases with potential onsite
damages and with potential future relative benets of production. If we main-
tain the assumption that the Hessian is diagonal, then the output decision rule
is




where (C ′)−1 is the inverse of the derivative of the cost function with respect to
output. Solutions for cases in which the Hessian is not diagonal and cases in
which the constraints might bind may require numerical computation.
We can determine points h̃Lt (Pt), for each period t ∈ [1, T ], such that rms
are indierent between operating and permanently decommissioning:
{
h̃Lt (Pt) : Π
L
t (Pt, h) = 0, a ≤ h̃L ≤ b
}
Firms with h ≤ h̃L produce, and remaining rms close. Aggregate output is∫ h̃L(Pt)
a
qt (Pt, h) f (h) dh
5.2.4 The Insurance Company
This model includes a single insurance company that issues insurance policies,
collects premiums, and pays a share of o-site damages. Because we know little
about the rates and policies of real-world insurers of the nuclear power industry,
we will assume that insurers know the distribution of rms f (h), but insurers
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do not know the level of potential damages for individual rms. This is at odds
somewhat with reality; see the NRC [30] document for details.
Insurance premiums are the sum of expected losses, overhead and prot, and
the expected discounted value of refunds. We assume that the total amount
of premiums collected equals the total amount of damage claims against the
insurance company plus costs and prots. We solve such an equation for the















−∞(1−p(xτ (Pτ ,h))φ(Pτ |Pt)dP
9=;f(h)dh
where π is the premium share going to overhead and prots and r is the average
yield of investments. The numerator calculates expected damage payments made
by the insurance company in the current period. The denominator is the integral
of one minus the markup rate minus the discounted level of expected premium
refunds. Seventy percent of the premium is refunded following 10 years of safe
operations. This amount is discounted at the constant rate r. The probability
of 10 consecutive years of safe operations is calculated, given the expected level
of future investment which in turn depends on expected electricity prices. The
markup π × Premium is overhead, prot, and other expenses.
Because insurers know only the distribution of potential damages, they can-
not issue premiums based on the level of potential damages for individual rms.
For this reason, refunds in this model also do not depend on h.
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5.2.5 The Consumers and Social Welfare
There are an innite number of consumers, as each of the innite number of
markets has at least one consumer. Each consumer nds electricity consumption
desirable. We assume that the group of consumers in each market is identical;
in particular, we assume that they have identical preferences.
The utility of zero aggregate consumption in a given market is denoted U (0).
In this case, zero need not denote zero consumption, but simply that consumers
will not enjoy the fruits of production by the producers in this model. In the
case of electricity markets, we consider only electricity produced by nuclear power
plants and normalize to zero the production of coal-red, gas-red, and other
power plants. We assume that nuclear plants produce base-load power, and that
it is the other plants that absorb demand uctuations stemming from variations
in price. The present value of a ow of utility from zero consumption from
Period t to Period T + 1 is









For markets in which plants have been decommissioned, this is the present value
of social welfare in Period t. For simplicity, we set the discount factor according




Social welfare over all markets may be found for a given price level by taking
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+ [1− F (h̃L (Pt))]× ζCloset
where F (g) =
∫ g
a
f (h) dh for g ∈ [a, b] is the measure of plants that operate. The
rst term on the right-hand side computes the present value of social welfare in
markets with operating plants. Social welfare in each of these markets is the sum
of consumers' utility and plant prots, less expected damages that are not borne
by the rm and its insurance coverage, plus the expected social value of zero
consumption, plus the expected present value of future operations. The second
term on the right-hand side is the sum of social welfare in markets without
operating plants. Expectations of future social welfare Eζ are computed by
integrating over utility
Eζ (P ′, h) ≡
∞∫
−∞
ζ (P ′, h)φ(P ′|p)dP ′
To compute this integral, we proceed as with the computation of expected prots
that is described in the appendix.
5.3 Numerical Results
General analytical results are dicult or impossible to calculate for this model,
so we evaluate it numerically. We rst must specify the functions and parameters
that were not specied above.
162
5.3.1 Calibration
Insurance premiums are set to $400,000 per reactor per period in 1984 dollars
(see Brownstein [11]). We thus ignore variation in premiums based on risk as-
sessments, the population and property values in the areas surrounding plants,
and other such factors.4 We assume that all refunds are 70% of the $400,000
premiums, or $280,000; see [30] for a listing of aggregate refunds.
Insurance coverage in 1984 was $160 million. Shared liability is determined
according to Equation 5.1.
The range of potential damages h is [$1m, $10, 000m], and this range is dis-
cretized into 101 equal segments. The liability cap is set to y = $660m.5 For
simplicity, we assume that f (h) is the uniform distribution.6 Note that we mis-
use the data, since these values represent the range of potential damages for each
plant. In our model, each plant poses damages h, which is a scalar rather than
a distribution for particular plants.
We specied above an autoregressive log-normal process for electricity prices.
We rst set the parameters γ = −0.51, ρ = 0.83, and standard deviation σ =
0.05, which correspond to relative electricity prices between 1973 and 1985.7 In
the second run, we set the parameters to γ = −0.40, ρ = 0.89, and standard
deviation σ = 0.02, which correspond to relative electricity prices from 1986 to
4See, for example, the review of Price-Anderson [30].
5These parameters correspond to those in Dubin and Rothwell [16].
6Dubin and Rothwell [16] assumed a log-logistic distribution, although their distribution
was dened dierently.
7Prices are from the EIA, are in dollars per kilowatt-hour, and are relative to the GDP
implicit price deator in 1984 prices.
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2004. We assume that 50% of the sale price is assigned to power generation
and the remaining unit revenue share goes to transmission and other expenses.
The truncation points for the log-normal distribution are -5.0 and -1.0. Nineteen
Chebychev interpolation nodes are chosen for the approximation and integration
of the value function.
As was shown above, we assume that the cost function is a second-order
polynomial. Costs per kilowatt of capacity are:
49.4− 7.59q + 0.001q2 + 2.08x+ 0.000002x2 − 0.00004qx
Cost data was taken from the EIA [2]. Total costs are total non-fuel oper-
ating costs per kilowatt of capacity and have been converted to 1984 prices.
Investment expenditures also have been converted to 1984 prices using the GDP
implicit price deator. Output and capacity data were taken from the EIA web-
site. Potential output is taken to be the level of capacity in 1984, which was
69.7 gigawatts, times the number of hours in a year, so that potential output
approximately is 610.6 billion KWh. A linear regression was used to calculate
parameters. Constraints were imposed to ensure that the cost function is convex.
It is assumed that operating costs are under-reported by 30%, and so the results
of this equation are inated accordingly8. Other expenses, such as fuel costs, are
not considered.
The maximum number of periods T initially is 40. This corresponds to the
number of years that plants initially were licensed to operate. We solve the model
a second time to consider implications of possible 20-year license extensions.9
8See EIA [2] for details.
9See Rust and Rothwell [56] for similar analysis.
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We set decommissioning costs to $400m and onsite cleanup following an ac-
cident to $1b.10 The interest rate is r = 0.07. Preferences are specied as
u (q) = 610.6 log (q + 1), so that u (0) = 0. The probability of an accident is
p (x) = χx, where χ is chosen so that p ≈ 0.005 at 1984 investment levels.
Basic Results
The rst two gures, Figures 5.1 and 5.2, display parts of the solutions given the
parameterizations listed above.
The graph in the upper left corner of the Figure 5.1 displays the level of in-
vestment in Period 1 across potential damages. The level of investment is shown
for various price levels, with higher prices leading to higher investment levels.
Note that investment does not depend on the level of potential damages. This
is so because of liability sharing and because we assumed a constant insurance
premium despite diering potential damage assessments.
The graph in the upper right corner of the gure displays the expected present
discounted value of rms in Period 1 across potential damages. Present values
are displayed for various price levels. The present values rise with prices. Note
that the values of the rms do not depend on potential damages for the same
reasons listed above.
The graph in the lower left displays the aggregate level of social welfare across
time. At each point in time, social welfare is displayed for the same set of price
levels. Note that social welfare falls over time and increases with prices. Social
welfare increases with prices because rms receive higher prots and because
10This is the amount cited by Dubin and Rothwell [17] for cleaning up after the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979.
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Figure 5.1: Dynamic Programming Solutions
we assumed that demand is perfectly inelastic. A more realistic social welfare
function would not increase so rapidly with prices, and the positive relationship
might actually be counter-factual. With this parameter set, there appears to be
little variation in social welfare as the price varies.
The nal graph, in the lower right corner, displays aggregate output over
time. For this set of parameters, and at the price levels that are graphed, either
all plants close or all plants produce in all periods, depending on electricity
prices.
Figure 5.2 displays the aggregate present value of rms over time. In each
period, the present values are calculated at the same set of price levels. We see
that the values of rms fall over time and increases with electricity prices.
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Figure 5.2: Aggregate Present Values
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Figure 5.3: Interpolation of Expected Prots
In Figure 5.3, we see expected prots in Period 1 across electricity prices for
plants with the lowest level of potential damages. The Chebychev approximation
of prots is displayed, along with a nite set of approximation points. Note that
despite the non-linearity imposed by the decommissioning rule, in which plants
close when the expected present value of the rm falls below decommissioning
costs plus refunds, a continuous Chebychev approximation of prots seems ap-
propriate. In contrast, linear splines approximations prove far superior for the
investment and output functions because of more extreme nonlinearities. The
latter two approximations are necessary for simulations, while the prot function
approximation is needed both to solve and to simulate the model. Chebychev
interpolation also is used for simulating social welfare levels.
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Figure 5.4: Simulated Prices
5.3.2 Simulations
The solutions described above were employed to simulate the behavior of a rm.
First, the exogenous price series was simulated, with the price in period 0 ini-
tialized to its steady-state level (p̂ = γ/ (1− ρ)). In this case, we calibrated the
price equation using post1986 electricity rates. The resulting simulated series is
shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.5 displays investment, the present value of the rm, social welfare in
the corresponding market, and output. Note that while nite-horizon dynamic
programming solutions inherently are nonstationary, investment indeed trends
lower but output levels are not trended.
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Figure 5.5: Dynamic Programming Simulations
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Table 5.1: Correlation Coecient
Output Investment Prices
Output 1.00 -0.09 0.16
Investment -0.09 1.00 0.66
Prices 0.16 0.66 1.00
To better understand the properties of the model, and because the data
is not trended strongly, we compute the correlation coecients among output,
investment, and prices. These are displayed in Table 5.1. Note that output
and investment have a negative correlation, while both output and investment
have a positive correlations with prices. We must remember, however, that these
statistics are based on a small sample. Simulation of additional data and with
alternative parameter specications could yield signicantly dierent results.
5.4 Applications
We employ the model in two applications. First, we consider the eects of a
structural shift in the price parameters. The U.S. electricity sector experienced
such a shift in the mid1980s. Second, we consider the eects on plants that
are allowed 20-year extensions to their operating licenses. U.S. regulators began
oering such extensions in the late 1990s.
5.4.1 Structural Shifts in Prices
Electricity price growth, relative to the GDP price deator, may be seen in Fig-
ure 5.6. Note that price growth consistently was positive in the period from
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Figure 5.6: Electricity Prices
about 1973 to 1985. In about 1985, relative price growth became consistently
negative. We estimated parameters for the price equation for the two periods;
these parameters are listed in the Calibration section above. Various struc-
tural stability tests support the graphical evidence for a structural break in the
mid1980s. The steady price growth of the 1970s and early 1980s ended, and a
long period of gradual decline began.
Rust and Rothwell [55] constructed a detailed model of nuclear power plants.
They employed the model in an attempt to detect optimal changes in the oper-
ations of power plants due to regulatory reform following the 1979 accident at
Three Mile Island. A key simplifying assumption in their model is that electricity
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prices are constant.
Their model showed that 90% of the present value of operations disappeared
in the mid1980s. Much of this was explained by higher operating and mainte-
nance costs, in part due to stricter regulations, increased decommissioning costs,
and stricter regulation of prices. Rust and Rothwell also detect an increased
likelihood of prudent behavior in the era of greater oversight and lower prots.
Finally, they observe that plants extended their average times between refueling
from 12 to 18 months. Rust and Rothwell conclude that these changes primarily
were due to shifts in regulation.
Our model described above is rather abstract, and so despite its calibration
using real-world data it is of limited use in performing quantitative analysis. We
might hope, however, that the qualitative results seem plausible. We begin by
comparing results for 10-year-old plants. This corresponds to a plant that began
life in 1975 and was observed in 1985. We use relative price levels of $0.0498 per
KWh, which is close to the 1985 relative electricity price with a 1984 base year.
First, we solve the model using price parameters estimated with 1974-1985
data. We note the solutions at Period 10. We again solve the model, this time
using price parameters estimated with 1986-2004 data, and again we observe
solutions at Period 10. The dierences in plant values roughly correspond to
changes a plant might have realized in 1985.
The present value of a 10-year-old plant observing relative prices of $0.0498
with the high-growth price structure is $5,766.0 million. The same plant under
the low-growth price structure is valued at $5,710.9 million. The reduction is
slight, about 0.96% compared to the 90% result of Rust and Rothwell. On the
other hand, the change is in the direction we would expect. Investment declines
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from $4.569 million to $4.564 million. This may be at odds with the increased
prudence detected by Rust and Rothwell.
We conclude then that some of the changes noted by Rust and Rothwell might
be due to demand side shifts and not exclusively to regulatory reforms. Our an-
nual model cannot capture the refueling details that require a high-frequency
model like that of Rust and Rothwell. Our model does explain some of the re-
duction in prots that they discovered. We allowed only demand-side changes,
and we did not consider any changes in operating costs, liability levels, or insur-
ance premiums. While in our model the eects of structural shifts are slight, they
lead us to suggest that the model of Rust and Rothwell may suer from their
constant-price assumption, and as a result their claimed eects of regulatory
reform might be overstated.
5.4.2 Operating License Extensions
Rust and Rothwell [56] build a detailed model of nuclear power plant operations.
They apply the model in an investigation of the eects of proposed 20-year
extensions to original 40-year operating licenses. They nd that the 20-year
extensions roughly double the present value of operations.
We replicate the analysis by again modeling a plant that began operations in
1975. This time, we compare the plant values in 1995 under the 40-year licenses
with plant values under 60-year licenses. We set the model price to $0.0358 per
KWh, which is close to the actual 1995 relative price. We employ price equation
parameters estimated with data from 1986 to 2004.
Under 40-year operating licenses and the noted price, the present value of
operations is $4,858.4 million. Under 60-year licenses, the same plant is worth
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$6,111.0 million. While this 25.8% increase is less than the doubling of plant
values reported by Rust and Rothwell, the increase also is large and is in the
same direction as their ndings. Optimal investment increases from $4.49 million
to $4.59 million.
We conclude that while the Rust-Rothwell model would improve through
relaxation of the constant-price assumption, the change likely would not alter
many of their qualitative results.
5.5 Conclusions
We constructed and applied a numerical model of the nuclear power industry.
This model provides detail on a number of important features of the American
nuclear power industry. Few other works in the literature oer such industry
details.
We calculated optimal investment and prots, together with social welfare,
for the American markets. We specied details for the insurance market for
nuclear liability insurance set up under Price-Anderson policies. Details in-
clude specication of insurance premiums, premium refunds, and shared liabil-
ity. Firms choose investment and capacity utilization levels given current and
expected electricity prices, and also they decide when to decommission their
plants. They face decommissioning costs, and they face onsite cleanup costs
should an accident occur. Output and investment costs are convex.
We nd that investment does not vary with the level of damages that rms
pose to the public. This is so because of the shared liability specications of
Price-Anderson, and because at least in our model insurance premiums do not
175
vary with potential damages. While our model remains somewhat abstract, and
we thus should interpret its results carefully, this suggests that we should consider
carefully whether the shared liability clauses yield unintended consequences. On
the other hand, it is possible that regulators recognize this problem and tailor
their investment requirements accordingly.
We tested our model to determine eects of changes in price structures like
those occurring in the 1980s. The model responded predictably, with a fall in
rm values corresponding to a reduction in the growth rate of electricity prices.
However, the reduction in rm values was very small. This suggests that some,
but perhaps very few, of the industry changes noted by Rust and Rothwell may
be explained by demand-side changes.
Finally, we tested the response of the model to operating license extensions.
The model responded strongly, with a dramatic jump in rm values. This sup-
ports the ndings of Rust and Rothwell.
This model would benet from many improvements and extensions. For
example, we easily could extend the analysis to consider the eects of capacity
uprates; that is, the eects of infrequent discrete increases in potential plant
capacities Q. Such changes have become common in the nuclear industry over
the past decade. Also, it would be desirable to make electricity prices dependent
on output decisions within the nuclear industry. This especially is desirable in
the aggregate, since nuclear power presently contributes roughly 20% of U.S.
production.
Other possibilities include the allowance of dierences across plants for p(x),
and to make f(h) a distribution of potential damages for each plant. (See Dubin
and Rothwell [17] for a similar specication.) This could improve the plausibil-
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ity of assumptions regarding private versus public information. Liability limits
would aect all plants in all cases. We also might suppose that accident prob-
abilities depend on the utilization rate, so that risk is greater when the plants
are run at full capacity.
Rothwell [47] notes the relationship between safety and plant performance.
That is, plants with high accident probabilities generally are more troublesome
and expensive to operate. Hence, operators have incentives to maintain their
plants in order to maximize output and minimize repair costs, even if they face
no liability. Dubin and Rothwell [17] nd that operators of less-reliable plants
moved more quickly to invest in safety equipment. They also report that relia-
bility generally falls with the age of the plant, suggesting that older plants have
higher accident probabilities. This correlation between reliability and accident
probabilities likely will prove important in any future quantitative analysis and





We have a set of functions of unknown specications that we have approximated
by Chebychev polynomial interpolation. We need to calculate the expected value
of these functions given various sets of distribution parameters, assuming that
the function argument x is normally distributed. The interpolation is performed
over a nite range [a, b], and thus the normal distribution must be truncated
at the same end points. The objective is to nd an analytical solution for the
expected value of f (x) given its Chebychev approximation and the truncated
normal distribution such that x ∈ [a, b].
First, we will set up the problem by dening the probability distribution
and the expected value of f (x), and we describe the Chebychev approximation
technique. Second, we will show that the expected value of f (x) over [a,b] is a
linear combination of the Chebychev coecients that dene the approximation
of f (x). The weights in this linear combination in turn are linear combinations of
moment integrals of x over domain [a, b], where weights in the latter combination
are coecients of the Chebychev polynomials. Third, we will dene an ecient
means of computing the moment integrals of x ∼ N (µ, σ2) over interval [a, b] by
showing that they are linear combinations of moment integrals for z ∼ N (0, 1)







. Fourth, we will dene a practi-
cal algorithm for computing the expected value of f (x) for x ∼ N (µ, σ2). Fifth,
we will apply this methodology to the calculation of the expected value function
in a dynamic programming problem with one continuous state variable. Finally,
we report test results of this method for various functions.
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These techniques can be extended to other distributions and interpolation
techniques, and they likely can be extended fairly easily to encompass multivari-
ate distributions. The work of describing the error properties for this approx-
imation method, apart from the numerical results reported in the last section,
remains to be done.
5.6.2 Denition of the Problem
The Probability Distribution
First, let us specify the distribution. Let Φ̃ (x) denote the truncation of the
normal cumulative distribution function Φ (x). Then
Φ̃ (x) =
Φ (x)− Φ (a)
Φ (b)− Φ (a)
,
for a ≤ x ≤ b, and





Φ (b)− Φ (a)
≡ φ (x)
Φ (b)− Φ (a)
,
where φ̃ is the truncated normal PD and φ is the normal PDF, and
b∫
a


















Φ (b)− Φ (a)
= 1.




φ̃ (x) f (x) ∂x =
b∫
−∞
φ (x) f (x) ∂x−
a∫
−∞
φ (x) f (x) ∂x




In this appendix, we assume that the function approximation employs Chebychev
polynomials, but the techniques developed here can be applied to many sets of
polynomials. The Chebychev approximation is made by nding a coecient
vector c that solves the linear system B × c = f (x) ⇒ c = B−1 × f (x), where











, j = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Chebychev interpolation nodes are specied on the [−1, 1] interval, but any nite
domain [a, b] can be mapped into [−1, 1] by x̃ = 2x−a
b−a − 1; hence, we shall ignore
this point throughout this paper. B is the basis matrix where elements Bi,j
is the ith Chebychev polynomial evaluated at the jth Chebychev interpolation
node. Chebychev polynomials are specied in trigonometric form as Ti (x) =
cos (i× arccos (x)) or by the equivalent recursion
T0 (x) = 1
T1 (x) = x
. . .
Ti (x) = 2xTi−1 (x)− Ti−2 (x) .
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Dene TC as the lower-triangular matrix of Chebychev polynomial coecients,
in which all elements are zero except
TC0,0 = 1
TC1,1 = 1
TCi,j = −TCi−2,j, i > 1, j = 0
TCi,j = 2T
C
i−1,j−1 − TCi−2,j, i > 1, j > 0
for increasing i, j. Then we can write the Chebychev polynomials as T = TC×−→x ,
where the vector−→x has element−→x i = xi for i = 0, . . . , n−1. Given the coecient
vector c, the approximate value of f (x) for x ∈ [a, b] may be found by evaluating
the rst n Chebychev polynomials at x and then evaluating f (x) ≈ c′ × T (x)
or equivalently by forming −→x and then evaluating f (x) ≈ c′ × TC ×−→x .
5.6.3 The Expected Value of f (x)
Suppose that x is stochastic. For most of this paper, we will assume that x
has the truncated normally distribution N (µ, σ) over the domain [a, b], but the
contents of this section apply to any distribution for which the rst n−1 moments
exist. Then the expected value of f (x) can be estimated as
b∫
a
φ̃ (x) f (x) ∂x ≈
b∫
a




φ (x) [c′ × T (x)] ∂x−
a∫
−∞
φ (x) [c′ × T (x)] ∂x
Φ (b)− Φ (a)
.
Recall that T is a vector of polynomials. Hence, if closed-form solutions
exist for the indenite integrals of moments 0 through n− 1, then we easily can
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compute the numerator of Equation 5.4. Closed-form solutions do not exist for
the normal distribution. Nevertheless, we will ignore the problem in this section.
In the following section, we will describe ways to mitigate the problem.
Let us start with the second integral in the numerator of Equation 5.4; eval-




φ (x) [c′ × T (x)] ∂x =
a∫
−∞
φ (x) [c′0 × T0 (x)] ∂x+
a∫
−∞






c′n−1 × Tn−1 (x)
]
∂x




φ (x) [c′ × T (x)] ∂x = c0
a∫
−∞
φ (x) [1] ∂x+ c1
a∫
−∞




















8x4 − 8x2 + 1
]
∂x
= [c0 − c2 + c4]
a∫
−∞


















xjφ (x) ∂x, j = 0, . . . , n− 1
Again, let TC be the lower-triangular matrix of Chebychev polynomial coef-
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c′ × TC ×−→x
]
∂x (5.5)
= c′ × TC ×
b∫
a
φ (x)−→x ∂x = c′ × TC ×∆Φ.
If we employ this result in the numerator of Equation 5.4, then we see that
the expected value of f (x) over [a, b] is a linear combination of the Chebychev
coecients that dene the approximation of f (x). The weights in this linear
combination in turn are linear combinations of moment integrals of x over domain
[a, b], where weights in the latter combination are coecients of the Chebychev
polynomials. We can write the approximate integral as
b∫
a
φ̃ (x) f (x) ∂x ≈ c′ ×W , (5.6)




5.6.4 Ecient Computation of Moment Integrals
If the indenite integrals exist for the moments of x, then calculation of W in
Equation 5.6 is straightforward, and thus estimation of E [f (x)] also is straight-
forward. We develop here a method for eciently computing Equation 5.6 for
the normal distribution, which has no closed-form indenite moment integrals.




where φ is the normal density function.
Note that if x ∼ N (µ, σ2), then z ≡ x−µ
σ
∼ N (0, 1) has the standard normal
distribution. Let φSTD denote the standard normal PDF. Let ∆ΦSTD denote the
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zjφSTD (z) ∂z, j = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Our objective is to nd a relationship between ∆ΦSTD and ∆Φ. We begin by



























φSTD (z) ∂z = ∆ΦSTD0 .
A similar relationship exists for the rst moment integrals:
y∫
−∞



































































































= σ2∆ΦSTD2 + 2µ∆Φ1 − µ2∆ΦSTD0











A pattern already has become evident that will allow us easily to relate ∆Φ







Dene matrix L as the lower triangular matrix with rows identical to the rows
of Pascal's triangle. Dene the lower triangular matrices Σ and M as
Σ =

σ0 0 0 . . .
σ0 σ1 0
σ0 σ1 σ2




µ0 0 0 . . .
µ1 µ0 0
µ2 µ1 µ0
. . . . . .

,
and dene ~ as the operator that multiplies two r× s matrices such that Ai,j =
Bi,j × Ci,j. Then
∆Φ = [L~ Σ ~M ]×∆ΦSTD.
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Again, closed-form solutions do not exist for ∆ΦSTD. Suppose we formed a
Chebychev approximation∫
φ (z) zi∂z ≈
[
CSTDi
]′ × TC ×−→z ,i = 0, . . . , n− 1
where TC again is the lower triangular matrix of Chebychev polynomial coe-
cients, where CSTDi are the approximation coecients for the i
th moment integral
of z, and where element j of vector −→z is zj for j = 0, . . . , n− 1. If the column i
of matrix CSTD is CSTDi , then∫
φ (z)−→z ∂z ≈
[
CSTD
]′ × TC ×−→z .
Recall that ∆ΦSTD is the dierence of two integrals that dier only in their












]′ × TC ×∆−→z .
The order of approximation N for ∆ΦSTD need not be the same as n, the
order of approximation for f (x). In the equation above, ∆ΦSTD is n× 1, TC is
N ×N , CSTD is N × n, and −→z is N × 1.
Finally, we have the approximation of ∆Φ
∆Φ ≈ [L~ Σ ~M ]×
[
CSTD
]′ × TC ×∆−→z .
Given an approximation domain [a, b] that coincides with the limits of inte-
gration for E [f (x)], and given the orders of interpolation n for f (x) and N for
the moment integrals of the standard normal variable z, then we have a simple
approximation for ∆Φ in which only elements Σ, M , and ∆−→z may vary. In
fact, Σ changes only if σ changes, M changes only with changes in µ, and ∆−→z
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changes with both σ and µ. If we dene matrix Z =
[
CSTD
]′ × TC , then the
above equation can be written simply as
∆Φ ≈ [L~ Σ ~M ]× Z ×∆−→z . (5.7)
5.6.5 Estimation of E [f (x)] for x ∼ N (µ, σ)
We nally have the tools required to eciently estimateE [f (x)] for x ∼ N (µ, σ2).
Combine Equations 5.4, 5.5 and 5.7 as follows:
b∫
a
φ̃ (x) f (x) ∂x ≈ c
′ × TC × [L~ Σ ~M ]× Z ×∆−→z
Φ (b)− Φ (a)
.



















]′×TC ×∆−→z . If Z0,• denotes the
rst row of Z, then we have nally
b∫
a
φ̃ (x) f (x) ∂x ≈ c′ × T
C × [L~ Σ ~M ]× Z ×∆−→z
Z0,• ×∆−→z
. (5.8)
Let vector W represent the fraction in Equation 5.8. Note that for a given
domain [a, b], given orders of interpolation n and N , and given distribution
parameters µ and σ, W is specied completely, so that it does not depend at all
on f (x). Given W , then, calculation of E [f (x)] requires only the inner product
of Chebychev approximation coecients c and W . If function approximations
for f (x) and g (x) dier only in their coecient vectors, then W is identical for
both. Given W , evaluation of the expectations requires simply the computation
of two inner products. For nite sets of values {µ} and {σ}, we can compute a
corresponding nite set of vectors {W}. Given {W}, expectations of the set of
function {f} can be calculated easily given that E [x] ∈ {µ} and +
√
V ar (x) ∈
{σ}, where the domain of f is [a, b] for all f ∈ {f}.
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5.6.6 A Dynamic Programming Application
Suppose that we are simulating the operation of a rm using dynamic program-
ming techniques. Each period, the operator of the rm sees the state of his rm
and then optimally chooses an action a from the set of possible actions A. We
believe that a will be chosen to maximize the expected present discounted value
of the rm. Besides the action a, suppose the only relevant condition inuencing
the value of the rm is the product price; we denote the logarithm of the price as
p. Suppose that p is independent of the rm's operations, and that the dynamics
of p are summarized adequately as
pt+1 = βpt + σεt+1,
where ε ∼ N (0, 1). If a (p) ∈ A are the optimally chosen actions, then the value
of the rm is dened as
V (pt) = πt (a (pt)) +
1
1 + r
EVt+1 (pt+1) , (5.9)
where r is the interest rate and π represents prots in the current period given
at.
Suppose a closed-form representation of V does not exist. Then we might
nd an approximation Vt (p) ≈ c′t×TC×−→p , where −→p i = pi for all p ∈ [a, b]. The
diculty in evaluation of Equation 5.9 is the computation of EV . Fortunately,
we can use the methodology developed above to assist us. We will proceed by
relating each part of EV to corresponding parts of earlier equations.




. We choose or-
ders of approximation n for our function approximation andN for approximation
of the standard normal moment integrals.
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Second, let pt be a nite set of points spanning the interval [a, b]. The normal
vector pt+1 has elements corresponding to variable x in preceding sections. For
given autoregression parameters β and σ, pt+1 has mean βpt and variance σ
2×in,
where in is an n× 1 vector of ones. From these sets of distribution parameters,
a set of vectors {W} can be constructed according to Equation 5.8.
Third, we begin to solve the model by recursively evaluating Equation 5.9.
For nal period τ , EVτ+1 = 0. Hence, Vτ = πτ . Given πτ , for which a is
chosen optimally, we can nd approximation coecients cτ such that Vτ (pj) =
πτ (a (pj)) ≈ c′τ × TC ×−→pj , where [−→pj ]i = (pj)
i and where pj is the j
th element of
pτ . Next, we proceed to period τ − 1. This time, EV is not zero, assuming πτ
is not zero. EVτ is dened as
b∫
a
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If we replace the function V with its approximations, then we have
b∫
a


















)∂p, i = 1, . . . , n.
This equation has the same form as Equation 5.4. Given calculation of {W} in
the second step, we can calculate this integral for element i of vector EVτ as
c′τ ×W {i}.
5.6.7 Evaluation
This section summarizes tests of the methodology using known functions. Ap-
proximations of known functions are made. The integrals of these function ap-
proximations, weighted by the truncated normal density function, are computed
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according to the methodology developed above. The integrals are computed us-
ing Simpson's method, which performs function interpolation of the probability-
weighted function using quadratic splines.11 Calculations are performed repeat-
edly with constant variances but allowing the mean to vary. The integrals com-
puted with the new method are compared to estimates computed with Simpson's
method.
The order of approximation for the moments of the normal distribution is 50,
and we form an approximation of the normal distribution over seven standard
deviations. The order of approximation for the function f (x) is 10. The domain
for the function, which corresponds to the non-zero interval for the truncated
normal distribution, is [0, 100]. We calculate the integrals repeatedly while al-
lowing the mean of the normal distribution to vary across the same interval.
The standard deviation is 10. The number of quadrature points for Simpson's
method is 500,001.
The approximate integrals are displayed below, along with the relative errors.
Note that the errors are relative to the results using Simpson's method, which
itself contains approximation errors. The function employed in Figure 5.7 is
f (x) = x, and the function employed in Figure 5.8 is f (x) = x2.
Note that these polynomial functions can be approximated very well using
Chebychev techniques. Chebychev approximation is less precise for functions
such as f (x) =
√
x. Hence, integration of the weighted approximation of f (x)
also is less precise. Figure 5.9 displays results.
It likely is possible to alter the spacing of the interpolation nodes to improve
11Simpson's method was chosen for ease of implementation. Other methods may be substi-
tuted without much diculty, and they may provide a better baseline for comparison.
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Figure 5.7: Expected Values of a Linear Function
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Figure 5.8: Expected Values of a Quadratic Function
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Figure 5.9: Expected Values of a Square Root Function
193
the t of the function approximations. Typically, performance of interpola-
tion techniques improves by increasing the density of nodes in areas where the
function exhibits greatest curvature. In the case of the square root function,
approximation error likely would decrease by putting relatively more nodes near
zero, and relatively less in the upper end of the domain.
A number of generalizations of these method are possible. They include
adoption of distributions other than the normal distribution, and approxima-
tion methods other than Chebychev. Especially useful would be to extend the
technique to multiple dimensions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion for Part 1
At the beginning of this section, we posed several questions. Should operators
of nuclear power plants continue to run their plants given the current economic
circumstances and regulatory policies? Should regulators adopt a conciliatory
stance to feed the economic desires of producers and consumers, or should they
enforce hard-line standards to lessen the risks of nuclear accidents? What are
the eects of liability limits on the decisions of plant operators, and what is the
economic benet to plant owners?
The preceding four chapters shed some light on these questions, and they
provide a framework in which to analyze other questions related to liability
limits and nuclear power. Our models in Chapter 2 illustrated basic economic
principles that suggest plant operators will have greater incentive to produce
when demand and prices are high, and when regulatory costs are low. We didn't
fully answer the question regarding whether plants should be allowed to operate.
We did, however, demonstrate the tradeos between economic well-being and
safety, where increasing wealth and consumption requires acceptance of risk. We
saw that liability limits indeed aect the protability of power plant operations,
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by making them more inclined to produce and less inclined to invest, and thus
liability limits aect the optimal decisions of plant operators. The eects on
decisions aren't necessarily bad from the perspective of consumers who place
high value on consumption relative to expected losses from an accident. Such
consumers would prefer limited liability, if it is required to maintain protability
for rms, in order to obtain consumption goods. We saw that in some cases,
it may be optimal to increase prots by imposing liability limits, but to force
rms to spend the funds on safety enhancements. We extended the concept of
what constitutes implicit subsidies and we derived theoretical support for their
denition, but we showed that existing perceptions of implicit subsidies may
exaggerate their true levels.
In Chapter 3, we reviewed the attempts of others to dene and measure im-
plicit subsidies. We reveal and correct several errors in published calculations.
We further show that the class of models currently employed are inconsistent
with the stated facts. In particular, existing models imply that insurers be-
lieve that claims will be led frequently. According to the stated facts, claims
should be led only after serious accidents. In the following exercise, we take
the facts seriously and oer several alternative models that eliminate this trou-
bling implication. The results suggest that implicit subsidies may be far lower
than reported. On the other hand, we show evidence that the stated facts might
be misleading, and we provide data that should be incorporated to extend our
understanding of Price-Anderson and its eects of the industry.
In Chapter 4, we extend the static model of Chapter 2 to a multiperiod frame-
work. We found some reason to fear that too little incentive is given to rms
posing the greatest threat to invest in safety measures. This problem comes
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through the liability sharing clause of the Price-Anderson Act. On the other
hand, regulators already may have addressed the problem by adopting policies
and instruments capable of forcing those rms to invest more. Also, our distri-
bution of potential harm is rather articial, and all plants pose risk of great harm
to the public, and so perhaps regulators simply impose strong safety standards
for all plants. We again apply our model in the study of implicit subsidies. The
dynamic framework allows us to calculate the expected present value of current
and future subsidies, taking into account the endogenous investment problem
and its eect on risk. This eort is unique, and should guide future eorts to
quantify the value of liability limits to the industry.
In Chapter 5, we extend the dynamic model developed in Chapter 4 by
adding a number of industry details. In particular, we add many details to
describe nuclear power plant operations, and we dene the insurance industry
and other means of dealing with liability established under Price-Anderson. We
calibrate and employ the model to simulate the eects on the industry of two
historical events. First, we simulate the sharp drop in electricity prices that
was observed in 1985. Second, we simulate the extensions of 40-year operating
licenses to 60 years that became available in the late 1990s. The model produces
satisfactory qualitative results. In the rst case, results suggest that existing
rm models should be extended to incorporate electricity price growth. The
second case provides qualitative and quantitative support for earlier ndings
that license extensions add greatly to the value of rms. Finally, we develop a
means to speed computation in numerical dynamic programming models. The
method was employed in our work to speed calculations and to simplify code.
We have presented a picture of the nuclear power industry and its regulation.
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Our analysis remains rather abstract, so that in many cases the details corre-
spond only vaguely to the actual economic agents and the environment in which
they operate. In the next section we will present a closer look at the real world
by constructing and reviewing industry data. We then will provide a detailed
look at a key agent of our earlier models, the nuclear power plant operator.
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Part II




Introduction to Part II
How has the nuclear industry fared in the past 15 years? Have the factors that
contributed to the struggles of the 1970s and 1980s been mitigated? Have nuclear
power plant operators learned from earlier experiences?
In the rst section, we looked at the overall nuclear power industry and
sought greater understanding of it by building a series of increasingly detailed
models of its primary features. In this section, we take a look at the history
of the industry by reviewing rst data on the aggregate and regional electricity
markets and then cost and operating data for individual sites and plants. We
then turn from simple observation of the markets and operator behavior to a
model of operators in an attempt to explain their behavior and to decipher the
nature of their decisionmaking.
In Chapter 8, we review aggregate and regional electricity prices. We see
that relative prices climbed rapidly from about 1973 to the mid1980s. At that
point, relative prices began a slow decline, marked by dramatically increased
seasonal volatility. Structural stability tests conrm graphical evidence of sig-
nicant changes in the price structure. Surely these changes aect signicantly
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the protability of power plants and have corresponding eects on decisions of
operators. We attempt to conrm these eects in our model of power plant
operators. Among various eects of these price changes that we might expect
to see reected in operator behavior, we list two. First, the increase in seasonal
volatility should increase the incentive to refuel, repair, and inspect plants when
demand is lowest. Thus, we expect operators to exhibit an increased tendency
to refuel in the spring and fall, and to limit down time so that they are back in
service when high price levels resume. Second, we expect the reduction in price
growth to force stricter adherence to optimal policies and cost minimization.
Other authors observed this increase in operator discipline and explained it as
a reaction to heightened regulatory standards and enforcement. Our arguments
do not negate their claims but simply oer alternative explanations to present a
fuller picture of the industry.
In Chapter 9, we turn attention rst to operating data. These data describe
conditions and events at individual nuclear power plants. We have a large data
set, covering nearly every commercial American plant over the past 30 years. The
story told by these data is dramatic. We see that the industry that struggled
terribly two decades ago improved greatly. Apparently, optimal methods were
learned and now are applied rigorously, aided by regulatory reforms. Average
operating spells are longer, refueling spells are shorter, and temporary shutdowns
appear less frequently. Great improvements in eciency and output would seem
to indicate that protability should have improved.
We next turn to nancial data in an attempt to verify these impressions.
Writers a decade ago reported what they believed to be the beginning of new
trends. Runaway cost growth in the 1980s seemed to be slowing. We extend
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the data by seven years, and it conrms their suspicions. Operating and main-
tenance, fuel, and capital additions costs have ceased their upward climb in real
terms, and in fact unit costs seem to be falling.
Improvements on the cost side matter little if revenues weakened still more.
We nd evidence that real electricity prices have been falling. Have improve-
ments in productivity been sucient to keep income at healthy levels? Un-
fortunately, we lack revenue data, for while operators are required to report
costs, revenue information remains proprietary. Our attempts to construct rev-
enue data are crude, yet they tell a plausible tale. It seems that revenues have
climbed steadily, even as costs have fallen. Corresponding attempts to construct
prot information indicate that following ten years of losses in the 1980s and
early 1990s prots are positive and rising.
Finally, in Chapter 10 we construct a model of power plant operators. The
model employs our set of monthly plant-level operating data and our monthly
price data. We attempt to capture basic properties of the fuel cycle and similar
information that determine the evolution and conditions of the plant. Given
this set of information, operators choose actions to maximize the present value
of prots. While our model is similar to earlier eorts, we oer several important
extensions. First, we include price data to capture the eects on operator be-
havior of price growth. Second, we incorporate the possibility of severe accidents
and the liability faced by operators. In addition, our extended data set allows
us to understand better the nature of power plant operations in the post Three
Mile Island industry. We apply the model primarily in two ways. First, we test
the model for structural stability, given the structural shift in electricity prices.
Other authors found similar models unstable, but they assumed no electricity
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price growth. Our model suggests that the changes in behavior observed by
others resulted signicantly from weakening demand and other changes in elec-
tricity prices. Our second application measures the benet to rms of possible
license extensions from 40 to 60 years. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency be-
gan accepting applications for these extensions in the late 1990s, and a number
of plants so far have received them. We nd that plants should be willing to
invest signicantly in upgrades in order to obtain extensions, for the extensions
improve signicantly the value of the rms. We also oer historical simulations
and forecasts under various assumptions for a plant of particular interest, the
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
Chapter 11 concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 8
Price and Demand Data
In the following work, we analyze the U.S. electricity markets over the past 45
years. We begin by examining aggregate electricity prices, both at monthly and
annual frequencies. We build univariate models of electricity prices and test them
for stability. We then review and model monthly regional electricity price levels.
Finally, we examine trends in annual aggregate electricity demand. In both the
price and demand data, we nd evidence of signicant market instability in the
1970s and 1980s.
The analysis is intended to support structural economic modeling applica-
tions that employ the data reviewed here. We thus are interested in whether
the structural models of prices are adequate and suciently exible to represent
the data. In general, we nd that apart from occasional structural shifts, simple
models are sucient to provide reasonable rst-order representations of the data.
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8.1 Price Data
8.1.1 U.S. Electricity Prices
This section analyzes the properties of aggregate U.S. producer prices for elec-
tricity. We develop simple models and test for structural stability of electricity
prices. The employed aggregate data is the Producer Price Index for industrial
electricity rates. It is monthly from January, 1958 to June, 2004; is not season-
ally adjusted; and was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics [59]. First,
unit root tests are performed to determine necessary transformations. Second, a
simple ARMAX model is estimated and tested for structural stability. We then
examine regional industrial electricity prices and test the adequacy of a very
simple model that will be suitable for use in a dynamic programming model.
Analysis
Industrial electricity prices were very stable throughout the late 1950s and the
1960s. This may be seen in the monthly growth rates displayed in Figure 8.1.1
They became more volatile and grew fairly rapidly through the 1970s. Growth
especially was high in 1974 and 197980.2 Nominal prices generally continued to
climb since then, but the trend slowed abruptly in the mid1980s. As the trend
shifted, prices developed a pronounced seasonal pattern. Davis, et al point out
that the falling relative prices were not a new trend but the resumption of the
1See Davis, et al [14], Section 2, for additional details and references on the history of
electricity prices.
2Davis, et al [14] list several reasons for the rapid price increases. They include techno-
logical problems, economic instability that made planning dicult, high fossil fuel costs, and
heightened environmental and safety regulations.
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Figure 8.1: Producer Price Index
historical norm. They list a series of regulatory reforms passed in the late 1970s
that took eect over the following years as part of the reason for such changes.
Descriptive statistics for nominal industrial electricity prices are presented
in Table 8.1. Note that the statistics are for monthly growth rates; the rates
have not been annualized. We see that prices grew slowly in the late 1950s
through early 1970s, at about 0.1% per month, and that volatility was quite
low. Between 1973 and 1985, the average growth rate increased by a factor of 9,
and volatility also increased substantially. Between 1986 and 2004, growth rates
fell to slightly below the average rate in the 1960s. However, volatility increased
well beyond that seen in the 1970s. This time the nature of the volatility was
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quite dierent. As may be seen in Figure 8.1 and as we will see later in regression
estimates, recent volatility primarily is in the form of seasonal cycles. This stands
in contrast to earlier periods in which seasonal uctuations were dominated by
persistent changes. Table 8.1 also displays statistics for the entire sample period
and for the period following the energy crisis of 1973. The wide swings in average
growth rates seems to suggest that there may have been a structural shift in the
mid1980s, and perhaps another in 1973. This possibility will be tested in the
following sections.
Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics for Aggregate Electricity Prices
PPI Growth Rates Mean Standard Error Observations
1959:11972:12 0.146% 0.0051 168
1973:11985:12 0.927% 0.0127 156
1986:12004:6 0.126% 0.0210 222
1959:12004:6 0.361% 0.0157 546
1973:12004:6 0.457% 0.0185 378
Unit Root Testing
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests, with lag lengths selected by BIC, were
used to test whether the data, in growth rates, were suitable for use in estimating
an ARIMA model. Results may be seen in Table 8.2, where (**) indicates
rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at the 1% signicance level for all sample
periods. These results should be viewed with scepticism given the apparently
contradictory graphical evidence noted above. Note that the BIC statistic, which
is known to be overly parsimonious in small samples, indicates inclusion of only
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Table 8.2: Unit Root Tests: Industrial Electricity Prices
1959:11985:12 1986:12004:6 1959:12004:6
Lag Length 1 15 15
t-Test -7.6078 ** -3.5423** -3.6351**
z-Test -117.1824** -188.1705** -42.8321**
one lag is optimal in the rst sample; the AIC statistic indicates that 14 lags
should be employed, which perhaps is more reasonable. Because rigorous analysis
of the price series is not necessary for the present work, we will accept the results
and proceed with estimation of an ARMAX model.
ARMAX Models
Graphical analysis of autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations support the
impressions given by the unit root tests, namely that we must proceed cautiously
with the assumption that the growth rates of prices are stationary. Other tests
that are not reported here suggest that seasonal dierencing may be appropriate.
To maintain the simplest possible models, we avoid seasonal dierencing and
instead employ seasonal dummy variables. The following model,3 with one AR
and one moving average term in addition to seasonal dummy variables, seems to
t the data fairly well, although certain qualications are necessary:
(1− L)D yt = α+
(ω0 + ω1L+ · · ·+ ωnLn)
(1− δ1L− · · · s− δmLm)
Xt+
(1 + θ1L+ · · ·+ θqLq)
(1− φ1L− · · · − φpLp)
ut (8.1)




yt is the dependent variable
ut is the series of residuals
q is the number of MA coecients
θq is the MA coecient at lag q
p is the number of AR coecients
φp is the AR coecient at lag p
α is a constant
D is the number of dierences
Xt are exogenous variables
n is the number of lags for X
ωn is the coecient on X at lag n
m is the number of denominator lags for X
δm is the denominator coecient at lag m.
In this analysis, yt is the logarithm of the electricity producer price index,
the number of dierences D is one, and the number of moving average terms (q)
and autoregressive terms (p) both are one. The exogenous variable vector X is
composed of monthly dummy variables; the number of lags (n) and denominator
lags (m) both are zero. Results for the model are presented in Table 8.3 for
two sub-periods and the entire data range. An ARIMA (1,1,1) with monthly
dummy variables was selected as a compromise between the three sample periods.
The model seems to t the data fairly well in the sample period from January,
1986 to June, 2004. The R2 value is high and the Ljung-Box statistic indicates
that the residuals are white noise.4 The model ts the data considerably less
4Greene [21] notes that some econometricians claim that the Ljung-Box statistic is not
appropriate for models with lagged dependent variables. Nevertheless, it supports the results
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well for the rst sample period and for the entire sample. The apparent serial
correlation remaining in the residuals is disturbing. Other aspects of the results,
however, are plausible. Note, in particular, that the dummy variable parameters
are large and signicant in the later sample period; this is expected given the
obvious qualities of the data evident in the graphs. The dummy variables seem
to contribute little in the early sample period, in which little seasonal variation
is evident.
Because this is not a formal analysis of electricity prices, we will proceed with
the present model despite concerns about its adequacy. A standard Chow test
for structural stability yields the value F(3,518)= 167.05, which is signicant at
the 1% level. Though our conclusions must be qualied, these results support
the strong graphical evidence that a structural shift occurred in electricity prices
sometime in the mid1980s. At this point, we will forgo attempts to pin down a
precise date for the shift.
This result will be employed in the review of previous models of electricity
markets and in the design of new models. Clearly, any such model needs to
account for market instability. Dynamic programming models suer the curse
of dimensionality, such that the addition of variables adds greatly to the compu-
tational burden. Incorporation of price variables into a dynamic programming
model thus requires a very simple forecasting equation with few stochastic terms
on the right-hand side. Simplicity is suciently critical that we must accept
certain short-comings that ordinarily would be troubling. We thus develop an
AR1 model of the logarithm of electricity prices with monthly dummies. The
single stochastic explanatory term satises our demand for simplicity. The work
of graphical analysis of the residuals using correlograms.
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presented here simply suggests the adequacy of such a model. The results are
displayed in Table 8.4. The data and predicted values are plotted in Figure 8.2.
The models appear, at rst glance, to t the data quite well. Closer examination
reveals persistence in the error terms. Still, given the limitations of estimating
dynamic programming models, it appears worthwhile to pursue an AR1 model
in log-levels. We will explore the matter further with panel data in the following
section.
8.1.2 Regional Electricity Prices
Regional industrial electricity price indexes are displayed in Figures 8.3 through
8.5, together with the aggregate U.S. electricity PPI. The data were obtained
from the BLS [59] and are shown in growth rates. While certainly there are
regional dierences, a few basic features are evident across regions and in the
aggregate data. First, the fairly steep upward trend that persisted throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s slowed abruptly. Nominal prices have grown slowly
since then. Second, at about the same time that the structural shift occurred,
prices gained a prominent seasonal pattern in at least most regions.
A simple AR1 model was estimated with the regional price data in logarithms
for two periods: January, 1973 to December, 1985 and January, 1986 to Decem-
ber, 2003. No allowance was made for regional dierences. The validity of this
assumption was tested. Regression results are displayed in Table 8.5. Analysis
of variance results for the residuals in the rst and second sample periods are
summarized in Table 8.6.
Once again, caution is in order because of doubts about the specication of
these models. With caution in mind, these results indicate that there are no
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Figure 8.2: Aggregate Price Estimation
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Figure 8.3: Regional Electricity Prices
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Figure 8.4: Regional Electricity Prices
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Figure 8.5: Regional Electricity Prices
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signicant rst-order dierences across regions evident in the regression resid-
uals. The result holds for both sample periods. The result is important if the
regression equation is to be incorporated into a dynamic programming model,
for it means that we do not need to add state variables to account for regional
distinctions. A check of second-order characteristics of the residuals indicates




The chi-square test for equal variances indicates that there are signicant
dierences in variance among the residuals. We might suspect other second-
order problems as well. In particular, signicant serial correlation likely persists,
as was evident in the graphical results for aggregate data.
8.2 Electricity Demand
We do not conduct extensive analysis of electricity demand. We do, however,
briey consider changes in the demand structure to gain a better understanding
of the industry. First, we examine data plots for total electricity output, real
Gross Domestic Product, and annual aggregate electricity prices relative to the
GDP deator. Summary statistics also are reported. Next, we estimate a rel-
atively simple model of electricity demand. The structural demand equation is
borrowed from Nelson and Peck [39]. Finally, we examine the regression results
216
for signs of market instability.
Figure 8.6 displays annual growth rates for electricity production and real
GDP from 1949 to 2004. The graph shows that electricity output growth ex-
ceeded real GDP growth from 1949 to 1972. After 1973, output and real GDP
grew at similar rates, with lower average electricity demand growth. In both
periods, real GDP and output are highly correlated. Figure 8.7 displays growth
rates of relative prices, measured both as the overall annual electricity price
average (from EIA [19]) and as the annualized industrial electricity PPI (from
BLS [59]). Except for a period of high relative price growth in the 1970s and
early 1980s, relative electricity prices generally have been falling slightly since
1959.
The statistics reported in Table 8.8 conrm that output growth exceeded
GDP growth before 1973 by about 3 percent per year. In 1973, output growth
fell from an average of 7 percent to 2.6 percent, while real GDP growth fell
from 4.2 percent to 3 percent. Relative price growth also increased dramatically,
from 1.6 percent to 11 percent per year. After 1985, energy markets became
considerably more stable. Electricity output growth remained largely unchanged
at 2.5 percent. Real GDP growth recovered somewhat to an average of 3.0
percent per year. Electricity price growth rates fell to about their earlier average
of 1.4 percent. Statistics also are displayed for two longer periods.
While it is dicult to determine precise times for slowing of electricity prices
and of demand in the mid1980s, it appears that output slowed before or at about
the same time that price growth fell. Because prices were heavily regulated
until recently, perhaps the possible lag between weakening demand and price
reductions was due to sluggish response by price regulators. The high fossil
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Figure 8.6: Output and Real GDP Growth
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Figure 8.7: Relative Electricity Prices
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fuel prices of the 1970s were beginning to moderate by the mid1980s, so that
production costs dropped accordingly. Ellis and Zimmerman [18] note that many
baseload power plants that were under construction, both coal and nuclear, were
cancelled as supply exceeded demand requirements. As surplus capacity grew
to high levels, the excess capacity perhaps gave regulators sucient ability to
eectively reign in price growth in the 1980s. Davis, et al [14] provide historical
details of electricity prices.
We estimate the relationship between output, prices, and GDP using the
model of Nelson and Peck [39]. We test this model for structural stability. We
do not use formal methods to determine the date of possible structural changes.
Instead, we simply adopt the 19851986 date employed in the tests for price
stability. The test equation is
qt = β0 + (β1/ (1− β2L)) pt + β3xt + ut
where
ut = γut−1 + et,
and where q is electricity output, p is the relative price of electricity, and where x
is real GDP. Estimation is performed using growth rates of each variable. Results
are shown in Table 8.9.
The model seems to t the data very well in the rst period but not so
well in the second. The Ljung-Box statistic does not reveal evidence of serial
correlation in the residuals. There is evidence of serial correlation in the results
for the full sample. The Chow test statistic is F(3,34) = 7.17, which is signicant
at the 1 percent level. We thus conclude that the demand structure shifted in
the mid1980s. Regression results are plotted in Figures 8.8 to 8.10.
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Figure 8.8: Demand Regression Results: Sample 1
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Figure 8.9: Demand Regression Results: Sample 2
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Figure 8.10: Demand Regression Results: Full Sample
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We have seen that the electricity industry has undergone dramatic changes in
the past several decades. Price growth was slow until the early 1970s, then high
until the mid1980s, and then slow again but seasonally volatile. Demand growth
was very high until 1973. Between 1973 and the late 1980s, output growth swung
widely, but on average growth was much slower than in the 1950s and 1960s.
Since 1990, output growth has been moderate and quite stable.
The analysis in this paper supports the adequacy of a crude price equation,
when we are willing to trade satisfactory second-order characteristics for sim-
plicity. It seems that a logarithmic AR1 model of regional electricity prices,
with seasonal dummies, will provide rst-order estimates satisfactory for use in
a dynamic programming model.
We also provide evidence of a structural shift in electricity prices around
1986. Rust and Rothwell [55] constructed a dynamic programming model of nu-
clear power plants. In order to simplify the model, they assumed that electricity
price growth was zero over the estimation period. They estimated the parame-
ters of the model over two subperiods: 1975-1979 and 1984-1993. They conclude
that the model parameters signicantly dier across the sample periods, so that
optimal behavior and plant values also changed signicantly. They assume that
much of the dierences can be explained by changes in the regulatory environ-
ment following the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant.
The results in this chapter, however, indicate that the simplifying assumptions
in the dynamic programming model may aect their results. We show that price
growth certainly was not zero, and that the price structures in the Rust-Rothwell
subperiods dier signicantly. These dierences are not captured in the struc-
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ture of the Rust-Rothwell model, and so the changes in price structure likely
aect the parameter estimates. To what extent their results would change if
their model included non-constant prices remains to be shown in Chapter 10.
225
Table 8.3: Aggregate Price Regression Results
1959:21985:12 1986:12004:6 1959:012004:6
Constant 0.00517* 0.00201 0.00394*
AR{1} 0.92600** 0.19637 0.33357*
MA{1} -0.70004** -0.34111 0.00077
January -0.00019 0.00275 0.00077
February 0.00232 -0.00321 -0.00011
March 0.00493* -0.00003 0.00273
April 0.00264 -0.00391 -0.00021
May 0.00007 0.01362** 0.00552*
June -0.00020 0.04060** 0.01651**
July 0.00195 0.00787* 0.00428
August 0.00108 -0.00250 -0.00042
September -0.00238 -0.00120 -0.00198
October -0.00295 -0.03772 -0.01693**
November -0.00527* -0.02820** -0.01452**
SEE 0.0087 0.0100 0.0128
Centered R2 0.315 0.786 0.348
Degrees of Freedom 309 208 532
Ljung-Box Q 61.25** 27.15 431.39**
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Centered R2 0.999 0.986
Degrees of Freedom 156 209
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Centered R2 0.997 0.997
Degrees of Freedom 3093 3174
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Table 8.6: ANOVA
Sample Period Source Sum of Sq DoF Mean Sq F-Stat Signif
1/197312/1985 INDIV 0.002 8 0.0003 0.335 0.953
ERROR 2.435 3097 0.0008
TOTAL 2.437 3105
1/198612/2003 INDIV 0.001 8 0.0002 0.194 0.992
ERROR 3.005 3313 0.0009
TOTAL 3.007 3321
Table 8.8: Output and Real GDP Growth
5972 7385 8604 5904 7304
Obs. 14 13 20 46 32
Prices Mean 1.668% 11.227% 1.435% 4.219% 5.334%
StdErr 0.02913 0.06816 0.02570 0.06106 0.06807
GDP Mean 4.203% 2.987% 3.076% 3.373% 3.010%
StErr 0.01958 0.02829 0.01245 0.02045 0.02004
Output Mean 7.103% 2.647% 2.455% 3.930% 2.541%
StdErr 0.01386 0.02165 0.02165 0.02926 0.02255
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Table 8.9: Electricity Demand
19611985 19862004 19612004
Constant 0.02649** 0.01168 0.01344
GDPR 0.57446** 0.39454 0.62775**
P -0.14166** -0.07661 -0.09022**
d_P{1} 0.87532** -1.09229 0.92469**
MA{1} 0.06216 0.08780 0.26467
SEE 0.011 0.023 0.21
Centered R2 0.877 0.141 0.523
Degrees of Freedom 20 14 39
Ljung-Box Q 1.549 3.110 30.022**
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Chapter 9
Operations and Financial Data
9.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the history the U.S. nuclear power industry as revealed in
available data. The work assembles two primary forms of data. First, monthly
operating data is constructed from 1975 through 2003. Second, cost data is col-
lected from 1961 through 2000. Available price data, which was described in the
previous chapter, is combined with annual output data to construct revenue and
prots. Finally, the two data sets are combined to make possible future analysis
of the relationship between costs, plant conditions, and operators' decisions.
The monthly, plant level operating data include information on output, the
primary type of activity performed at the plant, conditions at the plant, and
whether problems occur. The annual, site level cost data include information
on operating and maintenance costs, fuel costs, and capital additions costs, in
addition to capacity and output.
Monthly output data is combined with price data and additional information
in an attempt to construct annual revenue and ultimately prot estimates. The
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process is dicult and we assume the results contain signicant error. Still,
few if any others have published such attempts, and the results seem plausible
despite remaining problems.
Both data sets reveal clearly that while the 1980s were troubled times for the
nuclear power industry, the 1990s and recent years have seen dramatic improve-
ments. Evidence of such improvements include stable or falling unit costs, soar-
ing productivity and reliability, and climbing prots. Recent activity data reveal
operators following policies, which presumably are optimal, far more strictly than
in the past. We suppose that these changes in behavior are the results of forced
re-optimization in the face of soaring costs, learning, and regulatory reform. We
will employ this operating data and revisit these questions in Chapter 10.
9.2 Operating Data
9.2.1 Introduction
The operating data comprise an unbalanced panel spanning the months from
April, 1979 to December, 2003.1 One hundred sixteen plants are represented in
the sample, with a total of 27,385 reactor-month observations. The number of
plants in the sample is plotted over time in Figure 9.1. In the latter years, all
104 of the operational American reactors are represented in the sample.
The work updates the data set constructed by Rust and Rothwell [54, 56,
55].2 Their data ended in December, 1994. The data in this set extend their
1For the next chapter, we merge this data with an earlier set to span the months from
January, 1975 to December, 2003.
2The data used to construct our data set were provided in 2006 by Georey Rothwell of
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Figure 9.1: Number of Plants in Operation
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panel by 108 months. More important than this number itself is that data for
these months reveal whether trends that appeared to begin in the Rust-Rothwell
sample have continued. These apparent trends include increased output and
plant availability, improved reliability, and moderating costs.
9.2.2 Reliability and Performance
Of great concern to all, whether for environmental, public health, or economic
reasons, is the reliability of nuclear power plants. While the data in this set
reveal nothing directly about the safety of nuclear power, the likelihood of serious
accidents may be correlated with the reliability statistics that can be constructed
with these data. Our primary interests, however, are the economic implications
of reliability.
Figure 9.2 plots monthly average availability factors from 1980 to 2003. The
availability factor is the fraction of time in a month that a plant operates. Clearly,
there is a strong seasonal pattern, primarily because operators prefer to repair
and refuel in the spring and fall. Monthly averages rose from about 60% in the
1980s to about 80% by 2000.
The capacity factor, or availability factor, distribution over all periods is
displayed in Figure 9.3. Plants at 0% utilization may be closed for refueling,
repairs, because they are entering a stage of permanent decommissioning work,
or for other reasons. Nearly 25% of months are classied with a capacity factor
of zero. Few months are spent at low but positive levels. The frequency grows
with the capacity factor, with roughly 60% of months spent at 100% capacity.
Figure 9.4 reports the same information by decade. Several trends are appar-
Stanford University.
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Figure 9.2: Trend in Availability Factors
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Figure 9.3: Capacity Factor Distribution
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Figure 9.4: Capacity Factors by Decade
ent. First, the amount of time that plants are not operating falls signicantly.
Even more signicant is the increase in time spent at full capacity. Time spent
at intermediate levels of production fall, as probability mass shifts toward the
endpoints.
Figure 9.5 reports the average lengths of operating and refueling spells that
end at given dates. The average number of months required to refuel plants
averaged about four to ve months throughout the 1980s. The average declined
to two or three months by 2000. Remember, however, that repairs often are
made during refueling spells. Many repairs and retrots were required in the
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Figure 9.5: Length of Operating and Refueling Spells
tumultuous 1980s. Some of the observed pattern may be explained accordingly.
The gure also displays the average length of operating spells. Just as refu-
eling spells shortened over the sample period, operating spells grew from 10 or
12 months on average to perhaps 18 months. This pattern was reported in Rust
and Rothwell [55], and we see that the pattern also held in the following nine
years.
Figure 9.6 displays the frequency distributions of refueling and operating
spells. The mode of the refueling distribution is two months, but the upper tail
maintains signicant probability through nine months.
The mode of the operating spell distribution is 16 months, but signicant
probability mass is distributed widely about the mode. Still, roughly one-third
of operating spells last 15 or 16 months. A second mode is evident at 10 months.
We examine the distribution of refueling spells by subperiods in Figure 9.7.
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Figure 9.6: Distributions of Refueling and Operating Spells
Note that the mode falls from three months in 1980-1992 to 2 months in 1993-
2003. Probability mass at the mode increases from about 40% to nearly 60%.
This may indicate that fewer repairs, retrots, and inspections are required in
the latter period, and it also may indicate that sucient learning took place
by the mid1990s to allow consistently brief refueling spells. With the increased
seasonal volatility in electricity prices, we also suppose that there is increased
incentive to limit refueling to months with the lowest prices.
Figure 9.8 displays similar distributions by sub-period for operating spells.
Rust and Rothwell reported that a sample ending in 1979 revealed average op-
erating spells of 12 months. In their 1984-1993 sub-period, they report average
operating spells of 18 months. In the rst graph in the gure, we see that the
mode for the 1980-1992 sub-period is 15 months. In the second sub-period, from
1993-2003, the data is clustered much more tightly about the mode of 16 months.
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Figure 9.7: Refueling Spell Distributions
Figure 9.8: Distribution of Operating Spells
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Table 9.1: Spell Table
Full Sample 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2003
% of time operating 76.695 69.911 77.824 87.132
% of time at 0% capacity 07.982 11.597 07.582 01.841
% of time refueling 15.278 18.460 14.525 11.027
Total Reactor/Months 27385 9339 12847 4888
Table 9.1 reports the percentage of time spent operating, at zero capacity,
time refueling, and the number of observations per sub-sample. The percentage
of time spent operating climbs from 70% in the 1980s to 87% after 2000. The
time spent shut down declines from 12% in the 1980s to about 2%, and the time
spent refueling falls from 18% to 11%.
Figure 9.9 reports the eect of the duration of operating spells on availability
factors. In the early months of an operating spell, reliability increases to a peak
of nearly 90% after about eight months. Availability then gradually declines to
about 20% after 24 months.
Finally, we consider the probability that an operating plant will be forced
to shut down one or more times in a given month. In Figure 9.10, we see that
the probability is about 25% that a plant will be forced to shut down in the
rst month of an operating spell. The outage rate falls to roughly 10% by the
twentieth month of operation.3
We consider the eects of age on average outage rates in Figure 9.11. Note
an apparent bathtub shape of the probability distribution. Young plants face
3Erratic patters in the data for months 20 to 25 likely are due to the small number of
observations. Plants usually are refueled before the operating spell reaches 20 months.
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Figure 9.9: Eect of Duration on Availability Factors
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Figure 9.10: Outage Rates vs Duration
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Figure 9.11: Outage Rates vs Age
forced outage rates of perhaps 30%. The average falls roughly to 12% for plants
of age 300 months. While the statistics are less reliable for older plants, since we
have relatively few observations for them, it appears that the probability ceases
its decline by that point, and perhaps the probability of forced outages begins to
grow as plants pass 300 months. Rust and Rothwell suspected that this pattern
would be revealed, but their panel was too short to reveal it.
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9.3 Cost Data
The cost data were collected from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
Form 1, Annual Report of Major Utilities, Licensees and Others, Schedule 402.4
The data set include three series of accounting data: operations and maintenance
costs, fuel costs, and capital additions expenditures,5 as well as annual output
gures.
These cost data are available annually for each site with a functioning com-
mercial plant. Sites have between one and three functioning reactors. The full
data set is an unbalanced panel with 1,751 observations, covering 74 sites for the
years 1961 to 2000.
The cost data essentially are accounting data and do not necessarily corre-
spond nicely to economic concepts of the same names.6 Nonfuel operating costs
that are considered expenses are categorized as operating and maintenance costs.
Nonfuel costs that are capitalized are considered capital additions expenditures.
Categorization of these costs depends, to some degree, on the discretion of the
plant owners and of regulators. Such discretionary practices dier across owners
and regions, thus introducing potentially nonrandom errors into our data.
The operating data described above is based on monthly data for each plant
(i.e. reactor). In order to merge the data sets, a mapping of monthly, plant-
level data to annual, site-level data was established. Unfortunately, some data
is lost due to dierences in coverage. Observations were included in the merged
data set only if all 12 months of operating data for each plant on the site were
4The data were provided by Georey Rothwell at Stanford University.
5See the EIA analysis [2] for further details.
6See the EIA cost analysis [2], Chapter 2, for more details.
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available. The resulting merged data set covers the years 1980 to 2000, with 73
sites and 1,229 observations.7
Figure 9.12 displays average plant capacity, in megawatt-hours, in our data
set and the average computed from aggregate data reported by the EIA. Our
data account for most of the capacity of a typical plant in the 1990s, but fail
to account for signicant capacity in the 1980s. This might indicate that our
data are at variance with that of the EIA, or it might indicate that large plants
are not represented adequately in our matched sample. Our average capacity
gures are based on the capacity ratings assigned to plants when they opened.
To account for changes in capacity ratings over time, we add aggregate capacity
uprates to constructed capacity totals. These changes account for some, but not
all, of the dierences in recent years. The second graph displays the number of
plants in operation. Most plants are found in our sample by 1990, but many do
not appear in our matched data set in the 1980s.
Figure 9.13 displays the number of sites in the data set with one, two, or three
plants. Note that the number of single-plant sites peaked roughly in 1991 and
then began to decline. This is explained, in part, by construction of additional
plants on existing sites. For the same reason, we see the numbers of two- and
three-unit sites growing into the mid1990s.
The rst graph in Figure 9.14 displays aggregate capacity. While our data
accounts for most of the actual capacity starting in the early 1990s, the gap is
wider between our data and the actual total in the 1980s. We again consider the
eects of capacity uprates, which have become increasingly important in recent
years. The second graph displays a histogram of capacity by site. Note that a
7We have data to extend the merged set back to 1975.
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Figure 9.12: Industry Size
Figure 9.13: Number of Plants per Site
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Figure 9.14: Site Capacity
single site might be represented more than once, if a plant was added or removed
from operation.
We consider two reasons for these gaps between our capacity totals and the
actual levels. First, as noted previously, our capacity data do not account for
capacity uprates, where plants may be upgraded in order to produce more power
than was possible originally. The aggregate additional capacity was added to
our aggregate capacity data and is displayed in the rst graphs of Figures 9.12
and 9.14. However, the additional capacity does little to bridge the gap.
A more important explanation is that the matching process typically leads
to the elimination of data near the beginning and end of reactors' lives. Many
reactors began or ended operation in the 1980s, and fewer opened and closed in
the 1990s. This likely accounts for much of the dierences.
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Figure 9.15: Industry Output
Similar characteristics are evident in our aggregate output data when com-
pared to EIA gures. These data are compared in Figure 9.15. We account for
most industry output only after 1990. On the other hand, our capacity utiliza-
tion data (measured as potential output to actual output) closely matches the
EIA data; this may be seen in the second graph. Figure 9.16 displays average
output per megawatt (MW) of capacity, and it also displays the minimum and
maximum across plants of output per MW.
Clearly, there are dierences between our aggregates and the totals reported
elsewhere. It remains to be established, however, whether our data are rep-
resentative of the industry or whether other problems remain. The following
three sections present operations and maintenance costs, fuel costs, and capital
additions expenditures.
249
Figure 9.16: Output Distribution
9.3.1 Operating and Maintenance Costs
Average operating and maintenance costs per kilowatt of capacity are displayed
in Figure 9.17. Real costs are very similar to those reported by the EIA in
1995. Costs grew rapidly in the 1980s and into the early 1990s. Since then,
costs have leveled in nominal terms and have fallen in real terms. The EIA [2]
reports eorts by the NRC to improve eciency in order to maintain its safety
standards but at lower costs. In addition to learning by power plant operators,
such eorts may explain the slowing and eventual reversal of cost growth.
Figure 9.18 displays average real operating and maintenance costs per kilo-
watt (KW) of plant capacity. In addition, it shows the minimum and max-
imum costs across sites per KW of capacity. Note that the best-performing
sites had moderate cost growth. The worst-performing plants experienced rapid
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Figure 9.17: Operating and Maintenance Costs
cost growth through the early 1990s, but it appears that costs have been falling
through the mid1990s.
The EIA [2] claims that reported operating and maintenance expenditures
miss about 30% of actual costs. These additional costs include insurance pre-
miums, regulatory fees, and some labor costs. This will be important when we
attempt to construct prots. According to our understanding of the EIA docu-
ment, however, the data do include costs of replacement power when the plant
is not operating. The same document cites a report that about 67% of opera-
tions and maintenance expenditures are labor costs, and the balance is spent on
materials. Nearly half of employees at a typical plant perform maintenance and
support duties. Hence, much of the reported operations and maintenance costs
may be attributed to labor.
251
Figure 9.18: OM Cost Distribution
All cost data reported here have been deated with the GDP deator with a
base year of 2000. Cost data reported by the EIA were in 1993 prices and were
deated with a GDP deator estimated in 1994 or 1995. While the methodology
is crude, we employed the base 2000 deator to inate the EIA real data to
nominal terms, and then to construct real gures in 2000 prices. Clearly, it
would be better to use a vintage 1995 GDP deator to construct nominal values,
but use of a single deator suces to provide a comparison of our data to those
reported earlier.
9.3.2 Fuel Costs
Average fuel costs per kilowatt of capacity are displayed in Figure 9.19. While
the costs climbed rapidly in the early 1980s, they gradually have fallen since.
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Figure 9.19: Fuel Costs
Figure 9.20 displays real average fuel costs per KW of capacity, together with
the reported minimum and maximum values. Note that fuel costs peaked much
earlier than operating and maintenance expenses.
Finally, note that fuel costs are capitalized. Expenditures are depreciated
over a number of years, although they are displayed here in the year of pur-
chase. Fuel rods typically remain in a plant for several refueling cycles, so that
plants receive direct benets from their investments for perhaps four to ve
years. For national accounting purposes, the Bureau of Economic Analysis [5]
employs straight-line depreciation methods in their estimates of capital stocks,
based on the standard practices of rotation and replacement of fuel rods. They
assume that the average lifetime of a fuel rod is four years, although according
to our data, average lifespans of three fuel cycles would correspond to about 54
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Figure 9.20: Fuel Cost Distribution
months, or 4.5 years. The BEA employs Winfrey curves to calculate depreci-
ation, assuming that the earliest retirement among a given cohort of fuel rods
occurs at 45 percent of the average lifespan, and that the last rods are retired
at 155 percent of the average. We duplicate an abridged version of their de-
preciation distribution in Table 9.2. While this depreciation schedule does not
necessarily correspond to the depreciation calculations appearing on the balance
sheet of the rm, it likely gives a reasonably good approximation. Note again
that data series reported here makes no use of this information.
9.3.3 Capital Additions Costs
Average capital additions expenditures per kilowatt of capacity are displayed in
Figure 9.21. Real costs in our data set are highly correlated with those reported
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Table 9.2: Fuel Rod Depreciation








by the EIA. Such expenditures are calculated as changes in reported book value
of the plants. Because of changes in the estimates and because of sales of used
equipment,8 data in some years are negative. The EIA [2] reports two reasons
for negative values. First, the scrap value of replaced equipment may exceed the
cost of new equipment. Second and more important are the results of changes
in the plants' initial capital costs (these usually appear early in the life of the
plant) and cost disallowances. These observations have been dropped from our
data set. Little other manipulation of the data was done. While the EIA eorts
to construct capital additions expenditures were somewhat more sophisticated,
the aggregate results are quite similar.
An unfortunate characteristic of this data9 is that all (nominal) project ex-
8According to the EIA [2], expenses added to this account are net of the salvage value
of replaced equipment. Hence, the data reported here may understate gross expenditures on
capital.
9See EIA [2, p. 4] for more details.
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Figure 9.21: Capital Additions Costs
penditures are recorded in the year of completion. Major projects pose problems
when they span multiple years, for two reasons. First, if a plant temporarily
closes in order to repair or upgrade equipment, the costs might not be recorded
until a following year. Second, in times of rapid factor price growth, the report-
ing of cumulative nominal expenses over periods with varying prices will distort
our constructed real data.
Figure 9.22 displays average real capital additions costs per KW of capacity,
together with minimum and maximum values. Note that maximum costs peaked
in the mid to late 1980s, and generally they trended lower since then. The
apparent spike near the end of the sample period needs further investigation
to determine whether it is factual or indicative of a problem with the data
development.
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Figure 9.22: Capital Additions Cost Distribution
The EIA [2] summarizes capital additions expenses as three types. First,
there are retrots mandated by NRC regulators. Second are the repairs required
to keep a plant in operation. Finally, capital additions expenses may be vol-
untary measures to improve performance. The EIA reports that about half of
capital additions projects were forced by regulators, and about half were nec-
essary repairs. Few were voluntary. It is likely that plants voluntarily initiated
many projects since the EIA report, however, since the NRC began a program
to allow capacity uprates after required investments and inspections.
The EIA [2] reports eorts by the NRC to limit the number of backts
(mandated changes in equipment and plant design) as a likely cause for the
reduction in capital additions costs. The changes were initiated in 1988. While




Unfortunately, revenue data are not reported either for individual plants or sites,
nor are revenue data reported frequently for the industry. Indeed, the means of
assigning revenue to electricity generators is dicult to establish, for generation
is but one of several stages of production. We might conclude from the literature
that it is impossible to separate analysis of generation from transmission and
distribution,10 and perhaps we cannot consider generation by nuclear power in
isolation from other technologies. This in turn might indicate that there is
no hope of assigning revenue to nuclear power generation, since the electricity
industry is integrated both vertically and horizontally.
Instead, we rely on one of few sources of revenue information. The Census
Bureau [60, 61] began to publish revenue data for nuclear power generation in
1997; they again published data in 2002. Unfortunately, they published detailed
data only for Pennsylvania, citing condentiality reasons for suppressing data for
other states. The revenue data for Pennsylvania and the U.S. for 1997 and again
for the U.S. in 2002 are displayed in Table 9.3, where the data is in thousands of
current dollars. The table also displays output data, from the EIA, in millions
10Lee [32] reports that generation, transmission, and distribution are not separable stages
of production. He reports an eciency loss of about 4% if generation was separated from the
other processes. Nelson and Primeaux [40] cite several studies that reject vertical separability.
Hayashi, et al [24] report similar ndings. On a related matter, Karlson [31] reports that
electricity production is not separable across purchaser types; i.e., costs for sales to residential
customers are not separable from sales to commercial or industrial customers.
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Table 9.3: Revenue Shares
Year Revenue Output Implied Price Retail Rev.Shr.
PA 1997 $2,334,445k 67,655m $0.0345 $0.0592 0.58277
USA 1997 $13,966,616k 628,644m $0.0222 $0.0453 0.49044
USA 2002 $11,908,796k 780,220m $0.0153 $0.0488 0.45527
of kilowatt-hours, along with EIA industrial retail prices in current dollars per
kilowatt-hour. Finally, the revenue shares assigned to generation are computed
and displayed. The national data imply that nuclear power generation is assigned
45-49% of sales revenue, and data for Pennsylvania11 put the number at 58%.
We began the process of computing revenue data for nuclear power plants
by obtaining monthly producer price indexes for industrial electricity purchases
for nine regions comprising the United States. We converted these indexes into
dollars per kilowatt-hour by estimating regional prices in 1990 using state rev-
enue and output data from the EIA. We constructed weighted averages of unit
revenues for the power generated by nuclear power plants. We did so by mul-
tiplying monthly, plant level output data by our constructed price series, using
price data for the relevant region. After dividing by total monthly output and
then aggregating over time, we obtain annual price estimates. Average prices
are displayed in Figure 9.23 in nominal terms and relative to the GDP deator.
While it would be more clear with a longer time series, note that relative prices
peaked in the mid1980s and then began a steady decline.12 We then constructed
11The electricity price gure is from the Department of Energy and is the 1995 industrial
price.




series for unit revenues received by power plant operators by multiplying the
retail price by the 1997 unit revenue share reported in Table 9.3. Average rev-
enue estimates for electricity generation by nuclear power plants are displayed
in Figure 9.23.
Figure 9.24 displays aggregate revenue in nominal and real levels. Both esti-
mated retail sales (assuming only industrial customers) and revenues assigned to
nuclear generation are displayed. The second gure reports the same information
in dollars per kilowatt of capacity.
Some of the revenue growth is explained by increases in output. Such growth
in the 1980s primarily was due to additional units coming online. In the 1990s,
such growth primarily was due to increased reliability and other improvements
in capacity utilization. A second explanation for revenue growth in the early
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Figure 9.24: Revenue
1980s is price growth. This is seen most clearly in the real revenue per kilowatt
data, which grows steadily before leveling at about 1985.
Figure 9.25 displays the distribution of constructed revenue data per KW of
capacity, including the average, industry minimum, and industry maximum for
each year.
9.5 Prots
By combining the revenue and cost data reported above, we estimate prots for
the nuclear power industry. Certainly, this exercise at best is uncertain and we
face many diculties. At most, we hope to get a reasonable idea of trends in
the industry.
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Figure 9.25: Revenue Distribution
Of many diculties facing us, we mention three. First, the EIA [2] reports
that operating and maintenance costs were under-reported by about 30%; we
did not adjust them in the data reported here. Second, capital additions costs
are depreciated over many years, but they are subtracted immediately in the
following calculations. Finally, we made no attempt to account for taxes paid by
the industry, nor did we adjust prices to account for taxes paid by the customers
on electricity purchases. See the EIA study for a discussion of other problems
with the cost data.
Estimated prots per kilowatt of plant capacity are reported in Figure 9.26.
While we must be cautious in our interpretation of the data, given the concerns
listed above and many others, the qualitative results seem plausible. Figure 9.27
displays the distribution of prots per KW.
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Figure 9.26: Prots
Figure 9.27: Prots Distribution
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A review of the industry's history reveals that the industry was protable in
the early years. Things began to unravel in the 1970s, however. Environmen-
tal, safety, and other regulations extended construction times far beyond those
expected. Extended construction times, whether due to heightened regulation
or other reasons, became still more expensive with soaring interest rates. Even
after the plants were constructed, operating expenses proved far higher than ex-
pected. Finally, a dramatic reduction in 1973 of the growth rate of electricity
demand reduced the need for new base load generating capacity. Such woes were
compounded by the reaction to the 1979 accident in Unit 2 of the Three Mile
Island power plant and the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl power plant. These
troubles are revealed in the declining prots shown in Figure 9.26. Rothwell and
Eastman [51] report that the realized rate of return was less than the cost of
capital from 1979 to 1981 for US electric utilities. Many plants closed in the
unprotable 1980s and early 1990s, a period corresponding to negative prots
according to our calculations.
While trouble continued through the early 1990s, prots followed an upward
trend since the mid1980s. It seems likely that some of the increase in prots per
kilowatt may be explained by the voluntary removal of unprotable, troublesome
plants from the market. Other explanations include learning within the industry,
especially as the industry consolidated and large companies purchased multiple
plants. Regulators also learned, and they tailored their policies to achieve safety
and other standards while enabling companies to reduce costs.13
We made little attempt to analyze the eects of capacity uprates. Such
uprates promise additional future capacity in return for capital investment today.
13See the EIA cost analysis [2] for details and analysis.
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Many plant owners are making these investments, and future studies will be
needed to determine whether prots improve accordingly.
9.6 Decommissioning Costs
Little data is available for decommissioning costs, although a number of plants
have been or are being decommissioned. A list of most commercial plants that are
being decommissioned is presented in Appendix 9.8.1. Available cost estimates
range between $190 million and $420 million. The GAO [3] reports that costs
are expected to range between $300m and $400m in today's dollars. Dubin and
Rothwell [17] cite costs of about $1b for the cleanup of the damaged Three Mile
Island Unit 2 reactor.
9.7 Conclusions
This concludes a brief review of monthly operating and annual cost and revenue
data for the U.S. nuclear power industry. We saw that industry performance
has improved dramatically. This is seen clearly as increases in the fraction of
time plants operate. We also saw that costs have fallen, in real terms, per unit
of plant capacity. The nuclear industry now appears far more protable than in
the 1980s.
Our data set is suciently broad to allow much further analysis. Unfortu-
nately, though, some problems remain. The operating data summarized here in
fact are model data constructed for use in a dynamic programming model.14
14See Rust and Rothwell [56] for a detailed description of the data construction process, or
see the next chapter for a shorter description of the result.
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Use of model data is not optimal for purposes of summarizing data as we did in
this chapter. Renement of this work likely will include replacement of model
data with raw data.
One of the primary problems with use of model data is that it is dicult
to form aggregates and averages. Construction of a matched data set, where
monthly plant data is matched to annual site data, requires several aggregation
processes. At this point, though, most of the data construction work is com-
plete. Despite the diculties noted, we are poised to begin examination of our
potentially rich matched data set.
9.8 Appendix
9.8.1 Decommissioned Reactors
The following reactors were decommissioned. Reactors that were shut down
before the beginning or after the end of our data set might not be listed.
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Site Unit Month Year Costs
Big Rock Point 8 1997
Dresden 1 8 1978
Fermi 1 11 1972
Fort St. Vrain 1989 <$189m
Haddam Neck 7 1997
Humboldt Bay 3 7 1976
Indian Point 1 10 1974
LaCrosse 4 1987
Maine Yankee 8 1997 $357m
Millstone 1 11 1997
Peach Bottom 1 10 1974
Rancho Seco 6 1989
San Onofre 1 11 1992
Three Mile Island 2 3 1979 ≈$1b
Trojan 11 1992 $198m
Vallecitos 1963
Yankee Rowe 10 1991
Zion 1 2 1997 $417m
Zion 2 9 1996 $417m
1. Data for Fort St. Vrain are from Nuclear Energy Institute, August 1, 2006
2. Data for Trojan is in 1993 dollars, and data for Maine Yankee is in 1997
dollars. Cost estimates for the Zion plants were reported as $834m for
closing both. Both are reported in a report by the GAO [3].
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A Model of Plant Operations
10.1 Introduction
How do nuclear power plant operators decide when to decommission their plants?
How has their behavior been aected by the tumultuous regulatory changes in
the 1980s? Can we detect eects on behavior of liability protections?
To pursue answers to such questions, we need to construct a model of nuclear
power plant operators. This model will seek to reproduce operators' decisions
and to determine and understand the key factors upon which those decisions are
based. Nuclear plants are very expensive to build, to operate, and to repair.
Consequences of poor decisions and reckless actions can be catastrophic both
to equipment and ultimately to the surrounding community. For these reasons,
operators carefully and consistently must determine optimal operating strategies,
taking into account not only current conditions and potential short-run prots
but also the eects of current decisions on the future state of the plant.
We begin our work with an existing model of plant operators, and we extend
this model in several directions. Our goal is not simply to add detail, for there is
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no end to the list of relevant and important technological and economic details
that might be included. Instead, we seek to link the existing models, which
specify rather autonomous rms, to the rest of the world. In particular, we
consider the eects of electricity market conditions on the behavior of operators,
and we explicitly account for liability regulations imposed by industry regulators.
We do not oer a complete model here, in which other economic agents and
regulators are aected by and respond to operators' behavior. In the rst section
of this document, we developed such a model, though operators described there
were fairly primitive. Here, we oer much greater detail on operators, but little
about their interaction with others. We have in mind that future work should
join these eorts.
We nd that our dynamic programming model is a useful tool to understand
and predict the behavior of nuclear power plant operators. At least when using
aggregate measures, the model is able to mimic accurately the choices made
by operators, given current conditions of the plants. Historical simulations also
suggest that our model accurately predicts the behavior of operators. We nd
that electricity prices and expected changes in prices aect signicantly the level
of prots and correspondingly the optimal plant activities.
We extend and apply the model in several ways. First, we consider the eects
on plant values of 20-year extensions to operating licenses. We nd that the
values of plants increase signicantly with potentially longer operating horizons.
We found similar results in the application of our industry model reported in
Chapter 5. Second, we extend the model to include the possibility of catastrophic
accidents with destruction of the plants and liability for osite damages. While
the ability of the model to t the data changes little, the inclusion of risk and
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liability concerns does aect relative values of feasible choices and thus aects
predicted behavior. Finally, we employ the model in historical simulations and
forecasts under various assumptions.
We do not explicitly account for regulation in this model. We discuss po-
tential problems of this omission. We base the analysis on comparisons of two
models from Chapter 2. By comparing results for a model with both liabiltiy
and regulation to results for a model with only liability, we hope to learn of
potential problems with our dynamic programming work. Our analysis helps
us to understand and interpret the parameter estimates and predictions of the
present model.
We conclude with a number of possible extensions to our work. An appendix
to this document describes software developed for use in this project that can
be employed in the construction, estimation, and simulation of similar dynamic
programming models.
10.1.1 Background: The Rust-Rothwell Model
In a series of papers [54, 55, 56], Rust and Rothwell provide a summary of the
nuclear power industry and develop a model of plant operations. Their work [55]
was used to model changes in operations following the TMI accident in 1979,
and their work [56] was used to predict permanent closure of nuclear power
plants (NPP) under various NRC licensing plans. Their model accurately pre-
dicts lengthening of average operating spells (time between refueling shutdowns)
from about 12 months to about 18 months. This may reect changes in reg-
ulatory policy or a reevaluation of operating strategies. In the second paper,
plants are modeled under two licensing regimes. First, plants are permitted to
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operate only until the expiration of their initial 40-year operating licenses. Next,
the model is solved with 20-year extensions to each license. Their work shows
that extensions typically improve the value of operations at each plant, so that
plants owners are less inclined to exit the market prematurely given unfavorable
economic conditions and, for this reason, many should nd it optimal to seek
the extensions.
NPPs are modeled as traditional prot maximizers even though they op-
erated under regulated prices until recently. This may be justied by noting
their increasing inclination to minimize costs given the increasing likelihood of
cost disallowances by PUC's, falling prices of fossil fuels, and the introduction
of incentive-based regulations (Rust and Rothwell [54], EIA [2], Che and Roth-
well [12]).
Rust and Rothwell summarize the model as follows: In each period the oper-
ator decides whether to run the reactor, to shut it down for preventative mainte-
nance or refueling, or permanently close the plant for decommissioning [56]. At
the beginning of each period, each plant is in one of three conditions (or states
or spells): an operating spell, a refueling spell, or a major problem spell. Given
these and other conditions and the probabilities of moving from the current state
to each other state given the actions of the operator, the operator chooses the op-
tion that is most likely to maximize the plant's value. Once the expected value
of future operations falls below the cost of decommissioning, plant operators
permanently close the plants.
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10.2 Features and Contributions
Our work extends existing literature and models primarily in three areas. First,
we update existing data sets to include monthly data from 1975 to 2003. We
described this data in Chapter 9. Second, we consider the eects of electricity
prices on operator behavior. We believe that price trends and seasonal patterns
may have important eects on protability and on the timing of plant procedures.
We reported our development and analysis of price data in Chapter 8. Finally,
we consider the eects of liability on prots and behavior.
Our eorts are designed and intended to support many other features and
extensions of the current work. These eorts include the design of our model,
collection and construction of data, and the software designed and employed in
the construction and estimation of our model. We mention some of the intended
extensions at the end of this chapter.
10.2.1 Data Extensions
The data set developed and employed here updates the data constructed by
Rust and Rothwell [54, 56, 55].1 Their data extended from January, 1975 to
December, 1994. The data in this set extend their panel by 108 months. More
important than this number itself is that these months reveal whether trends
that appeared to begin in the Rust-Rothwell sample have continued. These
trends include increased output and plant availability, improved reliability, and
moderating cost growth.
1The data used to construct this set were provided by Georey Rothwell of Stanford Uni-
versity.
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The operating data comprise an unbalanced panel spanning the months from
January, 1975 to December, 2003. One hundred sixteen plants are represented
in the sample, with a total of 31,218 reactor-month observations in the set of
data available to the model. Most, if not all, plants are represented in the data,
although observations tend to be lost near the beginning and end of reactor life.
In the latter years of the sample, all 104 of operational American reactors are
represented in the sample. In Chapter 9, we saw that performance and prof-
itability improved dramatically for the nuclear power industry since the 1980s.
We saw great improvement in plant reliability and eciency, so that plants op-
erate at full capacity most of the time. Average refueling times fell sharply, and
by nearly every observed measure performance has improved.
10.2.2 Stochastic Prices
Primarily because they lacked adequate accounting data, Rust and Rothwell
simplied the prot function in their model to employ only operating history
data. Prot-maximizing behavior was assumed, so that prots could be inferred
from available operating data. However, their study did not have any direct
observation of prices or revenue, nor observations of costs, so prots were esti-
mated as a function of observable operating state variables, and in particular
the utilization rate of the reactor (i.e. the fraction of the potential output given
the rated generation capacity that actually was generated during the period).
The following simplications were necessary in their work for identication given
the data limitations. First, the present value of costs of closing a plant were nor-
malized to zero. Second, electricity prices were assumed to have zero trend,
though the possibility of seasonal variation was allowed, and the prot func-
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tion was divided by maximum revenues, or price times output given the choice
of 100 percent plant availability in the current month. Finally, the normalized
error term ε, which is dened below, was assumed to have a Type 1 extreme
value distribution. The assumption of zero price growth was defended by price
stability over the sample period and DOE projections of slow demand growth
in coming decades. The normalization also requires that plant size does not
aect optimal operating strategies; this assumption ignores the heterogeneity
revealed elsewhere [54, page 23]. Whether these assumptions signicantly limit
the ability of the model to t the data must be tested. We examine the constant
price assumption by extending the model to allow for changing prices and then
re-estimating the parameters. The results are compared to the Rust-Rothwell
results with stationary prices.
Rust and Rothwell incorporated monthly dummy variables in their normal-
ized prot function. These allow for a variety of seasonal eects, but perhaps
most importantly they allow for seasonal price changes. Such changes especially
have been important since the mid1980s, as is shown elsewhere in our work on
electricity prices. These price cycles reect changes in seasonal demand, which
tends to be low in the spring and fall. These periods of excess supply allow oper-
ators to take plants o-line for refueling and repairs. As was shown in Chapter 9,
plants typically refueled every twelve months in the 1970s and early 1980s be-
fore switching to 18-month refueling cycles. These refueling periods usually are
scheduled for the spring or fall, but may be observed at other times to corre-
spond to forced outages. We saw earlier that operators have become far more
strict in their adherence to 12 or 18-month cycles, as we observe relatively fewer
shutdowns in other months. This may be due, in part, to increased seasonal elec-
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tricity price volatility beginning in the mid1980s, as we reported earlier. Plants
now have greater incentive to operate in seasons with high prices and relatively
less incentive to operate otherwise.
Nominal electricity rates have been rising very slowly since the mid1980s,
while relative prices have been falling gradually. These facts support the zero-
trend assumption for electricity prices in the optimal lifetime study [56]. Esti-
mation was performed with data from January, 1989 to December, 1994. Both
nominal prices and relative prices were stable over the estimation range, and
price stability continued throughout at least the rst 10 years of the forecast.
Hence, the zero price growth assumption seems justied for that study.
The price data for relative and nominal prices tell a dierent story for electric-
ity prices between 1973 and 1985. Electricity prices grew rapidly in this period
before slowing suddenly in the mid1980s.2 This suggests that the constant-price
assumption may have been troublesome in the Optimal Response study (Rust
and Rothwell [55]). The study attempted to test the behavior of power plant
operators for evidence of signicant changes following the 1979 accident at the
Three Mile Island (TMI) power plant. To do so, Rust and Rothwell (RR) dened
three periods: the preTMI period from 1975 to 1979, the transition period from
1980 to 1983, and the postTMI period from 1984 to 1993. To test for signi-
cant changes in behavior, RR estimated the model parameters rst with data
from the preTMI period and then again with data from the postTMI period.
They found that the two parameter sets were signicantly dierent, and they
concluded that the changes in behavior were due to changes in the regulatory
2We investigated these matters in Chapter 8. We nd evidence of a signicant structural
shift in electricity prices in the mid1980s.
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environment. Unfortunately, they did not take into account the eects on be-
havior of the sudden shift in price growth in the early to mid1980s. These price
changes might have lowered current-period prots signicantly. If the changes in
the price structure were believed to be permanent, as they proved to be, then the
eect on the expected present value of future prots would have been still more
dramatic. Hence, the fall in the value of plant operations, as measured by RR,
cannot be explained fully by increased stringency of regulatory policies. Instead,
some of the changes likely would have occurred without nuclear regulatory policy
changes because of structural shifts in electricity prices.
A benet of incorporating electricity prices in the prot function is that it
allows prots to be dened in terms of dollars. Setting the units in dollars
will ease later extensions to incorporate other nancial data. It also eases the
incorporation and calibration of other factors, such as liability under the Price-
Anderson policies. A signicant problem remains, however. We do not observe
plant revenue, and thus we do not know the per-unit revenue level received by
nuclear power plant operators. Instead, we observe retail electricity rates and
attempt to construct unit revenues from these observed prices and supporting
information gleaned elsewhere. This work is described in Chapter 9, though
annualized, site-level gures were reported there. The construction methods for
our monthly site-level data follows the same process that was described there.
The extension also allows the testing of various hypotheses regarding the
eects of price changes. This especially may be important in forecasting plant
closure under various price projections. Perhaps the most pressing need for
relaxing the constant-price assumption is to account for changing price struc-
tures. We must return to the optimal response study to disentangle the eects
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of regulations from those of other economic phenomena.
10.2.3 Accounting for Physical Risk and Liability Caps
The Rust-Rothwell model does not account explicitly for the possibility of seri-
ous accidents. The risk is captured in part by the possibility of a major problem
spell which requires shutdown for an extended period and, given such a shut-
down, a positive probability of never returning to service. This ignores costs of
cleanup and compensation, and it ignores the eect of an accident at one plant
on the rest of the industry. Dubin and Rothwell [16] were rst to calculate a
probability distribution and (local) expected costs and liability of a serious ac-
cident. Heyes and Heyes [29, 27] correct the earlier calculations and extend the
analysis to Canadian plants; the corrections are acknowledged in Rothwell [49].
Harding [23] provides additional detail and analysis. Other problems with the
original Dubin-Rothwell work are addressed in earlier chapters, along with sev-
eral extensions.
In all countries with signicant commercial nuclear power production, gov-
ernments have capped liability for osite losses. In 2001, the US House of Repre-
sentatives passed an extension of the Price-Anderson Act, which currently limits
liability to $88 million per plant, capping industry liability at about $10 bil-
lion per accident; each plant may be liable for accidents at other plants, up to
the $88 million limit for each plant (Rothwell [50], Energy Outlook [4, p. 18,
21]). Such payments are required if damages exceed the mandated private in-
surance coverage of $200 million per plant. In Chapter 3, we report implicit
subsidy calculations between $5,000 and $5 million per reactor year, depend-
ing on the assumption, though signicant questions remain. While the cap and
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corresponding subsidies are set at relatively low levels, the liability is nontriv-
ial, and these amounts do not include onsite damages and loss of the damaged
reactor and possibly other reactors at the site. Including the possibility of se-
rious accidents may increase the likelihood of permanent closure, increase the
likelihood of temporary closure for maintenance and repairs, and increase ex-
penditures on maintenance (Heyes and Heyes [29]). Heyes and Heyes claim that
liability caps lead to 1) ineciently low incentives to a) prevent accidents and
b) prevent escalation of damage given the occurrence of a serious accident, and
2) the encouragement of excess capacity.
Nearly all estimates related to accident probabilities and potential damage
assessments are dicult to calculate, require many simplifying assumptions, and
are subject to much criticism. In addition, potential osite damages vary widely
and depend on factors that vary across plants and time. These factors include
property values and population density in surrounding regions and weather.
Adding to the diculty of calibrating probability and liability parameters are
the prot function normalizations listed above. Still, we might select several
parameter vectors and evaluate corresponding model results in an attempt to
determine the eect on operators' behavior of various liability and risk levels.
10.3 The Model
There are two sets of variables in the model.3 First, there are two vectors of state
variables: a vector of observed variables xt and a vector of state variables εt that
3Rust-Rothwell employed two versions of their model in [55] and [56]. We follow the ex-
tended version described in [56].
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are observed by the operators but not by the economist. Observed state variables
include electricity prices, indicators of conditions at the plant, and the age of the
plant. These variables evolve either according to deterministic rules encoded in
the model or according to stochastic processes that are estimated. Unobserved
state variables are assumed to exist in order to account for deviations in the data
between model predictions and reality. The second set of variables are choice
variables. This vector includes permanent closure, refueling, and operating at a
chosen utilization level.
After observing xt and εt, operators choose an action from vector at. Actions
are chosen to maximize the nuclear power plant's (NPP's) net present value V0




βtE0,t {π (αt, xt, εt) | x0 = x, εt = ε} (10.1)
where β is the discount factor (prots received in the near future are preferred
to prots received in the distant future). E0,t denotes expectations at time
0 of prots at time t. π is the current period prot function which has the
representation π(a, x, ε) = µ(a, x, φ) + ε(a), where φ is a parameter vector that
must be estimated; details of this prot function will be given later. The state
variables xt and εt change according to Markov processes with the transition
density λ (xt+1, εt+1 | xt, εt, αt). Lifetimes T are limited by operating licenses
granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which initially were
granted for 40 years; operators now may apply for 20 year extensions. The
vector x is dened as xt = (rt, ft, dt), where r is the type of spell, f is an
observed signal of possible events not under the operator's control (the operator
also observes the signal ε) that indicate operating conditions for the present
period, and d indicates the present duration of the current spell. (A summary of
these variables and their evolution, taken from [56], will be presented in following
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paragraphs.) Actions are chosen from vector A that includes permanent closure
of the plant, shutting down to refuel, or operation at a capacity between, and
including, 0 and 100 percent. The current state of a plant may limit its set
of feasible actions, and regulation further may restrict the set; we address the
former but not the latter concern. The laws of motion governing states r and d
are deterministic, but the law of motion for f is probabilistic; its distribution ρ
must be estimated.
The state variable ft is a stochastic signal of conditions in the current period.
The four possible values for ft are interpreted as follows:
ft =

1 no forced outage this period
2 one or more forced outages this period
3 if r=1, enter a major problem spell
if r=2, continue refueling
if r=3, the major problem spell continues
4 a major accident occurs.
The probability distribution for f is determined by the estimation of param-
eters for a set of ve binary logit equations g (·): 1) the probability of forced
outages during an operating spell, 2) the probability of forced outages imme-
diately following a refueling spell, 3) the probability of a major problem devel-
oping during an operating spell, 4) the probability of exiting a major problem
spell and resuming operations, and 5) the probability of exiting a refueling spell
and resuming operations. In an extended version of the model, we add to these
a calibrated probability of a major accident. The estimated probabilities are
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parameterized as
ρi (xt, at, t) =
exp {g (xt, at, t, ψi)}
1 + exp {g (xt, at, t, ψi)}
where i indexes the ve probabilities and ψ is a parameter vector.
The state variable rt is the type of spell in the previous period. Possible
values are given as
rt =

1 if the previous period was part of a major problem spell
2 if the previous period was part of a refueling spell
3 if the previous period was part of an operating spell.
The variable evolves according to the equation
rt+1 =

1 if ft = 3 and (rt = 3 or rt = 1)
2 if (at = 2 and ft < 3 and rt = 3) or (rt = 2 and ft = 3)
3 if at > 2 and ft < 3.
The state variable dt is the length of the spell as of the previous period. The
interpretation of this variable depends on the type of spell last period:
if rt=1 dt is the length of a major problem spell
if rt=2 dt is the length of a refueling spell
if rt=3 dt is the length of an operating spell.
The variable evolves according to
dt+1 =
 dt + 1{at 6= 2 and rt 6= 3} if rt+1 = rt1 otherwise.
Rust and Rothwell assume that electricity prices have no trend, though they
might exhibit seasonal variation. The assumption is relaxed in this paper. We
select a parsimonious autoregression equation for prices
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pt+1 = α+ αt+1 + ηpt + εt+1
where α is a constant, αt+1 is a parameter for monthly dummy variables, η is the
parameter on the lagged dependent variable, and ε is a stochastic error term.
The dependent variable p is in logarithms.
The set of feasible actions is determined by the current combination of state
variables. Depending on the current state of the plant, certain operations may
not be possible. Such choices are eliminated from consideration in the model.
The complete choice set is:
at =

1 Permanently close the plant
2 Refuel the plant
3 Temporarily shut down the plant
4 utilization between [1,25]
5 utilization between [26,50]
6 utilization between [51,75]
7 utilization between [76,99]
8 utilization = 100
The set of possible actions may be restricted further by regulators. We discuss
the possibility later in this chapter, but this model does not account explicitly
for regulatory intervention. This may prove to be problematic. Our maintained
assumption is that actions are chosen to maximize prots while taking into ac-
count solely the technical and economic environment. Surely actions sometimes
are chosen to comply with regulations while technical conditions and economics
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would seem to lead to a dierent choice.
The portion of the prot function µ that is composed of potentially observable
variables is dened as
µ(α, xt, φ) =

−φc if at = 1 (close the plant)
−cr (xt, φr) if at = 2 (refuel plant)
ptu (at)− cO (xt, at, φO) if at > 2 (operate at level at)
where φc is the present value of decommissioning costs, cr is the expected cost
of refueling, cO is the expected costs of operating at capacity a, pt is the market
price of electricity, and u is the utilization rate given the choice of availability
(0100%). With appropriate assumptions, conditional choice probabilities for
each action, given the current state, can be inferred from the expected value
function





exp {vt+1 (x′, a′)}
 p (dx′ | x, a, ϕ)
(10.2)
where At is the set of feasible actions. The choice probabilities are
Pt (a|x) =
exp {vt (x, a)}∑
a′∈At(x′) exp {vt (x, a′)}
. (10.3)
The dynamic programming model is solved by backward induction using
Equation 10.2. The model rst is solved for the nal period where the right-
hand-side contains only µ (the remaining term is zero since there can be no
production without an operating license). The corresponding left-hand side for
the nal period enters the equation for the previous period. The process con-
tinues until the current period is reached. Parameters in the prot function,
the laws of motion for state variables, and the discount rate are estimated by
284
maximum likelihood techniques that seek to reproduce actual operating histories
with model simulations.







ln [P (at,i | xt,m, pt,i, φ)]
+ ln [ξ (xt,i | xt−1,i, at−1,i, ψ)]
+ ln [ζ (pt,i | pt−1,i, ψ)]
9>>=>>;
The log-likelihood is composed of three terms. The rst is the predicted
probability that the observed action would be chosen. The second is the
probability that the observed transition of the discrete stochastic state
variables would be realized. The nal term is the transition density for the
evolution of the continuous price series. These terms are added across time and
across plants to form the log-likelihood.







































The results of Rust-Rothwell were veried with their original data set with an
earlier version of this model that corresponded closely to theirs. While the
parameter estimates were not identical to theirs, they were very similar. Such
small dierences are to be expected since the computer code developed here is
dierent than the code for their model. Since the parameter results are similar,
we do not report our estimates for their version of the model. Instead, we report
results only for our extended versions.
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The data set was extended to December, 2003 from the Rust-Rothwell end-
ing date of December, 1994, so the full set is from January, 1975 to December,
2003. The model is estimated over three subperiods. The rst is the period
generally preceding the TMI accident: January, 1975 to December, 1979. The
second allows a period of transition for the industry and regulators following
the TMI accident, and is intended to capture the era of relative stability follow-
ing the transition: January, 1984 to December, 2003. The third period allows
the industry still more time to adjust to the regulatory changes initiated af-
ter TMI, and thus it includes data between January, 1989 to December, 2003.
The preTMI and postTMI data sets correspond to Rust-Rothwell [55], where
they employed data from 1975-1979 and 1984-1993. The last set corresponds to
Rust-Rothwell [56], where they employed data from 1989-1994.
We employ the preTMI and postTMI samples in a test of structural stability
across a turbulent episode in the industry in which many regulations were re-
vised and introduced. Rust and Rothwell found evidence of a structural shift in
operator behavior. However, they assumed that electricity prices were constant.
We nd evidence of a structural shift in the parameters for electricity price equa-
tions. The structural shift in prices occurred at about the same time that Rust
and Rothwell claim that shifts occurred in operating policies. We want to see
whether incorporating stochastic and structurally shifting prices allows stability
of the remaining model parameters.
We employ the nal data set, from 1989-2003, in an extended model. This
model is employed to explore eects of risk to the physical plant and correspond-
ing Price-Anderson regulation of liability. We also employ these parameters in a
set of industry forecasts for optimal closure, as Rust and Rothwell [56] reported.
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Rather than the retail electricity rates themselves, we are interested in the
unit revenues earned by nuclear power plant operators for producing electricity.
We create an approximation of unit revenues by assuming that generators receive
a constant share of total revenues; the balance goes to transmission, distribution,
and other activities. We multiply industrial electricity rates by this share, and
then deate the results. Note that we employ two measures of factor prices. For
the sample periods 1975-1979, 1984-2003, and the combined sample, we employ
average wage rates as a proxy for factor prices. We defend this selection by noting
that a large fraction of operating costs are due to labor [2]. For remaining work,
we employ the Producer Price Index (PPI). Given relative stability of electricity
prices, the PPI, and wage rates in the 1989-2003 sample, we expect the choice
of the PPI instead of wage rates to have little eect on our results.
We follow Rust and Rothwell in setting the discount rate β to 0.999. This
corresponds to a real annual interest rate of 1.2%. This discount rate is small,
so that operators care a great deal about potential future prots.
Estimation of such dynamic programming models is performed with the
three-stage maximum-likelihood routine developed by Rust [53]. The rst stage
is to estimate the parameters ψ for the transition probabilities of the stochastic
state variables. This vector includes price equation parameters and parameters
for the binary logit functions used to predict the stochastic indicator variable
f . The second stage is to estimate prot function parameters φ, conditional on
the transition probability parameters. The third stage simultaneously estimates
both ψ and φ.
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10.4.1 First-Stage Estimation Results
In this section, we report transition probability parameters. First, we report the
price parameter estimates. The discussion is brief, since a detailed look at prices
is reported elsewhere. We then examine parameter estimates for evolution of the
discrete stochastic state variables.
Price Parameters
The estimated equation is
pt = α+ αmonth (t) + ηppt−1 + εt (10.4)
where p is the logarithm of relative prices in dollars per kilowatt-hour, α is a
drift term, and αmonth is a monthly dummy parameter. Estimates for four sample
periods are reported in Table 10.1. Note the signicance of the dummy variable
parameters is samples including the 1984-2003 data, while the parameter values
indicate little seasonal volatility in the 1970s. The parameters also reect the
shift from high average growth rates in the 1970s to slightly declining growth
since the mid1980s.
The data series are plotted in an earlier chapter. There, we estimated several
equations and considered the adequacy of Equation 10.4. We found statistical
evidence of a structural break in the mid1980s, which may be seen by observing
the parameter estimates reported in the table.
Reported adjusted R2 values are very high. This may be misleading, however,
given the nature of the employed data. Unit revenues for each plant were created
from regional electricity prices; data on nine regions were available. At most,
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Table 10.1: Price Parameters
1/1984-12/2003 12/1979 12/2003 12/2003
1/1975 -12/1979 1/1975 1/1984 1/1989
Pt−1 0.9947 (0.001)* 0.9927 (0.002)* 0.9951 (0.001)* 0.9947 (0.001)*
α -0.0166 (0.002)* -0.0298 (0.006)* -0.0147 (0.002)* -0.0143 (0.003)*
αDec -0.0031 (0.001)* 0.0049 (0.002)* -0.0049 (0.001)* -0.0007 (0.001)
αJan -0.0042 (0.001)* 0.0091 (0.002)* -0.0055 (0.001)* -0.0113 (0.001)*
αFeb -0.0060 (0.001)* 0.0098 (0.002)* -0.0074 (0.001)* -0.0048 (0.001)*
αMar -0.0067 (0.001)* 0.0111 (0.002)* -0.0084 (0.001)* -0.0110 (0.001)*
αApr 0.0077 (0.001)* 0.0065 (0.002)* 0.0077 (0.001)* 0.0097 (0.0010)*
αMay 0.0324 (0.001)* -0.0009 (0.002) 0.0353 (0.001)* 0.0349 (0.001)*
αJun 0.0052 (0.001)* 0.0123 (0.002)* 0.0045 (0.001)* 0.0011 (0.001)
αJul -0.0037 (0.001)* 0.0094 (0.002)* -0.0050 (0.001)* -0.0035 (0.001)*
αAug -0.0037 (0.001* 0.0123 (0.002)* -0.0054 (0.001)* -0.0054 (0.001)*
αSep -0.0311 (0.001)* 0.0066 (0.002)* -0.0349 (0.001)* -0.0413 (0.001)*
αOct -0.0246 (0.001)* -0.0029 (0.002 -0.0268 (0.001)* -0.0296 (0.001)*
R
2
0.989 0.993 0.989 0.987
NOBS 25900 2309 23713 18878
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we thus have nine unique price series for use with 116 plants. Statistics are
computed as if we have 116 unique price series.
Transition Probability Parameters
We next review the transition probability parameters. Five binary logit functions
are employed in the model to forecast the values of f . The parameter vector
is denoted ψ. Subscripts indicate the corresponding binary logit function, with
1) of the probability of forced outages during an operating spell, 2) rf the
probability of forced outages immediately following a refueling spell, 3) om the
probability of a major problem developing during an operating spell, 4) mo the
probability of exiting a major problem spell and resuming operations, and 5) ro
the probability of exiting a refueling spell and resuming operations. Parameter
values are reported in Table 10.3.
First, we examine the ψrf parameters. Note that the parameter for the
constant, ψrf (1), is positive for periods including the preTMI sample, and the
parameter is negative otherwise. This indicates that for all else equal, forced
outages following a refueling became less common. The parameter on reactor
ages, ψrf (t), is negative in all samples. This indicates that reactors become more
reliable as they age, at least according to this measure of reliability. Note that
we lack sucient data for old plants, and we have not allowed a quadratic term,
to capture possibly increasing risk at old plants.
We next examine the parameters ψro. Given our assumption that the dura-
tion of refueling spells is not under the control of the operator, these parameters
indicate the likelihood of refueling completion after given lengths of time. We
include parameters for refueling lengths 1-4, and another dummy parameter for
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spells longer than four months. In addition, we include a linear trend for all
spells longer than four months. Note that we do not have sucient data in our
small preTMI sample to estimate each parameter. While one-month refueling
spells are slightly more common in the 1989-2003 sample, they were uncommon
in all periods. Two-month refueling spells became much more common after
TMI. Note that the trend parameter ψro on long refueling spells is negative for
all samples, but that the likelihood of exiting a refueling spell falls more quickly
with duration in the 1989-2003 data set.
The parameter vector for forced outages in the midst of an operating spell,
ψof , includes terms for a constant, plant age, linear and quadratic operating
spell duration, and whether forced outages were observed in the prior period.
Note that for all else equal, forced outages were much more common in the
preTMI sample, and much less common in the 1989-2003 sample than even the
1984-2003 sample. The parameters on plant age have become smaller with later
sample periods. Perhaps we have an omitted variables problem and should add
a quadratic term, or perhaps operators are learning better operating procedures
so that age is less important. For all sample periods, the parameter on duration
is negative and the parameter on duration squared is positive. This means that
reliability initially increases during the operating spell, but then peaks and begins
to fall. However, both the increases and the subsequent declines are far less
signicant in the 1989-2003 period. Finally, in all samples we observe persistence;
forced outages in one month indicate a signicantly greater probability of outages
in the next.
We next review the parameter vector ψom that predicts the likelihood of a
major problem arising during an operating spell. Recall that we do not have
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in mind catastrophic events like the Chernobyl disaster. All else equal, major
problems were least likely to arise in the preTMI and 1989-2003 samples. Data
including the troublesome mid1980s yield higher estimates. The parameter on
plant age is not signicant for any sample, but it seems that (young) plants in
the preTMI sample grew unreliable more quickly than (older) plants in later
samples. Reliability fell relatively quickly over the operating spell in the preTMI
sample. If forced outages occurred in the preceding month, then major problems
are more likely to arise in the current month; note that we lack sucient data
to estimate a parameter in the preTMI sample.
Finally, we review the parameter vector ψmo which gives the probability of
moving from a major problem spell to an operating spell. All else equal, the
probability is quite small in the (small) preTMI sample, and it is relatively
large and stable in other samples. The probability increases with duration in all
samples. Apparently, the probability was much smaller in the mid1980s than in
the preTMI period and in 1989-2003.
10.4.2 Second-Stage Estimation Results
We now examine the second set of parameters. These prot function parameters
are conditional on the rst-stage estimates of the price parameters and transition
probability parameters.
In the estimates reported here, we assume that plants operate under forty-
year licenses. This is counterfactual for some plants, since the NRC specied a
process for obtaining 20-year license extensions. In recent years, some operators
have applied and received these extensions. We will compare 40-year and 60-year
estimates later.
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Table 10.3: Transition Probability Parameters
1/1975-12/1979 1/1975 1/1984 1/1989
1/1984-12/2003 12/1979 12/2003 12/2003
ψrf (1) 0.1496 (0.107) 0.4693 (0.332) -0.0709 (0.138) -0.5597 (0.189)*
ψrf (t) -0.0047 (0.001)* -0.0050 (0.006) -0.0037 (0.001)* -0.0023 (0.001)*
ψro(dt = 1) -3.2027 (0.155)* -186.908 (∞) -3.2098 (0.160)* -3.0582 (0.160)*
ψro(dt = 2) -0.4795 (0.060)* -0.9752 (0.220)* -0.4046 (0.062)* -0.1130 (0.075)
ψro(dt = 3) 0.0899 (0.063) 0.3557 (0.203) 0.0474 (0.069) 0.2841 (0.097)*
ψro(dt = 4) 0.3114 (0.106)* 1.0083 (0.409)* 0.2322 (0.119)* 0.3824 (0.165)*
ψro(dt ≥ 5) 0.4374 (0.186)* 0.2806 (1.343) 0.4463 (0.182)* 0.7046 (0.267)*
ψro((dt − 4)
×(dt ≥ 5))
-0.1801 (0.051)* -0.0048 (0.812) -0.1818 (0.051)* -0.2714 (0.085)*
ψof (1) -0.5374 (0.048)* 0.1487 (0.222) -0.8475 (0.047)* -1.2881 (0.065)*
ψof (t) -0.004 (0.0001)* -0.0047 (0.002)* -0.003 (0.0002)* -0.002 (0.0002)*
ψof (dt) -0.0388 (0.010)* -0.0484 (0.050) -0.0251 (0.010)* -0.0176 (0.012)
ψof (d
2
t ) 0.0006 (0.0006) 0.0008 (0.003) 0.00002 (0.001) 0.00002 (0.001)
ψof (ft = 2) 0.5714 (0.036)* 0.4362 (0.092)* 0.5332 (0.041)* 0.4021 (0.056)*
ψom(1) -7.7606 (0.466)* -8.9300 (2.83)* -7.6875 (0.525)* -8.4049 (0.781)*
ψom(t) 0.0001 (0.002) 0.0135 (0.015) -0.0003 (0.002) 0.0020 (0.002)
ψom(dt) 0.1474 (0.027)* 0.2556 (0.201) 0.1356 (0.028)* 0.1304 (0.045)*
ψom(ft = 2) 1.5749 (0.292)* -112.070 (∞) 1.8344 (0.328)* 2.0270 (0.379)*
ψmo(1) -3.6812 (0.477)* -8.2008 (27.236) -3.7099 (0.475)* -3.6719 (0.567)*
ψmo(dt) 0.05106 (0.02)* 0.4821 (2.374) 0.0517 (0.021)* 0.0528 (0.025)*
NOBS 25900 2309 23713 18878
LL -13540 -1569 -11899 -8745
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Rust and Rothwell incorporated monthly dummy variables and other non-
parametric terms in their specication of the prot function. We impose addi-
tional structure in our model, and we also incorporate stochastic prices. The
additional structure comes by dening separate revenue and cost functions, and
by allowing seasonal uctuations only in prices. That is, prots exhibit seasonal
variation only because prices tend to be higher in the summer and winter, and
so revenue tends to be higher in those periods. We assume that costs do not
exhibit seasonal variation.
Prot parameters
Estimation periods are identical to the transition parameter estimates above: 1)
a preTMI period from January, 1975 to December, 1979, 2) a postTMI period
from January, 1984 to December, 2003, 3) a combined period, and 4) a period
from January, 1989 to December, 2003.
Despite the dierences in the treatment of seasonal prot variation, and given
the addition of stochastic prices, and although code for this model is very dif-
ferent than that used in Rust-Rothwell, estimates of prot function parameters
are similar to the corresponding estimates reported in Rust-Rothwell [56]. This
may indicate that their seasonal dummies primarily were capturing price uc-
tuations. However, we did not test the signicance of cost function dummies in
the extended model. Instead, they were eliminated for sake of simplicity. Note
that the parameters reported in Table 10.4 are normalized cost levels, and so the
values naturally are positive.
Parameter φa=2 gives the monthly cost of refueling. Note that refueling costs
per month seem to have grown signicantly. If plants that are refueling get a
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signal that they are free to operate, but instead they continue to refuel, then
their monthly costs increase by φa=2,f=1. This parameter also is larger for later
samples. Given our assumption that the lengths of refueling spells are exogenous,
these indicate that plant operators have become less inclined to begin refuelling
of their plants.
There are three parameters for costs of temporary shutdowns. First, the pa-
rameters φa=3,f=3 gives the monthly cost of a major problem spell. Major prob-
lem spells seem to be about as costly in the 1989-2003 sample as in the preTMI
sample, but both are more costly than in samples that include the mid1980s.
This is a reasonable result for our revealed preference approach, since extended
closures were common following the TMI accident. This indicates, however, a
limitation of our model. We do not take account adequately of regulatory in-
tervention. Many temporary closures were due to mandated inspections and
equipment modications. In such cases, the observed actions were due to reg-
ulatory mandates rather than ordinary prot motives. The parameter φa=3,f<3
gives the cost of failing to operate when operations are feasible, and φa=3,f=2
gives the cost of failing to operate when at least one temporary shutdown would
have been required during the month. In the rst case, it seems that it has
become increasingly costly for plants to forgo the opportunity to produce power.
However, the costs of passing on the opportunity to produce power for only part
of a month have changed little. Note that the latter parameter could not be
estimated precisely with the preTMI sample.
Remaining parameters estimate the costs of producing power. φd,u>0 is a
trend term on the length of the operating spell. Costs may grow slightly more
quickly in later samples than in the preTMI sample so that operating spells
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tend to be shorter. Costs of operating for fractions of available time have grown
substantially and monotonically as the sample periods shift to later dates. Note
that parameter estimates are negative for the costs of producing at full capacity.
This may indicate that operators have a stronger preference for producing at full
power than is explained by our model. A possible reason is that starting and
stopping production is risky and is hard on equipment. Hence, operators prefer
production over refueling or temporary shutdowns, but they strongly prefer to
operate for full months rather than to stop and restart during the month. This
may indicate problems with our assumptions about regulation; that is, that op-
erators' decisions are limited only by technical constraints and not by regulatory
mandates. The nal parameter, φu=1,f=2, gives the cost of operating despite a
forced outage signal. The large parameter values indicate that such possibly
irresponsible behavior is very expensive and is avoided; such behavior has grown
more costly.
We display the value functions at given price levels in Figures 10.1 and 10.2.
The gures plot the present value of operations, rst for electricity prices of $0.03
per kilowatt-hour and then for $0.10 per kilowatt-hour. The results are based on
estimates using the 1989-2003 sample, so that expected price growth is modest
or slightly falling. Three curves are displayed in each, and plant age is on the
horizontal axis. First, we display values for a plant that in in its fth month of an
operating spell that received a signal that it is free to operate for another month
without problems. Second, we graph the value of a plant in its fth month of
an operating spell that receives a signal that it is free to operate, but that it
will need to shut down at least once in the following month. Finally, we plot
the value of a plant in its fth month of operations that receives a signal that a
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Table 10.4: Prot Function Parameters
1/1975-12/1979 1/1975 1/1984 1/1989
1/1984-12/2003 12/1979 12/2003 12/2003
φa=2 3.1574 (0.027)* 2.1446 (0.182)* 3.3052 (0.029)* 4.1266 (0.034)*
φa=2,f=1 3.1085 (0.242)* 2.3494 (0.953)* 3.2912 (0.268)* 3.4141 (0.350)*
φa=3,f=3 0.3220 (0.213) 0.4403 (1.575) 0.3335 (0.225) 0.4517 (0.228)*
φa=3,f<3 2.9108 (0.199)* 2.3672 (1.050)* 2.9454 (0.225)* 3.0607 (0.268)*
φa=3,f=2 3.5515 (0.407)* 3.7944 (46.26) 3.5885 (0.411)* 3.5357 (0.497)*
φd,u>0 0.0862 (0.002)* 0.0888 (0.013)* 0.0857 (0.002)* 0.0901 (0.002)*
φu∈(0,.25] 3.9344 (1.720)* 3.5409 (8.187) 3.9988 (1.918)* 4.1224 (2.633)
φu∈(.25,.50] 3.3226 (0.751)* 2.7475 (2.789) 3.4055 (0.851)* 3.4900 (0.983)*
φu∈(.50,.75] 2.4085 (0.223)* 1.9268 (0.768)* 2.4845 (0.238)* 2.5151 (0.276)*
φu∈(.75,1) 1.0996 (0.044)* 0.2553 (0.108)* 1.2289 (0.054)* 1.2946 (0.071)*
φu=1 -1.437 (0.007)* -1.005 (0.089)* -1.487 (0.008)* -1.612 (0.009)*
φu=1,f=2 5.4531 (1.20)* 3.2571 (1.060)* 6.1085 (2.682)* 6.1708 (3.257)
NOBS 25900 2309 23713 18878
LL -23753 -2147 -21551 -16747
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Figure 10.1: Firm Values at Low Prices
major problem has arisen. We see that there are signicant dierences in values
between plants that run at 100% capacity in a given month and an otherwise
identical plant that runs at limited capacity. There also is a signicant loss of
value when major problems arise, so that operators are more likely to close their
plants permanently.
Note that the seasonal volatility of electricity prices causes a great deal of
volatility in rm values. While the apparent eects on value of price average
growth rates seem small, we do observe greater plant values at higher electricity
prices.
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Figure 10.2: Firm Values at High Prices
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10.4.3 Goodness of Fit
We can get a sense of the performance of our model, and its capacity for replicat-
ing the behavior of plant operators, by comparing the frequency of each action
observed in the data to the aggregate probabilities predicted by the model. Fol-









I {ai = a, xi ∈ X}
where a is the action chosen by the operator, x is a state vector from the set
of states X in a given partition of the data set. Here, X is the entire data set.
In short, we calculate the nonparametric choice probabilities as the number of
times a particular action is chosen divided by the total number of observations.




















I {xi ∈ X}
Employing the estimated parameters, we sum the model's choice probabilities for
each feasible action, given the observed combination of state variables. We divide
the sum by the total number of observations to get an estimate of the probability
that a given action will be chosen, conditional on the state variables. In this case,
we do not partition the set of state variables, so that all observations are included.
The nonparametric and parametric choice probabilities are reported in Table 10.5
for the 1989-2003 sample period. We nd, as did Rust and Rothwell, that the
model seems to replicate very well the choice probabilities at the aggregate level.
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Table 10.5: Aggregation of Choice Probabilities
Nonparametric Parametric
Shut Down 0.0006 0.0009
Refuel 0.1368 0.1362
u = 0 0.0634 0.0639
u ∈ [1, 25) 0.0069 0.0070
u ∈ [25, 50) 0.0132 0.0133
u ∈ [50, 75) 0.0348 0.0354
u ∈ [75, 100) 0.1190 0.1206
u = 100 0.6253 0.6228
10.4.4 Structural Stability Test Results
We turn now to the question of whether the behavior of nuclear power plant
operators changed signicantly within our sample period from 1975 to 2003. In
their more limited model, Rust and Rothwell [55] discovered that parameter
estimates shifted signicantly when they split the sample. They attributed most
dierences to optimal responses to regulatory changes following the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979.
Rust and Rothwell discovered several dierences in their results, depending
on the sample periods. First, operators shifted from 12-month operating cy-
cles in the 1970s to 18-month cycles in later periods, on average. Second, they
estimate that over 90% of expected discounted prots disappeared for reasons in-
cluding stricter safety regulations, increases in expected decommissioning costs,
and stricter standards for price setting that forced owners to bear cost increases.
Finally, they noted a decrease in the frequency of imprudent or reckless behav-
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ior.
In our earlier work in Chapters 5 and 8, we discovered reasons to question
whether the conclusions reached by Rust and Rothwell are valid. More precisely,
we question not their observations but rather their conclusions. We found evi-
dence of a signicant structural break in electricity prices that occurred in the
mid1980s. We assume that unit revenues earned by power plant operators expe-
rienced a corresponding structural shift, so that rapidly-growing price patterns
in the 1970s shifted to a gradually falling relative price trend. The simple fact
that relative prices grew rapidly in the early part of the sample period leads us
to question the assumption that prices were stable and that zero price growth
was a reasonable assumption to simplify the model. Of particular concern is the
fact that the pattern of price growth shifted at roughly the same time Rust and
Rothwell observed changes in the behavior of power plant operators. In addition,
the introduction of signicant seasonal volatility likely aects the timing of op-
erators' decisions. We thus believe that Rust and Rothwell assumed too quickly
that changes in operator behavior should be explained as optimal responses to
changes in regulation. We have no reason to doubt their reasoning, for certainly
there were many regulatory changes that did aect behavior. We must remem-
ber, however, that operators also respond to economic changes, including shifts
in demand and prices. We studied this problem using the industry model of
Chapter 5.
We thus attempt to reconstruct the Rust-Rothwell structural stability test [55,
p. 35] to determine whether the behavior of the rms remained consistent over
time. This time, however, the model is extended in two important ways.4 Less
4Another dierence is that we use the extended version of their model developed in [56].
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important, perhaps, is that we extend the data set from 1993 to 2003. Our
sample periods thus are 1975 to 1979 and 1984 to 2003. The more important
change, and the one of particular interest, is the inclusion of stochastic and po-
tentially trended prices. The allowance of dierent price structures will allow us
to consider whether remaining parameters, and in particular the prot function
parameters, change in response to regulatory reforms.
We might expect that the increase in seasonal volatility, as was noted earlier,
might explain the increased adherence to strict 12 or 18-month operating cycles,
though it does not explain the transition from 12 to 18 months. We might
suppose that the change in relative price trends, from increasing to decreasing,
might explain some of the disappearance of estimated prots noted by Rust and
Rothwell and also reported here. Of course, no change in electricity prices will
explain the trends in operating costs observed in Chapter 9, so this explanation
too is incomplete. Still, it seems that prices should matter a lot, especially given
the sharp change in price growth. We test the parameter estimates for our model
in an attempt to discover whether our extended model captures adequately the
causes of operator behavior or whether there remain unexplained changes that
we too might attribute to regulatory eects.
We concluded already that there is a structural break in prices. We now con-
sider changes in the evolution of other state variables. We employ a likelihood-
ratio test on the hypothesis of stable prot function parameters. Again, this test
excludes the price equation, although results of a separate test were reported
earlier. Using results reported in Table 10.3, we nd that





The null hypothesis of structural stability for the discrete stochastic state vari-
ables cannot be rejected.
We now turn attention on prot function parameters. These estimates are
conditional on the rst-stage estimates of transition function parameters. The
test utilizes results reported in Table 10.4. Given the test result




we cannot reject the null hypothesis of structural stability.
What should we conclude about the stability of our model? First, caution is
in order. Before making bold claims about the superiority of this extended model,
the results should be subjected to further analysis. On the other hand, the test
results lend support to our arguments that the Rust-Rothwell conclusions were
misleading, and that demand-side changes explain some of the observed patterns
in operator behavior. Regulatory changes certainly did aect behavior within
the nuclear industry, and we should examine further the eects of regulation by
extending this work according to our industry modeling eorts.
10.5 Extensions and Applications
In this section, we extend and apply the dynamic programming model. We begin
by estimating parameters for the model assuming that rms operate with 60-
year licenses. Next, we estimate a model in which rms face the possibility of
a serious accident with corresponding costs and liability. Finally, we apply our
earlier estimates to perform historical simulations and construct forecasts.
In addition to the basic 40-year model described above, we constructed and
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estimated two alternative models. First, we estimated a 60-year version to ac-
count for available 20-year extensions to operating licenses that rst became
available in the 1990s. Second, we extended the basic model to include risks of
serious accidents with corresponding operator liability. Both alternatives were
estimated over the 1989-2003 sample period. Parameters are displayed in Ta-
ble 10.6. The rst column of the table replicates the prot function parameter
estimates reported above for the 1989-2003 sample. The center column reports
estimates for a model with 60-year operating licenses. The nal column reports
estimates for a 40-year model with risk and liability. Details are provided be-
low. Transition probability estimates essentially remain unchanged from those
reported earlier for the same sample, and so we do not report them again.
10.5.1 60 Year Operating Licenses
We consider possible twenty-year extensions to the original 40-year operating
licenses. The legislation to allow plants to apply for license extensions was not
passed until well after the start of the data sample in January, 1989. Further, not
all plants operating at the end of the sample in 2003 received extensions, applied
for extensions, or even stated intentions to apply. However, we might suppose
that forward-looking operators anticipated by 1989 or so that license extensions
would be oered in the future, and we might further assume that they formed
their operating policies accordingly. Hence, we estimate parameters for a 60-year
model using an otherwise unmodied version of the model described above. We
compare the parameters to those estimated allowing only a 40-year operating
horizon. Parameters for the 40-year model are shown in the rst column of
Table 10.6 and parameters for the 60-year model are shown in the second column.
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Table 10.6: Alternative Models
Base Model 60 Year Model Risk&Liability
1/1989 1/1989 1/1989
12/2003 12/2003 12/2003
φa=2 4.1266 (0.034)* 4.5610 (0.033)* 3.7415 (0.035)*
φa=2,f=1 3.4141 (0.350)* 3.3063 (0.328)* 3.3780 (0.343)*
φa=3,f=3 0.4517 (0.228)* 0.5455 (0.225)* 0.0534 (0.228)
φa=3,f<3 3.0607 (0.268)* 3.1162 (0.275)* 2.6619 (0.267)*
φa=3,f=2 3.5357 (0.497)* 3.4706 (0.502)* 3.5399 (0.497)*
φd,u>0 0.0901 (0.002)* 0.0987 (0.002)* 0.0903 (0.002)*
φu∈(0,.25] 4.1224 (2.633) 4.0007 (2.655) 3.7377 (2.676)
φu∈(.25,.50] 3.4900 (0.983)* 3.3547 (0.985)* 3.0962 (0.991)*
φu∈(.50,.75] 2.5151 (0.276)* 2.3839 (0.276)* 2.1136 (0.276)*
φu∈(.75,1) 1.2946 (0.071)* 1.1582 (0.071)* 0.8923 (0.071)*
φu=1 -1.612 (0.009)* -1.6918 (0.009)* -2.019 (0.009)*
φu=1,f=2 6.1708 (3.257) 6.0832 (3.081)* 6.1991 (3.334)
NOBS 18878 18878 18878
LL -16747 -16893 -16747
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This is dierent than the approach taken by Rust and Rothwell [56]. Their
data set ended before any plants obtained license extensions. They estimated
parameters using a 40-year model, and then they solved a 60-year model using
the previous parameter estimates. Because we have a longer sample period, and
because this extended sample includes observations for plants that have obtained
extensions, we proceed dierently.
Consider the estimates reported in Table 10.6. First, note that the parameter
estimates for the 40-year and 60-year models are very similar. However, the log-
likelihood values suggest that the 40-year assumption ts the data slightly better
than the 60-year model. We did not test for signicance of the dierences, and
we cannot make claims about the importance of these small dierences.
The cost of refueling is slightly higher in the 60-year model, but the cost of
entering a refueling spell despite freedom to operate is lower. The monthly cost
of a major problem spell is higher, as is the cost of an unforced shut down. If
an operator chooses to close for the entire month, with the alternative being to
operate for only part of the month, then this choice is less costly than under
the 40-year horizon. The increase in costs with duration of operating spells is
virtually unchanged, as are monthly costs for operating at rates greater than
zero and less than 100 percent. The benet of running at 100 percent is slightly
higher, but the cost of ignoring problem signals is lower. A number of the
dierences noted here may be explained by operators taking greater care to
maintain their plants in order that the plants may remain operable for greater
lengths of time.
We thus observe few dierences in the estimated parameters. A possible
reason is that regulators force operators to behave conservatively, so that rms
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operating under 40-year horizons appear to have longer-run objectives. We re-
turn to these topics later.
We display rm values in Figure 10.3, assuming at each age plants are in the
fth month of an operating spell and receive either a signal to operate without
problems, a signal that operations are feasible but problems will occur, or a signal
that a major problem has occurred and an extended shutdown will begin. Note
that maximum values are realized at about 350 months, in contrast to maximum
values at 225 months when 40-year licenses are enforced. Also, maximum values
are over 60 units versus the 50 units seen earlier in Figure 10.1. These dierences
are the amounts operators with plants of a given age facing the given vector
of state variables would be willing to pay for 20-year extensions to operating
licenses.
10.5.2 Risk and Liability
Our base models do not incorporate the possibility of serious accidents like the
one at Chernobyl or even at Three Mile Island. Incorporation of such details
requires that we go beyond standard econometrics, for such events are very rare.
We wish to determine whether we can detect in the data responses by operators
to such risks and the corresponding liability faced by plant owners.
We begin the analysis of risk and liability by introducing simple features of
risk and liability to our model. We allow plants to receive a stochastic signal
indicating whether or not a signicant accident occurs. We calibrate the risk of
an accident to 0.008% per month, and we arbitrarily set the cost to the plant
operator of an accident at 5,000 units. This roughly is 100 times higher than the
maximum plant values of about 50 units displayed earlier in graphs. We have in
308
Figure 10.3: Firm Values with 60-Year Licenses
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mind that this liability covers both onsite damages to the plant and workers and
liability for osite damages under the Price-Anderson Act. The implementation
is rather naive, in that we distinguish only between the accident risk (zero) when
the choice is made to decommission the plant and the given risk otherwise. In
reality, risks are relatively high when the plant is in the process of being powered
down or restarted. However, we did not account for these details, although such
extensions would be simple given the necessary risk assessments. Parameters
were estimated on the 1989-2003 data set with 40-year licenses assumed; they
are reported in column three of Table 10.6.
The log-likelihood values virtually are identical for this and the base model. It
appears that the two versions t the data equally well. Still, parameter estimates
seem signicantly dierent. The cost of a refueling shutdown is lower, but the
cost of refueling when operating is possible is about the same. The cost of a
major problem spell is higher, although the parameter estimate is less precise.
The cost of remaining idle during an operating spell is somewhat lower. Costs
increase at about the same rate during an operating spell, but otherwise the cost
of operating at partial capacity generally is lower. Prots at full capacity are
greater, and the cost of imprudent behavior is the same.
We see that such simple introductions of risk and liability are of limited
value. Far more useful would be to consider the eects of risk and liability on
regulation, and then to consider the eects of all three on the rm. We return
to these matters below. Also useful would be to consider the variations in risk of
various activities. These likely would create greater dierence in our parameter
estimates.
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10.5.3 Simulations and Forecasts
We employ our parameter estimates using the 1989-2003 sample, assuming 40-
year operating licenses, to simulate the history of the Three Mile Island Unit 1
nuclear power plant. We then forecast the remaining years of operation for the
plant, still assuming a 40-year license.
The historical simulation is intended to indicate the ability of the model to
predict behavior, given the condition of the plant. We thus construct our simula-
tion by observing actual state variables and then determining the corresponding
activity oering the greatest value. We perform the simulation from February,
1989 to November, 2003.
Historical activity data is displayed in Figure 10.4, and simulations are dis-
played in Figure 10.5. In general, it appears that the model does a good job at
predicting the optimal activity given current plant conditions.
We employ the price parameters and transition probability parameters for
other state variables, together with the prot function parameter estimates, to
construct a forecast for Three Mile Island from November, 2003 to January,
2014. We ran 100 forecasts, with each starting with the actual November, 2003
vector of state variables. We calculate average predicted utilization rates in each
forecast period. These predicted rates are graphed in Figure 10.6. Note that
the plant was 359 months old at the end of our data series. We assume that the
original 40-year operating license remains in place, so that the plant must close
by 480 months of age. Our model predicts that, if possible, operators will run
the plant to the end of its legal lifespan.
Suppose that in 2004, electricity prices suddenly reverted to their 1975-1979
pattern of high growth rates. Given this assumption, and maintaining the cost
311
Figure 10.4: Three Mile Island Activities
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Figure 10.5: Three Mile Island Simulations
313
Figure 10.6: Three Mile Island Forecast
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Figure 10.7: TMI Forecast: High Price Growth
and transition function parameters for the 1989-2003 sample, we constructed an
alternative forecast for TMI. We maintain the assumption of a 40-year operating
license. The forecast is shown in Figure 10.7.
Finally, we forecast utilization rates for TMI assuming the 1989-2003 price
pattern but with a 60-year operating license. The result is shown in Figure 10.8.
In all cases, we see that utilization rates average about 80%, and perhaps the
average declines slightly with plant age. In all cases, TMI is predicted to run
until forced to close. We observe few noticeable dierences between forecasts
with low and high-growth price assumptions, although dierences may be more
apparent using other measures. In the same way, few obvious dierences exit in
the forecast assuming 60-year licenses.
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Figure 10.8: TMI Forecast: 60-Year License
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10.6 Regulatory Factors
In Chapters 2 and 4, we considered industry models in which rms operated un-
der the supervision of regulators. We saw that in some cases in which regulators
had the authority to restrict rms' behavior, they would choose not to do so. In
other cases, they would set policies that at least some rms would nd binding.
In the model of the rm developed in this chapter, we do not account for
regulation. We do not claim that rms operate without oversight, and neither
do we assume that rms' decisions are unencumbered by regulatory policies.
Instead, we ignore explicit accounting for regulation solely for sake of simplicity.
We might consider the eects of these omissions on our model through use of
our earlier work. That is, suppose the real world was like the model with both
regulation and liability, but suppose we modeled the world with a liability-only
model. What dierences should we expect between our results and reality? By
comparing the results of our two models from Chapter 2, we can learn of po-
tential problems with the results of the present chapter. Of course, the present
model omits explicit investment decisions, while regulation in the earlier model
took the form of restrictions on investment decisions. Also, we will perform
the comparison using results for the static model because we have more com-
plete analysis and descriptions for that version. Despite such discrepancies, the
comparison may provide useful guidance for our dynamic programming work.
Key results in the Chapter 2 liability-only case are that only rms facing
full liability invest at the socially optimal level. Firms that receive liability
protections invest at suboptimal levels. Firms may exit the market sub-optimally
if prots are too low. Liability protection may be preferable to none if consumers
value the benets of higher consumption to the safety of zero production and
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if liability protections leave unprotable operations viable. Firms' investment
decisions are not aected by regulators.
In Chapter 2, we considered three cases in which both regulation and liability
are applied. First, there is the possibility that regulation will be set so that it
fails to bind for any rm. In that case, there are no observational dierences
between the liability-only and the liability-and-regulation cases. If this reects
reality, then there may be no problems with the current dynamic programming
model.
In the second and third cases, regulation was set to high levels so that all rms
found regulation binding. The primary dierences between the cases are whether
rms remain protable and whether all rms receive liability protections. If the
second case is true, then some rms receive protections, all rms nd regulation
binding, and at least some rms are protable. If the third case were true,
then all rms receive protections, all rms nd regulation binding, and no rm
is protable. It seems that neither case is quite right, for we believe that some
rms are protable but that all receive benet of liability protections. We believe
that both are correct in suggesting that regulation binds for all. We noted in
the applications and extensions section of Chapter 2 ways that the extreme
implications of the model might be lessened. Some of the suggested ways extend
the results for the third case, so that all rms receive protection, all rms nd
regulation binding, and some rms are protable. Because generally it seems the
most in line with reality of all our models, we will pursue comparisons between
this third case and the liability-only case.
In our industry models in Chapters 2 and 4, there were explicit investment
costs but no indirect output costs to investment. We considered direct and out-
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put costs to investing in Chapter 5. In this chapter, we do not consider explicit
investment decisions, nor do we include restrictions of investment on output.
Investment is lurking just below the surface, however, since most investment
typically is done when plants are refueling or operating at zero capacity. We
might assume that plants are investing when we observe either activity. In prin-
ciple, direct investment costs then would be included in estimated parameters
for those activities, and indirect costs would be given as the opportunity cost of
forgoing production at full capacity.
10.6.1 Investment
Because the activities of nuclear power plant operators are regulated heavily,
including their investment activities, then we expect to observe "suboptimal
behavior" recorded in our data, in contrast to the "optimal" behavior otherwise
recommended by our dynamic programming model. In the sense provided by
models in Chapter 2, regulators put lower bounds on investment levels, so that
rms invest more than they would prefer. In the dynamic programming model,
this would be observed as behavior that seems overly conservative. Specically,
we would see plants spending too much time refueling and operating at zero or
partial capacity.
Would our estimation technique actually measure direct investment costs?
Because rms choose to refuel more often than predicted, the revealed prefer-
ence technique suggests relatively lower costs for those activities compared to
the alternatives. Hence, regulation restrictions are at odds with our prot maxi-
mization assumptions, and the relative costs of refueling and limited production
may be underestimated.
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10.6.2 Short-Run vs. Long-Run Prots
Because of "excessive" observed investment levels, prots would appear too low
given the predictions of the dynamic programming model. It might be argued
that regulators care more about the long run than do operators who prefer short-
run prots. However, in our model operators do care about the long run, for
following the ndings of Rust and Rothwell we calibrate a small discount factor.
Still, rms may have too little incentive to consider the eects of their behavior on
consumers, thus giving regulators reason to step in. The restrictions they impose,
which presumably are intended to enhance safety, could improve expected long-
run prots while diminishing prots in the short run. This would be the case
if greater investment countered depreciation of the plant and enhanced safety.
Investment thus could extend the useful life of the plant and increase it reliability
as it ages. Hence, regulation could make it appear that rms care more about the
future than in fact they do. Then short-run prots would appear lower than the
model would predict, and the expected value of future prots would be higher.
This might explain the Rust-Rothwell ndings that the discount factor is very
small.
10.6.3 Exit Decisions
It is dicult to determine the eect of "excessive" investment on rms' decisions
to decommission their plants. If higher investment leaves the plants more reli-
able and safer, then serious problems should occur less frequently and expected
liability should be lower. On the other hand, lower short-run prots would slow
recovery of repair costs. This would make operators more inclined to exit when
major problems arise. We thus might expect to see too many rms exit compared
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to the predictions of our model.
In conclusion, we need to be careful as we interpret the parameter estimates
and results of our model. More work is needed to address these problems. One
possibility is to follow the lead of our industry model by incorporating the reg-
ulatory decisions. The regulations could take the form of restrictions on the set
of feasible activities. Another possibility is to incorporate the cost data into
our estimation process. This may help to reconcile the unlikely prot function
implications of our revealed preference approach given unobserved regulations
by forcing the estimates to match available nancial data.
10.7 Possibilities for Future Work
10.7.1 Electricity Supply
Following Rust [52], we can employ our model to construct an aggregate supply
function. That is, we can determine the relationship between aggregate output
generated by nuclear power plants and electricity prices. Our estimation of op-
timal responses to electricity prices provides sucient information to compute
an industry supply curve by computing average optimal output at various elec-
tricity price levels. As in Rust's work, we could compute supply curves over a
much greater price range than has been observed in the price sample. Our struc-




Rust and Rothwell [56] constructed industry output forecasts based on optimal
closure projections. In their model, prices were constant, or at least prices had
a constant mean. Prices in our model are not stationary. We estimated price
equations both in high-growth and low-growth eras. If we assume that future
price growth corresponds to growth in one of the past eras, then we could solve
the model accordingly. We then could project optimal operator responses based
on the price forecasts.
Determination of aggregate optimal output and closures would be useful di-
rectly, and the results could be used in extended studies to provide still more
value. Direct results include aggregate output and industry capacity. Of course,
we need to incorporate information on plant sizes, together with our model's
optimal output and closure decisions.
Optimal closure is of particular importance. First, when plants close in su-
cient numbers to signicantly aect electricity supplies, we expect a correspond-
ing aect on electricity prices. This endogeneity is not built into the present
model, but it could be captured in an extended model. Second, we expect very
signicant investment in electricity generation equipment, both to meet new de-
mand and to replace lost capacity as existing nuclear plants are decommissioned.
Results from our model thus could be used to forecast needed replacement invest-
ment. Finally, closure of nuclear plants would have environmental consequences
as well. If we suppose that nuclear capacity will be replaced with coal and nat-
ural gas plants, then closure of nuclear facilities means an increase in carbon
dioxide and other emissions. Together with a set of assumptions about replace-
ment technologies and emissions specications for those technologies, our model
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could be used to predict changes in air pollution.
10.7.3 Incorporation of Financial Data
In Chapter 9, we developed sets of monthly, plant-level operating data and an-
nual, site-level nancial data. Our unreported work includes establishment of
matches between the data sets. We intend to initiate panel data analysis of the
matched data set, and we believe that even simple regression techniques may
reveal interesting patterns and relationships in the data. While earlier versions
of both data sets were analyzed elsewhere, we know of no other attempts to
investigate the matched sets.
A potentially interesting use of the matched data is the incorporation of
nancial data into our dynamic programming model. Currently, our model em-
ploys no nancial data. We attempt to uncover features of the rms' prot
function by examining their behavior. Theoretically, these revealed preference
techniques will lead us to the truth about the nature of prots, but so far we
have no verication, and we have not exploited all available data. So far, we
know of no attempts to employ both operating and nancial data in a dynamic
programming model. However, we believe such techniques can be developed,
and our model would provide a suitable demonstration of these extensions to
the dynamic programming literature.
Cost Models
Before we begin employment of the cost data, it is useful to review other attempts
in the literature. The 1995 EIA study [2] likely provides the most comprehensive
and recent analysis of nuclear power plant costs. Available cost data, including
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the cost data used in that study, are available only in annual frequencies. Our
dynamic programming model, on the other hand, operates on monthly frequen-
cies. Assuming that the frequency problems can be resolved, work published by
the EIA may provide guidance in modeling cost minimization.
In their model [2, p. 28], four factors determine nuclear power plant operating
costs:
1. NRC regulatory activity and industry experience
2. Plant aging and utility/operator experience
3. Economic and State regulatory incentives to improve performance
4. The prices of inputs used to generate electricity from a nuclear power plant.
The present value of costs are given by a constrained minimization problem where
the objective function integrates discounted expected future costs of investment
goods, maintenance, replacement power, and other inputs. The integral equation
is minimized, though minimization is subject to two constraints: 1) capital stock
changes with new investment and the depreciation of existing capital, where
depreciation depends on maintenance expenditures and utilization rates, and 2)
electricity sales must be provided by replacement power or produced by the plant,
where production depends on capital, utilization, and other inputs. If safety and
output are modeled as joint goods, then a third constraint can be added, where
safety is a function of capital and other inputs. A DOE/EIA publication [1] and
Hewlett and McCabe [25] provide similar models in discrete time. As discussed
in the EIA 1995 update, those works show the continuous time model to be
equivalent to a dynamic discrete time model with myopic expectations; Hewlett
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and McCabe provide evidence to support the assumptions of myopia. Clearly,
this warrants further research given other evidence suggesting sophistication of
plant operators; our dynamic programming models rely on the importance of
such forward-looking behavior. Authors of the 1995 EIA study partially solve
the model described above and estimate parameters of the resulting equations
with annual data.
Writers of the 1995 EIA report noted patterns in the cost data that we re-
ported earlier. Real total nonfuel and operating costs per kilowatt grew rapidly
from the mid1970s to the mid1980s, but total costs were stable through the mid
1990's. Operating and maintenance costs per kilowatt continued to increase,
but the growth rate fell sharply in the late 1980s. Capital addition costs per
kilowatt of capacity peaked in the mid1980s and then gradually fell through the
early 1990s. At the time, they determined that declines in costs per kilowatt-
hour partly were due to modest factor price reductions but primarily were due
to increases in productivity. These trends were not homogeneous across reactor
types (pressurized or boiling water), vintages, or single versus multiple reactor
plants (Rothwell [48]). We might suppose that the bulk of recent protability
improvements also are attributable to productivity gains. Perhaps in future work
we should continue to give primary attention to productivity and related techno-
logical development and output decisions, along with regulation that constrains
the range of operators' choices and thus may limit output in the short run. Still,
an ideal model would include at least an index of factor prices.
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Incorporation of License Extension Costs
In their original licenses, power plant operators typically received permission to
generate at 95 percent of designed capacity to provide a safety margin. Many
plants have applied for increases of allowed rates, which could lower costs per
kilowatt and increase industry capacity by 5730 MWe by the mid2000s (Quinn,
et al [44]). Hagen, et al [22] document estimates of 10,000 MWe, but claim
that these estimates are unattainable. Capital cost expenditures are required
for these uprates, although the costs are lower than for equivalent expansion of
capacity with competing technologies, and operating costs per kilowatt of capac-
ity also should be lower. Still, there is much uncertainty in cost estimates, and
some reactor designs have much greater potential for expanded capacity. These
investment decisions, and certainly the resulting changes to the cost structure
and to output, should not be ignored.
Our model assumes that plants' cost structures do not depend on plant size.
Of course, it would be interesting to extend the model to allow diering capacity
levels. Even without capacity detail, it would be interesting to investigate our
model's implications for whether capacity uprate costs would be worthwhile in-
vestments. After incorporating available nancial data so that our model's unit
prot function is dened in terms of dollars, we could compute total plant prots
before and after capacity expansion. If the dierence is greater that expected
expansion costs, then we might conclude that such plants ultimately will choose
to expand.
326
10.7.4 Investment and Learning
Signicant learning eects are realized at individual reactors, within groups of
reactors owned by single rms, and across the industry (Rothwell [45], David
and Rothwell [35], Lester and McCabe [33], Lewis and Yildirim [34], Zimmer-
man [63], and EIA [2]). An unexplored topic is the benet obtained from pooling
knowledge within international rms; the matter is relevant given the recent pur-
chase of three American reactors by British Energy, which operates 15 reactors
in the UK (although the technology employed in the UK plants is somewhat dif-
ferent than technology employed here). Rothwell summarizes the consolidation
among domestic NPP's, which may yield benets of shared knowledge and other
eciency gains (Probability Distributions [50]; Risk of Early Retirement [48]).
Information may be shared among operators via industry organizations (e.g.
INPO facilitates communication among nuclear utilities on issues related to
plant safety and reliability, Lester and McCabe [33]) and by regulators. The
benets of pooled experience are limited by the lack of standardization of do-
mestic NPP's (Lester and McCabe [33], and David and Rothwell [13, 35]; Roth-
well [46] discusses the related matter of the eect of organizational structure on
eciency). Rothwell suggests that it is likely that the owners of noncompeti-
tive units will either (1) try to sell their units to or merge with more ecient
managers rather than retire them early or (2) organize themselves into coordi-
nating management groups. . .  [48]. If our modeling eorts of the nuclear power
industry are expanded to incorporate these possibilities, predicted closures may
fall as projected protability increases. While the task of disentangling learning
from other eects like age, regulation, and technological change is formidable,
the papers above include a variety of methods to measure learning within and
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among NPPs.
Issues in Investment in Nuclear Capacity
Investment decisions are critical to the successful operation of NPP's. Invest-
ment is not addressed directly by our dynamic programming model, although it
is addressed in the EIA's cost model [2]. Our work on liability and regulation
includes detail on certain types of investment, including investment in main-
tenance and safety enhancements. Our summary of cost data includes three
spending categories: operations and maintenance, fuel, and capital additions
expenditures.
Given the increasing probability of new construction of NPPs, we could use
our model to compute the value of a new plant. Of course, this would mean
that we implicitly assume that new plants would be built with the same tech-
nologies as existing plants, so that the structure of their operating costs and the
evolution of their state variables would be identical to those of plants in our sam-
ple. If the present value of a new plant exceeds the expected construction and
nancing costs, then we might conclude that new construction will take place.
New NPP's currently cost about $2000 per kilowatt, an amount substantially
greater than the $500/kW for existing plants (Rothwell [50]) and the relatively
low capital costs for coal and gas plants (Hagen, et al [22]). Other authors [6]
make the same point. Still, energy companies recently have announced plans
to build new plants, and regulators are granting permits and negotiating tax
incentives. Plants that are most likely to begin operations are new reactors at
existing sites, partially constructed plants that currently have been abandoned,
and plants that currently are shut down because of damage or unfavorable eco-
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nomic conditions (Hagen, et al [22]).
There are signicant learning eects in the construction of new plants; con-
struction experience in other countries could lead to lower costs here. Zimmer-
man [63] documents learning-by-doing eects and improving accuracy of cost
expectations. In past decades, costs initially were underestimated signicantly;
economies of scale were overestimated in the jump from small government-
sponsored demonstration projects to large commercial plants. The experience
of the French nuclear industry suggests costs can be lowered substantially with
standardization of technology, the operation of multiple reactors by single rms,
and consolidation of regulatory authority (David and Rothwell [13]). Domestic
adoption of technologies proven elsewhere may grant benets of standardization.
Chances of streamlining the regulatory process are uncertain in the current era of
market restructuring. Some benets of consolidation of existing plants likely are
realized already (Rothwell [50]); whether the eciencies of operating multiple
existing plants will extend to eciencies in building new plants is not clear.
Ellis and Zimmerman [18] note that the Clean Air Act improved the ability of
NPPs to compete with fossil fuel alternatives; the eects of carbon taxation may
similarly make NPPs more competitive in the future. Rothwell and Eastman [51]
document periods in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the realized rate of
return and the allowed rate of return were less than the cost of capital. A num-
ber of authors have addressed similar matters regarding NPPs in restructured
markets.
Even without construction in new plants, output likely will continue to in-
crease at existing plants. Capacity factors and reliability have been increasing
for over a decade; even higher utilization rates are projected (for example, see
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the Energy Outlook [4]). Understanding of the causes of the U-shaped capacity
factors displayed in Chapter 9, where performance initially improves and then de-
clines with plant age, is important to predicting future performance. Signicant
eects on utilization include regulatory eects, learning-by-doing, technological
improvements, expenditures on maintenance and other improvements, and the
eects of economic and regulatory incentives (DOE [2]). Examination of the
record of new construction and utilization of competing technologies, especially
coal plants, may shed light on the operation of NPPs. There is some evidence
that such phenomena that rst seem peculiar to nuclear plants in fact extend
to competing generators (see, for example, Ellis and Zimmerman [18]). For ex-
ample, low utilization in the 1980s may be the result of excess capacity caused
by a decrease in the growth of demand. The statistics also may be misleading,
since even among NPPs, only Babcock & Wilcox (the manufacturers of TMI)
reactors experienced a signicant decrease in productivity after 1979, but their
struggles pulled down the industry average productivity (Rothwell [45]).
These investment decisions, and certainly the resulting changes to the cost
structure and to output, should not be ignored.
10.8 Conclusions
We constructed and solved a forward-looking model of nuclear power plant op-
erations. Important extensions of our work relative to earlier eorts include the
addition of price equations and incorporation of the risk of serious accidents.
More work is needed to expand our results and to conrm them. However, ini-
tial results indicate that the mid1980s change in price structure may account for
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structural instability observed in earlier models.
Our model of power plant operators summarized key features of the fuel
cycle and other technological factors in a vector of state variables. Given the
current realization of plant conditions, and given current and expected electricity
prices, operators choose a feasible activity to carry out in the current month.
We found our model capable of reproducing observed behavior with a great deal
of accuracy.
Our work shows the importance of considering demand-side factors when
modeling nuclear power plant operations. Extensions of earlier work to incorpo-
rate electricity prices indicates that prices signicantly aect operator behavior.
Earlier work seemed to indicate that changes in regulation were responsible for
changes in plant values and in operator behavior. Our work shows that at least
some of the observed changes in fact were due to changes in the price structure.
We employ the model in the study of eects of license extensions oered to
operators in the 1990s. As we found in Chapter 5, and as earlier writers found,
the values of plants increased signicantly when extensions became available.
We also nd evidence that operators take greater care of their plants in order
that they might survive to greater ages.
We incorporate details of accident risks and liability. In general, more work
is needed to incorporate estimates of risk that depend on plant activities. Still,
our simple implementation of risk and liability information shows that optimal
policies do respond to these factors.
We noted a number of possible extensions to our work. Perhaps the extension
with the greatest potential is to incorporate nancial data to rene our estimates
of plant prots. We already have accumulated most of the necessary data to
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support this work, as we reported in Chapter 9. We intend to focus considerable





We set out to build a unifying model of the nuclear power industry to make
sense of key factors in a complicated market. The work began our eorts to
form a framework upon which future studies may be built. We established
an admittedly abstract model of the nuclear power industry in order to guide
construction of more realistic economic models. We then built models of the
industry with greater realism, guided by the lessons learned in building the
industry models and analysing their properties. Along the way, we gained a
better understanding of this industry which remains much studied but little
understood.
11.1.1 What We Did
We constructed and analyzed nuclear power industry data that reveal dramatic
changes in the industry over the past thirty years. In the 1980s, with soaring
costs, public opposition, and burdensome regulations, the future of the industry
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was in doubt. Our matched data set reveals, both in the cost data and in the
activities of individual plants, that in following decades productivity improved
dramatically while cost growth stabilized and prots per unit of output increased.
While we were able to construct only crude measures of revenue and prots, our
data seem to conrm impressions given by media reports that the industry has
returned to protability. Construction of prot estimates for the nuclear power
industry is a rare, if not unique, contribution. Still more rare is the construction
of revenue and prot data for each site of nuclear power operations.
We set upon the ambitious task of developing an extensible model that ini-
tially incorporates the key features and economic agents of the nuclear power
industry and ultimately can can support both additional micro and macro level
details. In this way, we hoped to support eorts to make sense of existing liter-
ature. It is our impression that while many useful studies have been completed,
they often focused narrowly on specic topics. Relatively little modeling work
has been done to tie together these fragments of understanding of this compli-
cated industry.
Our models include as a key feature an element of the nuclear power industry
that typically receives little attention in the formal literature. This feature is
the limited liability protections oered under the Price-Anderson Act. It is
our belief that little is understood about the eects on the industry of this
policy. Operators clearly prize it, and legislators have extended it repeatedly
since it rst passed in 1957. Environmentalists and consumer activists revile
it, and they suppose that the industry would collapse without such protections.
Strangely, perhaps, few studies have been published that attempt to calculate
the policy's value to the industry, or even to enhance our understanding of
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the specic nature of the benets. We began with a fairly extensive model of
the industry, derive optimal regulation and operator behavior, and then derive
equations for implicit subsidies to the industry. The result indicates that earlier
attempts to quantify the level of subsidies failed to account for certain costs to
the industry arising directly or indirectly from liability protections. We show
the importance of considering the full set of regulations faced by the industry,
and we advise against attempting to determine costs or benets to the industry
of a particular policy without considering possible indirect eects.
There is a large literature on the economics of nuclear power, including many
studies on the struggles of the nuclear power industry in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The struggles were observed both in the construction of power plants and in their
operation. Many explanations for the observed diculties have been proposed,
and many of them have been tested. Summary studies also have been published
in an attempt to make sense of the many ideas. Unfortunately, few models
have been presented that are suitable to incorporate dissimilar causes of the
industry's troubles. Our models seek to support three primary explanations:
costs and other rm-level causes, eects of regulation, and demand-side eects.
While we spent much of our time thinking about the interaction among sev-
eral economic agents, we also spent considerable time focusing on the agent of
primary concern to us. Of the countless models of nuclear power plant opera-
tors, we chose to extend existing dynamic programming models. We extended
the previous work in three ways. First, we extended the data set to determine
recent industry trends. Second, we incorporated demand-side eects on operator
behavior by including price equations in the model. Finally, we examined the
eects of the risk of catastrophic accidents on operator behavior.
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11.1.2 What We Concluded
Costs have stabilized, productivity has climbed, prices may be increasing, and
so the industry now seems more protable than at any time since the mid1970s.
These impressions given by the data are supported by the high interest in ex-
panding capacity of existing plants and the recent interest in building new plants,
despite remaining uncertainties of community tolerance and support of regula-
tors. The recent apparent willingness of regulators and perhaps the public to
consider expansion of the industry signies a great shift in attitudes toward
nuclear power. These relatively positive inclinations, together with apparent
economic protability, suggest that life for nuclear power plant operators is far
better than in the 1980s.
Part of the reason that plants are able to operate protably is that liability
protections remain in place. Whether critics claim correctly that these bene-
ts contribute signicantly is a question still unanswered. Our work revealed
problems in earlier estimates of the magnitudes of implicit subsidies. We oered
alternative calculations that suggest that the amounts are lower than previously
reported, but doubt remains. Our derivations of implicit subsidy calculations
reveal that existing views of implicit subsidies are too narrow, and that more
eects of liability protections on plant operations must be taken into account in
order to identify and quantify benets.
We conclude that earlier eorts to build dynamic programming models of
nuclear power plant operators insuciently accounted for primary determinants
of operators' decisions. In particular, earlier eorts omitted demand-side factors
that aect protability. In addition, we saw that at least in theoretical models,
the eects of regulation on operators' behavior and on prots can be highly
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signicant.
11.1.3 What Is Next?
As we began, we announced our objective. Our sights were suciently high so
that we could not possibly arrive at our ultimate destination by the end of the
present study. Rather, our goal was to begin well, so that at this point much
work would remain to be done, supported and prompted by our beginnings.
Did we succeed? We might address the question by considering possibilities
for future work that are inspired and supported by the work we now conclude.
We established three frameworks and employed them in our work. They
were 1) compilation and unication of operating and accounting data sets for
individual plants and sites, 2) an abstract model of the nuclear power industry,
including nuclear power plant operators, industry regulators, and consumers,
and 3) a detailed model of nuclear power plant operators.
The data set developed remains largely unexploited. In particular, we made
little eort to investigate the relationships between the operating data and the
cost data. While earlier samples of both sets were studied elsewhere, we are
aware of no other eorts to combine and study the full set. Many questions
might be answered by such studies, including What is the average cost per
month of refueling? What is the cost of a typical extended problem spell?
Can we link the moderation of cost growth to changes in operators' behavior?
A very interesting possibility is to incorporate the cost data with our dynamic
programming model. This oers the possibility to go beyond the revealed pref-
erence approach to prot function estimation. We at least would like to know
how well the prots implied by our model correspond to actual accounting data.
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Our model of the nuclear power industry remains rather primitive. A number
of diculties with the present model were presented in the text. In particular,
work to make the nature of uncertainty regarding potential damages correspond
more closely to reality would yield a model more satisfying. In particular, we
would prefer a model in which each plant faces a distribution of potential dam-
ages, so that each plant operator receives benets from liability limits.
An extension of particular interest is to make investment unobservable to
regulators, perhaps following Shavell [58]. In such a model regulators monitor
investment and detect imperfectly violation of standards. Monitoring is costly,
and the level of regulation, the degree of monitoring, and the severity of punish-
ment for violations would be endogenous. This would represent much better the
real world with violation of regulatory standards, occasional detection of such
violations, and subsequent penalties.
The model can be extended indenitely by adding other details, such as
competing generating technologies. We then could use the model to analyze
tradeos between, for example, nuclear power with its inherent risk and coal
power with its carbon dioxide and other emissions.
We also would like to consider political interests related to nuclear power.
In particular, the eects of political interests on the regulation of nuclear power
could be studied with our model.
Our extended dynamic programming model of nuclear power plant operators
remains rather primitive, as it is devoid of many details important to the indus-
try. While the model could benet from incorporation of additional detail at the
microeconomic level, we believe the greatest promise may be realized by further
integrating the various modeling eorts and data work in this paper. We noted
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in the paper that the model is constructed under the assumption that operators
are rather simple prot maximizers. In reality, they operate under high levels of
regulation. We thus remain skeptical of some of our prot function estimates,
for they seem to indicate high protability for frequently-chosen actions that
more likely were required by regulators. By extending our work on regulators
and combining it with our work on power plant operators, we might improve






In this appendix, we summarize very briey the software constructed to sup-
port the econometric dynamic programming work reported in Chapter 10. The
software was designed to be useful for construction of a variety of dynamic pro-
gramming models, and it is intended to make such work less dicult and thus
much quicker, so that more attention may be paid to economics and less to
programming.
The approach to numerical dynamic programming follows the work of Mi-
randa and Fackler [38]. They oer a textbook and an accompanying set of
numerical and dynamic programming tools for Matlab. Our tools instead are
written in C++. While the approach to writing code necessarily diers because
of the nature of the programming languages, we loosely follow their techniques to
separate the model-specic portions of code from remaining code. We similarly
follow their example in our approach to solving nite-horizon and innite-horizon
models with possibly both discrete and continuous state variables and discrete
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choice variables.
The primary dierence between our software and the tools of Miranda and
Fackler is that we oer econometric analysis in addition to simply solving nu-
merical models. Our software currently allows models to be solved either with
quasi-Newton optimization methods or with derivative-free methods.
We also follow the lead of Inforum programmers at the University of Mary-
land who built and maintain the set of modeling tools for C++ known as In-
terdyme [36]. It was their intention to facilitate the construction of large-scale
interindustry models by oering tools to handle data construction and manage-
ment, regression estimation, and other standard procedures. By relying on these
tools, the job of setting up and debugging large economic models can be done far
more quickly and reliably. The modeling tools for C++ are supported by G7,
the Inforum program for econometrics and database construction. Typically, G7
is used to prepare data and estimate regression parameters for a model. The
model then is built using Interdyme tools and employing the databanks and re-
gression equations. Once the model is solved, G7 again is used to analyze and
report the results.
We too used G7 to collect and organize data on nuclear power plant opera-
tions. Once the databank was constructed, we used Interdyme tools linked to
our dynamic programming model to read the data. After loading the data into
objects dened by our own data storage classes, further data processing was per-
formed as described in the Rust-Rothwell papers. With this data in hand, the
process of solving the model and estimating its parameters could begin. While
thus far we depended on Interdyme rather little, we intend to integrate our eorts
far more completely in the future. The greatest contribution received thus far
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from the Inforum eorts is the specication of useful objectives and techniques
in the design and implementation of modeling tools.
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